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    政大機構典藏 > 商學院 > 會計學系 > 學位論文 >  Item 140.119/54993
    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/54993

    Title: 併購獨立專家之選擇及併購後綜效之探討
    A study on the choice of independent experts and the synergy in the M&A transaction
    Authors: 黃玉雯
    Contributors: 林宛瑩
    Keywords: 獨立專家
    Independent experts
    M&A synergy
    Agency cost
    Date: 2011
    Issue Date: 2012-10-30 14:35:30 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: 本研究將我國獨立專家可能發揮之功能分為能夠認證交易係公平且無弊端之「消極認證功能」及能積極預測綜效並為市場排除不具綜效交易之「積極認證功能」,並藉由分析代理成本與獨立專家選擇之關聯性,以及獨立專家自我選擇與併購後綜效之關聯性,實證探討我國獨立專家制度之運作概況及其功能。
    This study tests whether the negative certification function and positive certification function are important service performed by independent experts in the M&A transaction. It conducts an empirical investigation of the choice of independent experts and the synergy in the M&A transaction.
    The result demonstrates that when the debt ratio is high, the percentage of stock owned by institutional owners and external shareholders is low, the premium is high, and the size of acquirer and target is similar, acquirer tends to hire a more prestigious independent expert. It confirms that the negative certification function exists. In addition, we find that when the reputation (measured by market share) of independent experts is high, the market synergy in the M&A may be higher than others. It is because of that the independent experts tend to protect their reputation by choosing their clients rigorously. Therefore, the positive certification function is also confirmed.
    Reference: 王文宇,2002,企業併購法總評,月旦法學雜誌,第83期(4月):71-80。
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    Description: 碩士
    Source URI: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0099353017
    Data Type: thesis
    Appears in Collections:[會計學系] 學位論文

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