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    政大機構典藏 > 商學院 > 會計學系 > 期刊論文 >  Item 140.119/63962
    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/63962

    Title: 內部人持股連續變動公司之盈餘管理行為特性
    Authors: 張文瀞;周玲臺;林修葳
    Chang, Wen-Jing;Chou, Ling-Tai Lynette;Lin, Hsiou-wei William
    Contributors: 會計系
    Keywords: 投機性盈餘管理;訊息發放性盈餘管理;裁量性應計數;管理者股權
    Opportunistic earnings management;Signaling earnings management;Discretionary accruals;Managerial ownership
    Date: 2003-07
    Issue Date: 2014-02-18 15:59:34 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: 管理者可基於自利動機從事投機性盈餘管理,亦可基於溝通資訊動機而從事訊息發放性盈餘管理。本文以內部人持股連續變動公司為例,檢測投機性與訊息發放盈餘管理之顯著性。實證工作特點是先區隔極有可能從事投機性盈餘管理公司(如本文之持股減少公司)與極有可能從事訊息發放性盈餘管理公司(如本文之持股增加公司),再測試其盈餘管理特性,最後搭配公司績效改變所形成之盈餘管理誘因,綜合解釋樣本公司之盈餘管理行為。實證結果顯示,持股減少公司從事投機性盈餘管理,延緩一年會計盈餘的下降;持股增加公司基於經濟實質並無重大變動,看不出盈餘管理之顯著性。所以監督內線售股交易將有助於評估盈餘操縱之可能性。
    Managers can manage earnings opportunistically or signally based on self-interest incentives or information-communicating motives, respectively. This research empirically examines both characteristics of earnings management of those firms whose shares holdings of managers have changed and last for 2 years. We proxy the magnitude of earnings management by discretionary accruals, which are estimated via a cross-sectional version of the Jones model. We first use holdings percentage-decreasing (increasing) firms as potential opportunistic (signaling) earnings management firms, then test the characteristics of earnings managements, and finally observe some financial variables trend to justify the evidence what we get. The results show that holding percentage-decreasing firms manage earnings opportunistically to postpone the decay of accounting earnings and holding percentage-increasing firms don’t manage earnings possibly owing to no material change in firms’ prospect. Thus, we suggest that monitoring insiders’ selling trading can be informative about the likelihood of earnings manipulation.
    Relation: 會計評論, 37, 53-83
    Data Type: article
    Appears in Collections:[會計學系] 期刊論文

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