本研究針對薪資設計進行探討。作者將薪資給付基礎視為組織可有效運用的控制機制，並透過文獻探討與觀念推演，分析績效本位、職務本位以及技能本位等三類薪資給付基礎具備之控制功能。其中，績效本位薪資具備了產出控制的功能，職務本位薪資偏重在行為控制功能，技能本位薪資則強調投入控制的效果。其次，文中整合組織控制與代理理論觀點，歸納出產出可衡量性、轉換過程知識完整性以及行為可觀察性等三項績效資訊特性，並建構績效資訊與薪資給付基礎的關係模式。研究結果發現，代理理論的預測能力略高於組織控制觀點。且產出可衡量性與績效本位薪資的使用有正相關，轉換過程知識完整性與行為可觀察性則與職務本位薪資之使用呈正相關，而與技能本位薪資呈負相關。 Based on organizational control perspective, the basis for pay is recognized as some kinds of control mechanism. After reviewing the relevant literature, we got three categories of basis for pay, including performance-based pay, job-based pay and skill-based pay. And these three bases for pay have output control, behavior control and input control functions respectively. By integrating organizational control and agency theory approach, we got three dimensions of performance information, including outcome measurability, knowledge of transformation process, and behavior observability. And we building a model of relationships between performance information and basis for pay. We found agency theory was more predictive than organizational control theory. Besides, outcome measurability has positive relationships with performance-based pay, knowledge of transformation process and behavior observability also positively related to job-based pay, and negatively related to skill-based pay.