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| Title: | 受託人之自己管理義務 ——從受益人最大利益原則論第三人 代為處理信託事務之容許範圍 |
| Other Titles: | Rethinking the `Duty Not to Delegate` of the Trustee: Analyzing the Reasonable Scope of Delegating to Others the Administration of a Trust which the Trustee is Required Personally to Perform-Forming a View of Rule of Best Interests of Beneficiaries |
| Authors: | 王志誠
Wang, Chih-Cheng |
| Contributors: | 法律系 |
| Keywords: | 自己管理義務;直接管理義務;受益人最大利益原則;二重信託
Duty not to delegate;Nondelegation rule;Rule of best interests of the beneficiaries;Double trust |
| Date: | 2011.10 |
| Issue Date: | 2014-10-06 17:11:35 (UTC+8) |
| Abstract: | 信託設定之基礎，在於委託人對受託人存在著個人之信賴關係。委託人就其所設定之信託目的，自行決定最佳人選，而將其財產交由所信任之受託人負責處理信託事務。因此，受託人應自己、直接處理信託事務之義務，毋寧為信託制度本質上之要求；受託人若不自己處理信託事務，而再委由第三人代為處理信託事務，恐有違委託人設定信託之主觀信賴及期待。傳統上，受託人若未經委託人同意，應不得將信託事務委由第三人處理。事實上，從信託事務處理之量的觀點，受託人可能無法獨力有效完成；且從信託事務處理之質的觀點，其事務執行可能必須具備專業知識及技術，始足以有效、正確達成信託目的。抑有進者，鑒於商業信託或營業信託之事務內容具有複雜化、專業化及大量化之特性，若仍堅持應由受託人親自處理信託事務，將有害於信託財產管理之效率及信託運作之彈性。從受益人最大利益原則之觀點，若委託人對於自己管理義務所設定之例外容許範圍，並不符合受益人之利益，是否仍應容許受託人使第三人代為處理信託事務，實有疑義。因此，各國信託法制對於受託人之自己管理義務，通常設有使第三人代為處理信託事務之例外容許機制，而以任意規定呈現。本文採用比較法制研究，除介紹美國、日本及我國有關受託人自己管理義務之發展外，並區辨受託人使第三人代為處理信託事務與履行輔助人之概念差異。此外，尚檢討若放寬受託人得使第三人代為處理信託事務之容許範圍，其與二重信託之概念是否有所不同，並分析應否承認二重信託之合法性。
The personal fiduciary relationship between settlor and trustee is the foundation of trust. The settlor can choose the best person to perform the administration of a trust for fitting the purpose in creating the trust. Nondelegation rules indicate that the personality of the trustee is central to the purpose of the trust. The trustee is required to be performed by the trustee personally. In such a case, allowing the trustee to delegate the administration of a trust would defeat the purpose and the reliance of the settlor in creating the trust. A trustee may not resign the trusteeship without permission of the settlor. In fact, it may be imprudent not to delegate investment power, especially if the trustee lacks the expertise to manage the trust himself, due to the change of quantity and quality in trust administration. The circumstances of modern life that have resulted in ever greater specialization and expertise elsewhere in economic and administrative life affect trust administration as well. It is inevitable, therefore, that well-intentioned trustees will seek out and rely upon outside advisors in the conduct of the investment function, in order to take advantage of an agent`s superior skill, facilities, economies of scale, or the like. In a view of comparative trust laws, the “duty not to delegate” of the trustee is defined as the default rule. The drafter of the trust instrument can waive the nondelegation rule and authorize the trustees to delegate trust activities. The settlor may intend the trustee to perform administration duties personally, whereas modern trust law allows the trustee to delegate those duties in a reasonable exception scope under rule of the best interests of beneficiaries. In addition, the trustee must use prudence, care, and skill in hiring an advisor or investment manager, supervising his performance, and monitoring his activities. Part II of this Article will first review and discuss the development of trust laws in the United States, Japan and Taiwan, particularly the nondelegation rule. Part Ⅲ will investigate the differences of an agent delegated by trustee with an assistant in the fulfillment of obligation. Besides, this Article will analyze and discuss the feasibility of creating a double trust, and whether it will be allowed when the “duty not to delegate” of the trustee is defined as the default rule. |
| Relation: | 法學評論 , 123, 305-342 |
| Data Type: | article |
| Appears in Collections: | [法律學系] 期刊論文
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Files in This Item:
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Description |
Size | Format | |
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| 305-342.pdf | | 760Kb | Adobe PDF2 | 2243 | View/Open |
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