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|Title: ||Agency Problem of Proxy Contest and Monitor Mechanism: the Evidence on The Separation of Ownership and Control, and Minority Shareholders’ Expropriation|
|Other Titles: ||委託書之代理問題及制衡機制：對控制權偏離暨少數股東侵占行為之實證研究|
Lin, H.F;Chen, Y.R.;Wu, T.Z.
Proxy contest;Separation of ownership and control
|Issue Date: ||2015-01-08 17:51:00 (UTC+8)|
This research aims to investigate the implications of the proxy contest on the separation of ownership and control and agency problems in Taiwan. The design of the director's suffrage in the proxy was meant to give the shareholders authority to oversee the management teams. However, such design also enables certain shareholders acquire substantial board control right without holding a large stake of company shares, and may therefore cause a negative economical outcome. Using a dataset of 1,066 corporations which had elected directors in 2002 to 2005, this research finds a greater divergence between controlling shareholders' control over the board seats and their ownership when the companies solicit the proxy for board seats. In addition, this research adopts various forms of related party transactions, investments income, and income on disposal of investments for expropriation of minor shareholders wealth. The findings show that companies soliciting the proxy possess higher related party property transaction loss, lower investment income, and lower income on disposal of investments. Finally, this research takes into account the moderating effect of director's share ownership on proxy contest and minority shareholders wealth, and finds that a high level of director ownership adds to increase the investment income and the income on disposal of investments, supporting the convergence of interest hypothesis.
|Relation: ||International Journal of Accounting Studies, 54, 1-42|
|Data Type: ||article|
|Appears in Collections:||[財務管理學系] 期刊論文|
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