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    Title: 租稅歸宿的實驗研究
    Other Titles: Experimental Studies on Tax Incidence
    Authors: 徐麗振
    Contributors: 財政系 
    Date: 2014
    Issue Date: 2015-08-05 11:11:56 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: 一個和租稅歸宿有關的眾所周知的理論結果是,支付租稅的人未必就是真正負擔租稅的 人,亦即法定的租稅歸宿和經濟的租稅歸宿無關。同樣的,法定的補貼歸宿也未必就是經濟 的補貼歸宿。最後真正決定租稅負擔或補貼利益的是相對的供給與需求彈性。此一理論預期 被稱為租稅 (補貼) 歸宿等效或 tax liability side equivalence (tax LSE)。 本研究計畫為三年期計畫,在每一年的計畫中我們打算藉由實驗方法檢驗一個和租稅 (補貼) 歸宿等效有關的議題。在第一年的計畫中我們將操作競爭市場實驗並藉此探討租稅 (補貼) 歸宿和相對供給與需求彈性間的關係。我們主要檢驗的是,不論相對的供需彈性為 何,租稅 (補貼) 歸宿等效的假說是否皆成立。 第二年的計畫仍然採用競爭市場實驗。不過和現行實驗研究不同的是,現行實驗研究多 假設租稅被丟棄,但是我們的實驗將考慮租稅用來提供公共財,亦即我們同時考量租稅歸宿 和支出歸宿。我們嘗試檢驗租稅歸宿等效是否仍然成立,以及納入公共財後稅後均衡數量增 加或下降。我們也將探討當考量支出歸宿時,供需雙方的相對租稅負擔如何改變。 第三年的計畫嘗試藉由獨佔實驗檢驗租稅 (補貼) 歸宿等效是否成立。我們將應用 Roth, Prasnikar, Okuno-Fujiwara, and Zamir (1991) 等學者的實驗設計,在實驗中數個買方同時對一 賣方出價,然後賣方決定是否出售一單位商品給出價最高的買方。不過和 Roth et al. (1991) 不 同的是,Roth et al. 假設所有買方對商品有相同的評價,且賣方的成本等於零,而為了使我 們的實驗更接近獨占市場,我們在實驗設計上做了一些修改。這些修改包括:每位買方對商 品有不同的評價,賣方的邊際成本為正且可以是遞增或固定不變,以及賣方有許多單位的商 品可售出。我們嘗試藉由此實驗去檢驗課稅或補貼前後的市場價格與成交量是否符合理論預 期,更重要的是,我們將檢驗租稅 (補貼) 歸宿等效的假說在獨佔市場是否成立。
    A well-known theoretical prediction regarding tax incidence is that who pays the tax is not necessarily who bears the tax burden. That is, the statutory tax incidence is irrelevant to the economic tax incidence. Similarly, the statutory incidence of a subsidy is not necessarily the economic incidence of the subsidy. What really determines the tax burden or subsidy benefits is the relative elasticities of demand and supply. This prediction has been called the tax (subsidy) incidence equivalence or tax liability side equivalence (tax LSE). This proposed project is a three-year project. We plan to test three different issues regarding tax (subsidy) incidence equivalence via experimental methods. In the first-year project we plan to conduct competitive market experiments and to explore the relationship between tax (subsidy) incidence and the relative elasticities of demand and supply. We mainly try to test the hypothesis that tax (subsidy) incidence equivalence holds regardless the relative magnitudes of the elasticities of demand and supply. The second-year experiments are still based on competitive market games. Differing from the prevalent experimental studies that tax revenues are discarded, in the second-year project we incorporate the public good into the model, and the public good is funded by the tax revenues. That is, we consider both tax incidence and expenditure incidence. We try to test whether tax incidence equivalence still holds, and whether the incorporation of a public good raises or reduces the after-tax equilibrium quantity. We are also going to explore the change in the relative tax burdens of demanders and suppliers when expenditure incidence is considered. The third-year project tries to investigate the tax and subsidy incidence equivalence via monopoly experiments. We apply Roth, Prasnikar, Okuno-Fujiwara, and Zamir’s (1991) experimental design that several buyers make bids simultaneously to a seller, and the seller decides whether to sell the product to the buyer with the highest bid. Differing from Roth et al.’s setting that all buyers have the same valuation on the product and the seller’s cost is zero, we make some modifications to make our experiments closer to monopoly. These modifications include: buyers’ valuations are different, the seller’s marginal costs are positive and may or may not constant, and the seller has many units to sell. We plan to test whether the market prices and quantities (both before and after the tax/subsidy) are consistent with the theoretical predictions, and whether the tax (subsidy) incidence equivalence holds.
    Relation: NSC102-2410-H004-003-MY3
    PF10301-0895
    Data Type: report
    Appears in Collections:[財政學系] 國科會研究計畫

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