美國在近幾年爆發上市公司財報不實，以及數件公司管理失當的會計醜聞事件後，為了重建投資人的信心，確保財務資訊之正確性及可靠性，美國國會在2002年通過沙賓法案(The Sarbanes-Oxley，簡稱SOX)。沙賓法案的主要內容在規範和財務報表有關之內部控制，讓上市公司之財務資訊更加透明。 沙賓法案的通過，帶動了許多相關的實證研究，探討此法案的經濟效益。然而，大部分的實證研究集中在SOX法案對受規範的美國上市公司之會計審計成本或者股價之影響上，而且也沒有得到一致的結論。因此，本兩年期的研究計劃旨在由一個更廣泛的角度，來檢視SOX法案的經濟效益。我們將分別由外國貸款者及美國本國借款者兩個不同的觀點，分析SOX法案的影響。 在第一年的計劃中，我們將探討SOX法案如何影響外國銀行的放款行為(foreign lending behavior)。目前的文獻已指出SOX法案可提高財務資訊的品質、可靠性及透明度。既然財報資訊是跨國銀行放款行為的一項重要決定因素，我們認為外國銀行的放款行為會受財報品質改變的影響。我們預期SOX法案所導致的財務資訊之正確性及可靠性增加，將有效減低國外放款銀行和美國本國借款者之間的資訊不對稱，進而促使外國銀行願意貸放更多款項給受SOX規範的美國借款者。第一年的計劃，對由外國放款者的角度，來分析SOX的影響力有一定程度的貢獻。 在第二年的計劃中，我們將探討SOX法案對受規範的上市公司之債務成本之影響。既然SOX法案會增加財務報表品質，因此除了將減少放款者事前的資訊風險以及事後的監督以及重新簽約的成本，財務資訊的正確性提高後，也會因而增加放款者評估借款者的信用狀況之能力。因此我們預期SOX法案實施後，放款者會因借款者財務資訊的正確性及可靠性增加，而要求較低的貸款價差(loan spread)。第二年的計劃對文獻的貢獻，在於使用貸款價差這項變數，來衡量借款者的債務成本，不同於以往文獻只使用公司債的收益率來分析SOX法案對借款人的影響。 Over the past several years, numerous top executives have been found guilty of improprieties such as illegal accounting methods and violating the anti-corruption statutes. The enactment of Sarbanes-Oxley Act (the Act or SOX hereafter) was the regulatory response to a series of these corporate wrongdoings. The SOX Act imposes mandatory disclosure requirements and initiates new duties on the board of directors for public companies, aiming to prevent deceptive accounting and improve the accuracy and reliability of corporate disclosures. SOX's adoption ignited a growing body of empirical research studying its economic consequences. However, most of them concentrate on either accounting/audit costs or stock prices of SOX-complying US firms, and provide mixed evidences regarding the effect of SOX. This two-year research project argues that the economic consequence of SOX should be examined from a wider perspective, and attempts to empirically analyze the impact of SOX from the viewpoint of both foreign lenders and domestic borrowers. In the first year of the project, we examine how the implementation of SOX influences the lending behavior of foreign banks. Existing research suggests that one effect of SOX is the enhanced quality, reliability and transparency of financial information. Since cross-border lending decisions depend more on financial statements rather than soft information, lenders' loan-granting decisions are thus expected to be more sensitive to the quality of financial statement information. We therefore expect that the enhanced quality and reliability of financial information subsequent to SOX will reduce information asymmetry between foreign banks and US SOX-complying borrowers, which in turn will motivate foreign banks to make more loans to cross-border borrowers. The first year research therefore contributes to the literature on analyzing the consequences of SOX from the perspective of foreign lenders. In the second year of the project, we investigate the effect of SOX on the cost of debt for SOX-complying borrowers. Since SOX may enhance financial reporting quality, thereby reducing the ex ante information risk faced by lenders and ex post monitoring and re-contracting costs, the Act will improve lenders' ability to assess the likelihood of a borrower's default. We therefore expect that lenders will charge lower spreads to SOX-complying borrowers due to the improved financial information induced by SOX implementation. The second year research therefore contributes to the literature on providing the evidence regarding how SOX implementation affects a firm's external financing as expressed in the loan spreads, rather than corporate bond yields as studied in previous literature.