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    政大機構典藏 > 商學院 > 財務管理學系 > 學位論文 >  Item 140.119/78057


    请使用永久网址来引用或连结此文件: https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/78057


    题名: 銀行往來關係及議價能力如何影響聯合貸款條約中使用依據績效調整利率的條款
    Banking Relationship, Bargaining Power and the Use of Performance Pricing Covenants in Syndicated Loan Contracts
    作者: 李光耀
    Lee, Kuang Yao
    贡献者: 張元晨
    Chang, Yuan chen
    李光耀
    Lee, Kuang Yao
    关键词: 聯合貸款
    銀行往來關係
    議價能力
    依據績效調整利率的條款
    syndicated loans
    banking relationship
    bargaining power
    performance pricing covenants
    日期: 2014
    上传时间: 2015-09-01 16:09:47 (UTC+8)
    摘要: 借款公司與銀行間彼此往來關係以及議價能力是否是決定聯合貸款契約中依績效調整利率條款內容的重要因素?
    本研究嘗試利用1993至2010美國聯貸案之資料來檢視此一關係是否確實存在。
    實證結果發現，當借款公司與銀行已有往來關係且公司之籌資選擇較少時，會比較傾向簽訂利率向上調整之績效條款。此外，由於單一主辦行於聯貸案中無法向借款公司剝削所有利益，因此對於已和借款公司有往來關係的主辦行來說，其較不傾向簽訂利率向上之調整績效條款。最後，本研究發現，對於主辦行排名較後面的銀行來說，其更傾向簽訂利率向下之調整績效條款來吸引客戶(借款公司)。
    It is shown in this thesis that long-term banking relationships and bargaining power are important determinants of performance-pricing covenants (PPC) inclusions in syndicated loan contracts. Using a large sample of syndicated loans data (1993-2010), I find that syndicated loans tend to include more interest-increasing PPC when a long-term banking relationship exists and when borrowers have fewer financing alternatives. The presence of banking relationship with lead arrangers reduces the odds of using interest-increasing PPC, because lead arrangers might not be able to capture all rents from holding-up borrowers. Finally, I find lenders with lower league table ranking are likely to use more interest-decreasing PPC to attract borrowers, which again is consistent with the hold-up hypothesis.
    參考文獻: Adam, T., D. Streitz,. 2014. Hold-Up and the Use of Performance-Sensitive Debt, Working Paper.
    Cai, J., Mattes, J. A., & Steffen, S. 2012. Performance Pricing versus Financial Covenants: Agency Costs and Incentive Alignment, Working Paper.
    Manso, G., B. Strulovici, and A. Tchistyi. 2010. Performance-sensitive debt. Review of Financial Studies 23 (5), 1819–1854.
    Asquith, P., A. Beatty, and J. Weber .2005. Performance pricing in bank debt contracts. Journal of Accounting and Economics 40, 101–128.
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    Demiroglu, C., & James, C. M. 2010. The information content of bank loan covenants. Review of financial Studies, 23(10), 3700-3737.
    Murfin, J. 2012. The Supply‐Side Determinants of Loan Contract Strictness. The Journal of Finance, 67(5), 1565-1601..
    Renzis, De T., Francis, B., Hasan, I., 2010. Performance Pricing Provisions in Bank Loans: A Cross-Country Analysis, Working Paper.
    Adam, T., V. Burg, T. Scheinert, and D. Streitz. 2014.Managerial Optimism and Debt Contract Design, Working Paper.
    Panyagometh, K., Roberts, G. S., Gottesman, A. A., & Beyhaghi ,M. 2013. Performance Pricing Covenants and Corporate Loan Spreads. Working Paper.
    Bhanot, K. and A. S. Mello .2006. Should corporate debt include a rating trigger?
    Journal of Financial Economics 79, 69–98.
    Bharath, S., S. Dahiyab, A. Saunders, and A. Srinivasan .2007. So what do i get? the
    bank’s view of lending relationships. Journal of Financial Economics 85, 368–419.
    Bharath, S. T., S. Dahiya, A.Saunders, and A.Srinivasan .2011. Lending relationships and loan contract terms. The Review of Financial Studies 24, 1142–1203.
    Dass, N. and M. Massa .2011. The impact of a strong bank-firm relationship on the
    borrowing firm. Review of Financial Studies 24, 1204–1260.
    Degryse, H.and S.Ongena .2005. Distance, lending relationships, and competition. The Journal of Finance 60, 231–266.
    Agarwal, S. and R. Hauswald .2010. Distance and private information in lending. Review of Financial Studies 23, 2757–2788.
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    Rajan, R. G. 1992. Insiders and outsiders: The choice between informed and arm’s length debt. The Journal of Finance 47, 1367–1400.
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    2730–2756.
    Tchistyi, A., D. Yermack, and H.Yun .2011. Negative hedging: Performance-sensitive debt and ceos’ equity incentives. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 46, 657–686.Von Thadden, E.-L. 1995.Long-term contracts, short-term investment and monitoring. Review of Economic Studies 62, 557–575.
    描述: 碩士
    國立政治大學
    財務管理研究所
    102357016
    資料來源: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0102357016
    数据类型: thesis
    显示于类别:[財務管理學系] 學位論文

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