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    政大機構典藏 > 商學院 > 財務管理學系 > 期刊論文 >  Item 140.119/79391
    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/79391

    Title: The Effects of Bank Monitoring on Firm’s Cash Holding Policy and Value of Cash
    Authors: 張元晨
    Lu, Chien-Lin;Chang, Yuanchen
    Contributors: 財管系
    Keywords: Bank loan;Cash holdings;Covenants;Value of cash
    Date: 2015
    Issue Date: 2015-11-10 16:38:54 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: This paper explores the role of creditors in firm’s cash holding policy. We test whether creditors affect firm’s cash reserves and the value of cash via covenants of bank loan contracts. The results show that the tightness of cash-related covenant limits firm’s attempt to accumulate cash, causing firms use their cash more efficiently. Borrowers tend to hold more cash reserves for precautionary motive since they might not be able to borrow from banks when they violate covenants. By separating the sources of cash, we show that firms liquidate net working-capital and reduce payout ratio to retain more cash after violating covenants. Finally, we find that the effects of covenant violations on cash are significant for high M/B firms, and the violation help low M/B firms increase the value of cash since firms save cash mainly for precautionary motive after covenant violations.
    Relation: Journal of Financial Studies,
    Data Type: article
    Appears in Collections:[財務管理學系] 期刊論文

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