Loading...
|
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/95449
|
| Title: | 高階主管獎酬、盈餘結構與後續經營績效之實證研究 |
| Authors: | 王婉茲 |
| Contributors: | 張清福
王婉茲 |
| Keywords: | 高階主管獎酬
流動裁決性應計項目
後續績效
經濟附加價值
compensation structure
discretionary current accruals
performance
EVAR |
| Date: | 2002 |
| Issue Date: | 2016-05-09 16:20:15 (UTC+8) |
| Abstract: | 本文以美國公司為樣本，探討高階主管獎酬結構與後續經營績效之關係以及高階主管獎酬結構與盈餘結構之關係。在高階主管獎酬結構與後續經營績效之關係方面，本文以營業活動之現金流量(CFO)、經濟附加價值(EVA<sup>R</sup>)與股票報酬率(RET)作為衡量公司經營績效之指標，並以會計績效指標之總資產報酬率(ROA）與普通股權益報酬率(ROE)作為敏感性分析。實證結果均支持預期之推論，即高階主管獎酬結構著重長期激勵之公司，其後續績效明顯優於獎酬結構著重短期激勵之公司。
在高階主管獎酬結構與盈餘結構之關係方面，本研究發現：(1) 盈餘結構之應計項目中，應收帳款變動數、應付帳款變動數、存貨變動數與高階主管短期激勵性獎酬呈正相關，而折舊費用則與高階主管之短期激勵性獎酬呈負相關；反之，應收帳款變動數、應付帳款變動數、存貨變動數則與高階主管之長期激勵性獎酬呈負相關，而折舊費用則與高階主管之長期激勵性獎酬呈正相關。如預期地，這說明較高的短期性盈餘應計項目會導致較高的短期激勵性獎酬，及較低的長期激勵性獎酬；而與長期性投資有關的折舊費用則與長期激勵性獎酬呈正相關。因此偏向短期激勵性獎酬之結構，易誘使高階主管利用該四項應計項目，以獲取短期激勵性獎酬；反之，若高階主管獎酬結構以長期激勵性獎酬為主，則高階主管會較重視長期獲利能力與績效，無形中減少操縱短期盈餘之誘因。(2)高階主管現金獎酬比例越高之公司，其盈餘結構中之流動裁決性應計項目比例亦越高，說明現金獎酬比例較高之獎酬結構會誘導高階主管調節流動裁決性應計項目，以達到預定之盈餘目標。
綜合以上研究發現，高階主管獎酬結構對於經理人之經營誘因，扮演極重要之角色。
This study investigates the relationship between CEO compensation structure and components of earnings and that between CEO compensation structure and firm`s long-term performance. The larger the proportion of long-term incentive compensation in CEO`s total compensation, the better the firm`s long-term performance which is measured either as CFO, EVA<sup>R</sup>, stock return, or accounting performance measures. On the contrary, higher proportion of short-term incentive compensation in total compensation can be obtained by manipulating accrual components. Firms with larger proportion of cash compensation have higher current discretionary accruals so that managers could be motivated toward managing discretionary current accruals to achieve target earnings. Such evidence suggests that compensation structure can be an important mechanism that induces manager`s efforts towards shareholders` interest. |
| Reference: | 一、中文部分
王泰昌與劉嘉雯，2000，經濟附加價值（EVA○R）的意義與價值，中華管理評論，第4期（9月）：15-31。
行政院勞工委員會，1992，績效獎金制度的設計與執行，台北：政府出版品。
李坤致，2001，智慧資本與價值動因對企業價值影響之研究，國立中正大學企業管理研究所未出版碩士論文。
陳隆麒，1999，當代財務管理，台北：華泰書局。
張素玲，1999，公司評價新趨勢－EVA○R（經濟附加價值）在台灣應用的可能性，國立中央大學財務管理研究所未出版碩士論文。
綦小霈，2001，公司成長、產業競爭、獎酬結構與後續績效之關聯性實證研究，國立中正大學會計學研究所未出版碩士論文。
鄭丁旺，2001，中級會計學（下冊）。
二、外文部份
Agarwal, N. C. 1981. Determinants of executive compensation. Industrial Relations 20 (Winter): 36-45.
Barth, M. E., D. P. Cram, and K. K. Nelson. 2001. Accruals and the prediction of future cash flows. The Accounting Review 76 (January): 27-58.
Balsam, S. 1998. Discretionary accounting choices and CEO compensation. Contemporary Accounting Research 15 (Fall): 229-252.
Carnell, M. R. and F. E. Kuzmit. 1982. Personnel: Management of human resource. Bell and Howell Co.
Chen, S. and J. L. Dodd. 1997. Economic value added (EVATM): An empirical examination of a new corporate performance measure. Journal of Managerial Issues 9 (Fall): 318-333.
Dechow, P. M. 1994. Accounting earnings and cash flows as measures of firm performance: The role of accounting accruals. Journal of Accounting and Economics 18 (February): 3-42.
______, R. G. Sloan, and A. P. Sweeney. 1995. Detecting earnings management. The Accounting Review 70 (April): 193-225.
______, S. P. Kothari, and R. L. Watts. 1998. The relation between earnings and cash flows. Journal of Accounting Economics 25 (May): 133-168.
DeFond, M. L., and J. Jiambalvo. 1994. Debt covenant violations and manipulation of accruals. Journal of Accounting Economics 17 (January): 145-176.
Eisenhardt, K. M. 1989. Agency theory: An assessment and review. Academy of Management Review 14 (October): 193-225.
Fama, E. F. 1980. Agency problems and theory of the firm. Journal of Political Economy 88 (April): 288-307.
Fisher, A. B. 1995. Create stockholder wealth. Fortune 132 (December): 105-116.
Gaver, J. J., K. M. Gaver, and J. R. Austin. 1995. Additional evidence on bonus plans and income management. Journal of Accounting and Economics 19 (February): 3-28.
Grant, J. L. 1996. Foundations of EVA for investment managers. Journal of Portfolio Management 23 (Fall): 41-48.
Guidry, F., A. J. Leone, and S. Rock. 1999. Earnings-based bonus plans and earnings management by business-unit managers. Journal of Accounting and Economics 26 (January): 113-142.
Guy, F. 2000. CEO pay, shareholder returns, and accounting profits. International Journal of the Economics and Business 7 (November): 263-274.
Hall, B. J. 2000. What you need to know about stock options. Harvard Business Review 78 (March-April): 121-129.
___________ and Liebman, J. 1998. Are CEOs really paid like bureaucrats? Quarterly Journal of Economics 113 (August): 653-691.
Hagerman, R. L. and M. E. Zmijewski. 1979. Some economic determinations of accounting policy choice. Journal of Accounting and Economics 1 (August): 141-161.
Healy, P. M. 1985. The effect of bonus schemes on accounting decision. Journal of Accounting and Economics 7 (April): 85-107.
_____ and J. M. Wahlen. 1999. A review of the earnings management literature and its implications for standard setting. Accounting Horizons 13 (December): 365-383.
Hill, N. T. and K. T. Stevens. 1995. CEO compensation and corporate performance. Journal of General Management 20（Summer）: 65-67.
Holthausen, R. W., D. F. Larcker, and R. G. Sloan. 1995. Annual bonus schemes and manipulation of earning. Journal of Accounting Review 19 (March-May): 29-74.
Jenkins, E. and R. E. Seiler. 1990. The impact of executive compensation schemes upon the level of discretionary expenditures and growth in stockholder wealth. Journal of Business Finance and Accounting 17 (Autumn): 585-592.
Jensen, M. C. and W. H. Meckling. 1976. Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior-agency cost and ownership structure. Journal of Financial and Economic 3 (October): 305-360.
Jensen, M. C. and K. J. Murphy. 1990. Performance pay and top-management incentive. Journal of Political Economy 98 (April): 225-264.
Kaplan, R. S. 1984. The evolution of management accounting. The Accounting Review 58 (July): 390-418.
Lehn, K. and A. K. Makhija. 1996. EVA & MVA: As performance measures and signals for strategic change. Planning Review 24 (May-June): 34-38.
Mayfield, J. 1997. Economic value management. Management Accounting 75 (September): 32-33.
Mehran, H. 1995. Executive compensation structure, ownership, and firm performance. Journal of Financial Economics 38: 163-184.
O’Byrne, S. T. 1996. EVA and market value. Bank of America Journal of Applied Corporate Finance 9 (Spring): 116-125.
Pavlik, E. L., T. W. Scott, and P. Tiessen. 1993. Executive compensation: Issues and research. Journal of Accounting Literature 12: 131-189.
Rappaport, A. 1978. Executive incentives vs. corporate growth. Harvard Business Review 59: 81-88.
Rogerson, W. 1997. International cost allocation and managerial investment incentives: a theory explaining the use of economic value added as a performance measure. Journal of Political Economy 105 (August): 770-795.
Skinner, D. J. 1993. The investment opportunity set and accounting procedure choice: Preliminary evidence. Journal of Accounting and Economics 16 (October): 407-445.
Sloan, R. G. 1996. Do stock price fully reflect information in accruals and cash flows about future earnings? The Accounting Review 71 (July): 289-315.
Stern, J. 1993. Value and people management. Corporate Finance 104 (July): 35-37.
Stewart, G. B. 1990. The quest for value: a guide for senior managers. Harper Business.
Teoh, S. H., I. Welch, and T. J. Wong. 1998. Earnings management and the underperformance of seasoned equity offerings. Journal of Financial Economics 50: 63-99.
Tully, S. 1993. The real key to create wealth. Fortune 128 (September): 38-50.
Watts, R. L. and J. L. Zimmerman. 1978. Toward a positive theory of the determination of accounting standards. The Accounting Review 53 (January): 52-77. |
| Description: | 碩士
國立政治大學
會計學系 |
| Source URI: | http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#A2010000150 |
| Data Type: | thesis |
| Appears in Collections: | [會計學系] 學位論文
|
Files in This Item:
There are no files associated with this item.
|
All items in 政大典藏 are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved.
|
