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    政大機構典藏 > 商學院 > 財務管理學系 > 學位論文 >  Item 140.119/96314
    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/96314


    Title: 囚犯兩難賽局之合作行為分析
    Authors: 謝慧美
    Contributors: 周德宇
    謝慧美
    Date: 1997
    Issue Date: 2016-05-10 18:56:59 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: 吾人日常生活中常遭遇類似囚犯兩難的問題,如返還遺失物、幫助陌生人、遵守規則,以及慈善捐贈等。傳統囚犯兩難賽局下的Nash均衡是雙方皆不合作,然而日常生活中實不乏合作的例子存在,因此有必要對PD賽局加以研究。
    本文利用演化方法,加入C類型與D類型於Guttman(1996)的模型中分析,試圖探討囚犯兩難賽局之合作行為變化。本文除了使Guttman的模型更為一般化之外,將使傳統文獻發展更為完整。
    本模型在單方不確定下存在兩種人,甲(R)是理性人,乙(MR)試可能理性人。甲懷疑乙可能是理性人、機械式TFT、C或D類型。研究結果發現:在混合策略的PBE中,對任何參賽的階段小於preempt前一階段而言,R不會採行非合作策略;對任何參賽的階段小於preempt前兩階段而言,MR不會採行非合作策略。當雙方交手次數增加時,非合作階段數維持不變,亦即,合作階段數隨交手機會增加而提高。最後透過比較靜態分析得知,當甲認為乙是C類型的可能性增加時,他可能提前或延後preempt策略以探索乙的類型。若甲認定乙是TFT類型的機率較小,使得preempt的策略報償大於和乙同時由C轉變為D的策略報償時,他會提前preempt以剝削乙。而當甲認定乙是TFT類型的主觀機率增加時,他會延後preempt以避免遭受乙的懲罰,故此時合作的機會增加。
    單方不確定性的結果可以一般化至雙方不確定的情況。
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    Description: 碩士
    國立政治大學
    財政學系
    Source URI: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G91NCCU7082012
    Data Type: thesis
    Appears in Collections:[財務管理學系] 學位論文

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