| Reference: | Anderson, R. C., Mansi, S. A., & Reeb, D. M. (2003). Founding family ownership and the agency cost of debt. Journal of Financial economics, 68(2), 263-285.
Aslan, H., & Kumar, P. (2009). Controlling shareholders and the agency cost of debt: Evidence from syndicated loans. FIRS Prague Meetings and EFA 2009 Bergen Meetings.
Claessens, S., Djankov, S., Fan, J. P., & Lang, L. H. (2002). Disentangling the incentive and entrenchment effects of large shareholdings. The journal of finance, 57(6), 2741-2771.
DeAngelo, H., & DeAngelo, L. (1985). Managerial ownership of voting rights: A study of public corporations with dual classes of common stock. Journal of Financial economics, 14(1), 33-69.
Dimitrov, V., & Jain, P. C. (2006). Recapitalization of one class of common stock into dual-class: Growth and long-run stock returns. Journal of Corporate Finance, 12(2), 342-366.
Dyck, A., & Zingales, L. (2004). Private benefits of control: An international comparison. The Journal of Finance, 59(2), 537-600.
Fang, V. W., Noe, T. H., & Tice, S. (2009). Stock market liquidity and firm value. Journal of financial Economics, 94(1), 150-169.
Fischel, D. R. (1987). Organized exchanges and the regulation of dual class common stock. The University of Chicago Law Review, 54(1), 119-152.
Gale, D., & Hellwig, M. (1985). Incentive-compatible debt contracts: The one-period problem. The Review of Economic Studies, 52(4), 647-663.
Gilson, R. J. (1987). Evaluating dual class common stock: The relevance of substitutes. Virginia Law Review, 807-844.
Gompers, P. A., Ishii, J., & Metrick, A. (2010). Extreme governance: An analysis of dual-class firms in the United States. Review of Financial Studies, 23(3), 1051-1088.
Hart, O., & Moore, J. (1998). Cooperatives vs. outside ownership (No. w6421). National Bureau of Economic Research.
Hoi, C. K., & Robin, A. (2010). Agency Conflicts, Controlling Owner Proximity, and Firm Value: An Analysis of Dual‐Class Firms in the United States. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 18(2), 124-135.
Howell, J. W. (2010). The Dual Class Stock Structure in the United States: A New Dataset and An Examination of Firms who Leave the Structure.
Lehn, K., Netter, J., & Poulsen, A. (1990). Consolidating corporate control: Dual-class recapitalizations versus leveraged buyouts. Journal of Financial Economics, 27(2), 557-580.
Lemmon, M. L., & Lins, K. V. (2003). Ownership structure, corporate governance, and firm value: Evidence from the East Asian financial crisis. The journal of finance, 58(4), 1445-1468.
Lin, C., Ma, Y., Malatesta, P., & Xuan, Y. (2011). Ownership structure and the cost of corporate borrowing. Journal of Financial Economics, 100(1), 1-23.
Lins, K. V. (2003). Equity ownership and firm value in emerging markets. Journal of Financial and Quantitative analysis, 38(01), 159-184.
Masulis, R. W., Wang, C., & Xie, F. (2009). Agency problems at dual‐class companies. The Journal of Finance, 64(4), 1697-1727.
Mikkelson, W. H., & Partch, M. M. (1994). The consequences of unbundling managers` voting rights and equity claims. Journal of Corporate Finance, 1(2), 175-199.
Nenova, T. (2003). The value of corporate voting rights and control: A cross-country analysis. Journal of Financial Economics, 68(3), 325-351.
Nini, G., Smith, D. C., & Sufi, A. (2012). Creditor control rights, corporate governance, and firm value. Review of Financial Studies, 25(6), 1713-1761.
Partch, M. M. (1987). The creation of a class of limited voting common stock and shareholder wealth. Journal of Financial Economics, 18(2), 313-339.
Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1997). A survey of corporate governance. The journal of finance, 52(2), 737-783.
Tinaikar, S. (2007). The disclosure effects of dual class ownership structures. ProQuest.
Zhang, Y. (2007). Dual-class stocks and the benefits of control. Applied Economics Letters, 14(4), 293-297.
Zingales, L. (1995). Insider ownership and the decision to go public. The Review of Economic Studies, 62(3), 425-448. |
