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| Title: | 垂直整合廠商是否促成下游競爭廠商的聯合行為
Does Vertical Integration Facilitate Downstream Collusion? |
| Authors: | 歐宜芬
Ou, Yi Fen |
| Contributors: | 溫偉任
Wen, Wei Jen
歐宜芬
Ou, Yi Fen |
| Keywords: | 垂直整合
連續Cournot寡占
聯合行為
卡特爾
折現因子
併購謬論
Vertical Merger
Successive Cournot Oligopolies
Collusion
Cartel
Discount Factor
Merger Paradox |
| Date: | 2016 |
| Issue Date: | 2016-07-20 16:36:43 (UTC+8) |
| Abstract: | 本文運用連續Cournot寡占模型分析垂直相關市場中，垂直整合廠商的存在如何影響下游卡特爾組織出現的可能性。結果顯示，當廠商家數少時，由於下游市場將出現併購謬論而使下游廠商不願組成卡特爾組織；當廠商家數較多時，相較於「沒有垂直整合廠商」的情況，「存在一家垂直整合廠商」時，下游競爭廠商也較難形成穩定的卡特爾。因為此時任何一家卡特爾成員藉由背叛可以拿到的好處將遠高於背叛的機會成本。其原因為面對一家低成本的垂直整合廠商，高成本廠商所形成的卡特爾將生產較少的數量，且賺取較低的利潤。縱使卡特爾成員採用冷酷策略來處罰背叛的廠商，背叛廠商所遭受的利潤損失將是微乎其微。因此，本文指出垂直整合廠商的存在可降低下游市場形成卡特爾組織的可能性，進而維持市場競爭、提升社會福利。
This research investigates the emergence of downstream cartel in vertically-related industries by using successive Cournot oligopolies. The results show mergers’ paradox exists to circumvent the formation of downstream cartel with few firms in both upstream and downstream. Besides downstream firms would have less incentive to form a cartel organization when competing with an independent vertically-integrated firm in the industry relative to the industry without a vertically-integrated firm. The vertical integration would lessen the downstream cartel collusion as well as circumvent the double marginalization problem. The reason is that vertically-integrated firm would have huge gain from the ease of double marginalization and enjoys cost advantage to dominate the downstream market. The emergence of vertically-integration firm would in turn weaken the competitive advantage of those cartel firms in the downstream market. On the other hand, the firm betraying from the cartel would suffer much less punishment from the grim strategy conducted by the cartel facing vertically-integrated competitor in the downstream market. However, the gain from betraying the cartel would be much greater since every cartel firm would only produce less originally facing the vertically-integrated competitor. Therefore, the downstream cartel would be difficult to substantiate and the downstream market would maintain its competition. In this situation this paper contributes to a justification that the existence of vertically-integrated firm would be welfare-improving. |
| Reference: | Cunha, M. and Sarmento, P. (2014), “Does Vertical Integration Promote Downstream Incomplete Collusion? An Evaluation of Static and Dynamic Stability”, J Ind Compet Trade, 14:1–38.
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| Description: | 碩士
國立政治大學
國際經營與貿易學系
102351006 |
| Source URI: | http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0102351006 |
| Data Type: | thesis |
| Appears in Collections: | [國際經營與貿易學系 ] 學位論文
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