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    题名: 企業經營績效、員工及董監事薪酬與公司治理之相關性研究
    The Study on the Correlation of Employee and Board Director Compensation, Business Performance and Corporate Governance
    作者: 游建烽
    Yu, Chien Fong
    贡献者: 彭金隆
    Peng, Jin Lung
    游建烽
    Yu, Chien Fong
    关键词: 員工薪酬
    董監事薪酬
    經營績效
    公司治理
    加薪四法
    日期: 2016
    上传时间: 2016-07-20 17:37:44 (UTC+8)
    摘要: 本文旨在探討企業獲利與分配員工間的合理性問題。利用2008年至2014年的公開發行以上公司之資料進行實證分析。首先，本文發現企業營收成長率與員工薪酬成長率、董監事薪酬成長率具顯著正相關，顯示員工薪酬確實隨著企業營收而有所調升。然而，員工薪酬成長率低於營收成長率之幅度達0.2%。董監事薪酬的成長率則顯著高於營收成長率5.1%。顯示企業員工的薪酬成長率低於董監事薪酬的成長率。
    本文進一步分析不同公司治理環境對企業營收成長率與員工薪酬成長率、董監事薪酬成長率之影響。實證結果發現家族企業與董監事兼任總經理之企業，其(1)營收成長率高於員工薪酬成長率的情形、以及(2)董監事薪酬成長率高於營收成長率的情形更為明顯。換言之，公司治理對企業的員工薪酬分配或董監事薪酬分配有顯著影響。
    基於上述發現，本文認為《公司法》第235-1條應針對勞方的酬勞分配訂定合理的範圍，建議可行的方案為訂定董監事酬勞發放率與員工分紅率的上下限或兩者之相對比率，此比率可隨著產業特性與風險、公司規模做適度的調整，以避免企業分紅政策失去彈性、企業負擔過於沉重或造成中小企業行政困擾的問題。此外，避免企業違背修法的精神，本文建議可參考歐洲的員工董事制度或比照美國立法要求企業揭露高階主管、董監事與一般員工之薪酬差距，並列為公司治理指標。
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    描述: 碩士
    國立政治大學
    經營管理碩士學程(EMBA)
    103932168
    資料來源: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0103932168
    数据类型: thesis
    显示于类别:[經營管理碩士學程EMBA] 學位論文

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