English  |  正體中文  |  简体中文  |  Post-Print筆數 : 27 |  Items with full text/Total items : 118252/149288 (79%)
Visitors : 75173109      Online Users : 327
RC Version 6.0 © Powered By DSPACE, MIT. Enhanced by NTU Library IR team.
Scope Tips:
  • please add "double quotation mark" for query phrases to get precise results
  • please goto advance search for comprehansive author search
  • Adv. Search
    HomeLoginUploadHelpAboutAdminister Goto mobile version
    政大機構典藏 > 商學院 > 會計學系 > 學位論文 >  Item 140.119/158664
    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/158664


    Title: 銀行控制型態、薪酬差距與經營績效之關聯 性−我國銀行業實證研究
    Bank Control Type, Executive Pay Gap, and Firm Performance:Evidence from Taiwan’s Banking Sector
    Authors: 鄭惠謙
    Cheng, Hui-Chien
    Contributors: 徐愛恩
    Tsui, Stephanie
    鄭惠謙
    Cheng, Hui-Chien
    Keywords: 銀行控制型態
    薪酬差距
    經營績效
    Bank's control types
    Pay gap
    Operating performance
    Date: 2025
    Issue Date: 2025-08-04 14:52:28 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: 本研究旨在探討不同控制型態,包括公股銀行、家族主導銀行與金控
    子公司銀行,對銀行經營績效之影響。而根據錦標賽理論與公平理論,薪酬
    制度對企業績效具有重要影響,因此本研究進一步以高階經理人與基層員
    工間之薪酬差距作為中介變數,探討控制型態與經營績效之關聯性,以及
    不同控制型態如何透過薪酬差距影響績效表現。
    本研究以資產報酬率、每股盈餘與逾期放款比率作為經營績效衡量指
    標,並以薪酬差距作為中介變數,進行複迴歸分析與中介效果分析。實證結
    果顯示,不同控制型態銀行會影響經營績效,此影響可能係直接影響,或透
    過中介變數,即透過薪酬差距影響,亦可能同時直接與間接影響績效。本研
    究之發現可作為我國銀行業於不同控制形態下調整薪酬制度與完善治理機
    制之依據,期能有效促進經營績效之提升。
    This study examines how different bank control types—state-owned, family-controlled,and financial holding subsidiary banks—affect operating performance. Drawing on tournament and equity theory, it focuses on the compensation gap between senior managers and entry-level employees as a
    mediating variable.
    Using return on assets (ROA), earnings per share (EPS), and non-performing loan ratio (NPL) as performance indicators, the study applies multiple regression and mediation analysis. Results show that control types influence performance directly, indirectly via the pay gap, or through both. The findings offer insights for refining compensation systems and improving governance in Taiwan’s banking sector.
    Reference: 一、 中文文獻
    台灣金融研訓院,2021,110年銀行業關鍵性人力資源供需之研究
    台灣董事學會,2022,華人家族企業關鍵報告。
    沈中華與張元,2008,企業的社會責任為可以改善財務績效嗎?-以英國FTSE社會責任指數為例。經濟論文,第36卷第3期:339-385。
    沈育宏,2007,家族持股、家族管理與公司績效:以台灣上市公司為例,國立台灣科技大學財務金融系未出版碩士論文。
    李沃牆、林惠娜與劉雅鳳,2013,公股銀行放款集中度對經營績效及逾放之影響分析,朝陽商管評論,第12卷第2期:93-112。
    李佳玲,2006,不確定性、高階經理人薪資差距與公司績效之關聯性:競賽理論之驗證,會計評論,第42期:23-53。
    李淑慧,2023,市場力量是否能夠遏止肥貓公司? 臺灣市場的證據,國立台北大學企業管理學系碩士論文。
    金宇祥,2016,員工薪酬與公司的經營績效和市場績效之關聯性研究,國立臺灣大學財務金融學系碩士論文。
    吳孟道與林建甫,2014,臺灣金融改革的回顧與展望,會計研究月刊,第347卷:70-75。
    林建甫與彭思遠,2013,國政分析:金融企業的社會責任【線上論壇】。http://www.npf.org.tw/post/3/12519?County=%25E8%258A%25B1%25E8%2593%25AE%25E7%25B8%25A3&site=
    林家慶與董珮珊,2017,臺灣的銀行高階經理人薪酬研究,兩岸金融季刊,第5卷第1期:43-67。
    紀文惠,2008,高階經理人薪酬計畫與公司績效、盈餘管理之關係,國立成功大學會計學系碩士論文。
    洪曉穎,1997,美國商業銀行財務資料揭露之資訊內涵,國立臺灣大學會計學系碩士論文。
    洪修遠,1996,商業銀行財務績效之研究-DEA與因素分析法之比較,國立成功大學企業管理學系碩士論文。
    許鈺珮與張錫介,2005,金融控股公司法實施對台灣銀行業經營效率影響之分析,金融風險管理季刊,第1卷第2期:33-56。
    張綺娟,2005,影響台灣地區商業銀行逾放比之因素,國立交通大學經營管理系碩士論文。
    黃銘傑,2000,公司監控與監察人制度改革論-超越「獨立董事」之迷思,台大法學論叢第29卷第4期:159-208。
    陳安琪,2006,競賽理論與廠商績效:台灣上市櫃電子產業之實證研究,國立中央大學產業經濟系碩士論文。
    陳明園與石雅慧,2004,高階經理人薪酬-代理理論與競賽理論之實證研究,臺大管理論叢,第15卷第1期:131-166。
    陳時年,2017,我國金控公司經營績效與風險之研究-以子公司組合與市占率為例,國立政治大學風險管理與保險系碩士論文。
    陳椿鶯,2008,銀行業資產品質與經營績效關聯性之研究,逢甲大學會計學系碩士論文。
    曾柏洋,2008,台灣地區銀行業市場結構、風險行為與經營績效之研究,銘傳大學經濟學系碩士論文。
    葉銀華,1990,台灣股票市場成交量與股價關係之實證研究-轉換函數模式,台北市銀行月刊,第22卷第11期:57-70。
    楊維娟、陳俐臻與林福來,2008,台灣銀行在金控與非金控架構下經營效率之比較-資料包絡分析法之應用,國立台中技術學院學報,第9卷第2期:33-48。
    賴呈昌,2004,台灣地區金控銀行與非金控銀行績效之評估-DEA方法之應用,國立中正大學國際經濟系碩士論文。
    謝文馨,2009,台灣地區銀行經營績效之分析-以泛公股銀行與民營銀行為例,國立交通大學管理學院碩士在職專班財務金融組碩士論文。
    謝曜仲,2018,我國公股銀行負責人異動與績效之研究,國立政治大學經營管理碩士學程論文。
    蕭樺慈,2005,台灣地區金融控股公司績效分析-財務指標實證,淡江大學財務金融學系碩士論文。
    簡湘庭,2013,金控公司多角化程度對經營風險之影響,國立政治大學風險管理與保險系碩士論文。
    羅巧玲,2006,金控子銀行與一般銀行績效比較,國立交通大學經營管理系碩士論文。
    蘇哲毅,2012,商業銀行淨拆款部位對經營風險的影響,國立中央大學財務金融系碩士論文。

    二、 英文文獻
    Adams, J. S. 1965. Inequity in social exchange. Advances in Experimental Social Psychology 2: 267–299.
    Allouche, J., B. Amann, J. Jaussaud, and T. Kurashina. 2008. The impact of family control on the performance and financial characteristics of family versus nonfamily businesses in Japan: A matched-pair investigation. Family Business Review 21 (4): 315–330.
    Ang, S., S. Slaughter, and K. Y. Ng. 2002. Human capital and institutional determinants of information technology compensation: Modeling multilevel and cross-level interactions. Management Science 48 (11): 1427–1445.
    Nguyen, A. H., H. T. Nguyen, and H. T. Pham. 2020. Applying the CAMEL model to assess performance of commercial banks: Empirical evidence from Vietnam. Banks and Bank Systems 15 (2): 177–186.
    Ansar, J., P. Cantor, and R. W. Sparks. 1997. Efficiency wages and the regulated firm. Journal of Regulatory Economics 11 (1): 55–66.
    Balsam, S., J.J. Choi, and M. Ju. 2017. The impact of the CEO-worker pay ratio on firm value. Temple University Working Paper.
    Barney, J. B., and W. Hesterly. 1996. Organizational economics: Understanding the relationship between organizations and economic analysis. In Handbook of Organization Studies, 115–147.
    Barontini, R., and L. Caprio. 2006. The effect of family control on firm value and performance: Evidence from continental Europe. European Financial Management 12 (5): 689–723.
    Baron, R. M., and D. A. Kenny. 1986. The moderator-mediator variable distinction in social psychological research: Conceptual, strategic, and statistical considerations. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 51 (6): 1173–1182.
    Barro, J. R., and R. J. Barro. 1990. Pay, performance and turnover of bank CEOs. Journal of Labor Economics 8 (4): 448–481.
    Bhattacharyya, A., C. A. K. Lovell, and P. Sahay. 1997. The impact of liberalization on the productive efficiency of Indian commercial banks. European Journal of Operational Research 98 (2): 332–345.
    Bloom, M., and J. G. Michel. 2002. The relationships among organizational context, pay dispersion, and managerial turnover. Academy of Management Journal 45 (1): 33–42.
    Chua, J. H., J. J. Chrisman, and P. Sharma. 1999. Defining the family business by behavior. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice 23 (4): 19–39.
    Claessens, S., S. Djankov, and L. Lang. 2000. Separation of ownership from control of East Asian firms. Journal of Financial Economics 58: 81–112.
    Core, J., and W. Guay. 1999. The use of equity grants to manage optimal equity incentive levels. Journal of Accounting and Economics 28 (2): 151–184.
    Connelly, B. L., K. T. Haynes, L. Tihanyi, D. L. Gamache, and C. E. Devers. 2016. Minding the gap: Antecedents and consequences of top management-to-worker pay dispersion. Journal of Management 42 (4): 862–885.
    Cowherd, D. M., and D. I. Levine. 1992. Product quality and pay equity between lower-level employees and top management: An investigation of distributive justice theory. Administrative Science Quarterly 37 (2): 302–320.
    Crosby, F. J. 1984. The denial of personal discrimination. American Behavioral Scientist 27: 371–386.
    Demsetz, H., and K. Lehn. 1985. The structure of corporate ownership: Causes and consequences. Journal of Political Economy 93 (6): 1155–1177.
    Elyasiani, E., and S. Mehdian. 1995. The comparative efficiency performance of small and large US commercial banks in the pre-and post-deregulation eras. Applied Economics 27 (11): 1069–1079.
    Faccio, M., and L. H. Lang. 2002. The ultimate ownership of Western European corporations. Journal of Financial Economics 65 (3): 365–395.
    Garen, J. E. 1994. Executive compensation and principal-agent theory. Journal of Political Economy 102 (6): 1175–1190.
    Grossman, W., and R. E. Hoskisson. 1998. CEO pay at the crossroads of Wall Street and Main: Toward the strategic design of executive compensation. Academy of Management Perspectives 12 (1): 43–57.
    Gonzales-Bustos, J. P., A. B. Hernández-Lara, and X. Li. 2020. Board effects on innovation in family and non-family businesses. Heliyon 6 (9): e04980.
    Gomez-Mejia, L. R., M. Larraza-Kintana, and M. Makri. 2003. The determinants of executive compensation in family-controlled public corporations. Academy of Management Journal 46 (2): 226–237.
    Gomez-Mejia, L. R., M. Nuñez-Nickel, and I. Gutierrez. 2001. The role of family ties in agency contracts. Academy of Management Journal 44 (1): 81–95.
    Gomez-Mejia, L. R., and D. B. Balkin. 1989. Effectiveness of individual and aggregate compensation strategies. Industrial Relations 28: 431–445.
    Heffernan, S. 2005. Modern Banking. Chichester, UK: John Wiley & Sons.
    Hiller, N. J., and D. C. Hambrick. 2005. Conceptualizing executive hubris: The role of (hyper-) core self-evaluations in strategic decision-making. Strategic Management Journal 26: 297–319.
    Holmström, B. 1979. Moral hazard and observability. The Bell Journal of Economics 10 (1): 74–91.
    Huang, Y. T., S. Y. Wen, and J. Yu. 2012. Financial determinants of bank performance in Taiwan. Journal of Economics and Behavioral Studies 4 (12): 691–702.
    Jensen, M. C., and W. H. Meckling. 1976. Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics 3 (4): 305–360.
    Kaplan, R. S., and D. P. Norton. 1992. Putting the balanced scorecard to work. Harvard Business Review 70 (1): 71–79.
    Kerr, J., and R. A. Bettis. 1987. Boards of directors, top management compensation and shareholder returns. Academy of Management Journal 30: 645–664.
    Klein, P., and M. Saidenberg. 1998. Diversification, organization, and efficiency: Evidence from bank holding companies. Working paper.
    Lansberg, I. S. 1983. Managing human resources in family firms: The problem of institutional overlap. Organizational Dynamics 12 (1): 39–46.
    Laverty, K. J. 1996. Economic "short-termism": The debate, the unresolved issues, and the implications for management practice and research. Academy of Management Review 21 (3): 825–860.
    Lazear, E. P., and S. Rosen. 1981. Rank-order tournaments as optimum labor contracts. Journal of Political Economy 89 (5): 841–864.
    Martin, J. 1981. Relative deprivation: A theory of distributive injustice for an era of shrinking resources. Research in Organizational Behavior 3: 53–107.
    Mishkin, Frederic S. 1995. Symposium on the Monetary Transmission Mechanism. Journal of Economic Perspectives 9: 3-10.
    Schulze, W. S., M. H. Lubarkin, R. N. Dino, and A. K. Buchholtz. 2001. Agency relationships in family firms: Theory and evidence. Organization Science 12 (2): 99–116.
    Shen, C. H., and C. Y. Lin. 2012. Why government banks underperform: A political interference view. Journal of Financial Intermediation 21: 181–202.
    Shin, J. Y., S. C. Kang, J. H. Hyun, and B. J. Kim. 2015. Determinants and performance effects of executive pay multiples: Evidence from Korea. ILR Review 68 (1): 53–78.
    Siegel, P. A., and D. C. Hambrick. 2005. Pay disparities within top management groups: Evidence of harmful effects on performance of high-technology firms. Organization Science 16 (3): 259–274.
    Solow, R. M. 1979. Another possible source of wage stickiness. Journal of Macroeconomics 1 (1): 79–82.
    Song, Z. J., and M. Xia. 2012. Pay of Bank CEOs, Compensation Differences and Bank Performance. Journal of Finance and Economics, 37(10): 136–145.
    Vroom, V. H. 1964. Work and Motivation. New York: John Wiley & Sons.
    Wade, J. B., C. A. O'Reilly III, and T. G. Pollock. 2006. Overpaid CEOs and underpaid managers: Fairness and executive compensation. Organization Science 17 (5): 527–544.
    Wang, Y. 2015. Does salary gap really have incentive effect? Modern Economy 6 (9): 1023–1027.
    Zhao, X., J. G. Lynch Jr., and Q. Chen. 2010. Reconsidering Baron and Kenny: Myths and truths about mediation analysis. Journal of Consumer Research 37 (2): 197–206.
    Description: 碩士
    國立政治大學
    會計學系
    112353031
    Source URI: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0112353031
    Data Type: thesis
    Appears in Collections:[會計學系] 學位論文

    Files in This Item:

    File Description SizeFormat
    303101.pdf1697KbAdobe PDF0View/Open


    All items in 政大典藏 are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved.


    社群 sharing

    著作權政策宣告 Copyright Announcement
    1.本網站之數位內容為國立政治大學所收錄之機構典藏,無償提供學術研究與公眾教育等公益性使用,惟仍請適度,合理使用本網站之內容,以尊重著作權人之權益。商業上之利用,則請先取得著作權人之授權。
    The digital content of this website is part of National Chengchi University Institutional Repository. It provides free access to academic research and public education for non-commercial use. Please utilize it in a proper and reasonable manner and respect the rights of copyright owners. For commercial use, please obtain authorization from the copyright owner in advance.

    2.本網站之製作,已盡力防止侵害著作權人之權益,如仍發現本網站之數位內容有侵害著作權人權益情事者,請權利人通知本網站維護人員(nccur@nccu.edu.tw),維護人員將立即採取移除該數位著作等補救措施。
    NCCU Institutional Repository is made to protect the interests of copyright owners. If you believe that any material on the website infringes copyright, please contact our staff(nccur@nccu.edu.tw). We will remove the work from the repository and investigate your claim.
    DSpace Software Copyright © 2002-2004  MIT &  Hewlett-Packard  /   Enhanced by   NTU Library IR team Copyright ©   - Feedback