| Reference: | 外文書籍
Babbitt, Susan. E. (1993). “Feminism and Objective Interests: The Role of Transformation Experiences in Rational Deliberation,” in L. Alcoff and E. Potter (eds.), Feminist Epistemologies. (pp. 245–264). New York: Routledge.
Benson, Paul (2005a). “Feminist Intuitions and the Normative Substance of Autonomy.” in J. Taylor (ed.), Personal Autonomy: New Essays on Personal Autonomy and its Role in Contemporary Moral Philosophy. (pp. 124–142). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Benson, Paul (2005b). Taking Ownership: Authority and Voice in Autonomous Agency. In: Christman J, Anderson J, eds. Autonomy and the Challenges to Liberalism: New Essays. (pp. 101–126). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Cudd, Ann E. (2006). Analyzing Oppression. New York: Oxford University Press.
Cudd, Ann E. (2014). “Adaptations to Oppression: Preference and Resistance” in Oshana, M.A.L. (ed.). Personal Autonomy and Social Oppression: Philosophical Perspectives. (pp. 142–160). Routledge.
Clatterbaugh, Kenneth (1996). ‘‘Are Men Oppressed?’’ in Larry May, Robert Strikwerda, and Patrick D. Hopkins (ed.). Rethinking Masculinity. Rowman and Littlefield.
Dworkin, Gerald (1981). “The Concept of Autonomy,” in Rudolph Haller, ed., Science and Ethics. (pp. 203–213). Amsterdam: Rodopi.
Elster, Jon (2016). Sour Grapes: Studies in the Subversion of Rationality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Frankfurt, Harry. G. (1988). The Importance of What We Care About: Philosophical Essays. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Friedman, Marilyn (2003). Autonomy, Gender, Politics. New York: Oxford University Press.
Geuss, Raymond (1981). The Idea of a Critical Theory: Habermas and the Frankfurt School. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hill, Tomas (1991). Autonomy and Self-Respect. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Khader, Serene J. (2011). Adaptive Preferences and Women’s Empowerment. New York: Oxford University Press
Mackenzie, Catriona & Stoljar, Natalie (2000). “Introduction: Autonomy Refigured: Five Feminist Critiques of Autonomy” in Relational Autonomy: Feminist Perspectives on Autonomy, Agency, and the Social Self. (pp. 35–51). Oxford University Press.
Meyers, Diana T. (1989). Self, Society, and Personal Choice. Columbia Universal Press.
Meyers, Diana T. (2000a). “Intersectional Identity and the Authentic Self: Opposites Attract!” in Relational Autonomy: Feminist Perspectives on Autonomy, Agency, and the Social Self. (pp. 151–180). New York: Oxford University Press.
Nussbaum, Martha. C. (1999). Sex and social justice. New York: Oxford University Press.
Nussbaum, Martha. C. (2011). Creating Capabilities: The Human Development Approach. Harvard University Press.
Raz, Joseph (1986). The Morality of Freedom. New York: Oxford University Press.
Stoljar, Natalie (2000). “Autonomy and the Feminist Intuition.” in Relational Autonomy, Feminist Perspectives on Autonomy, Agency & The Social Self. (pp. 94–111). Oxford University Press.
Stoljar, Natalie (2014). “Autonomy and Adaptive Preference Formation” in Andrea Veltman, and Mark Piper (eds), Autonomy, Oppression, and Gender, Studies in Feminist Philosophy. (pp. 227–252). New York: Oxford University Press.
Wolf, Susan (1988). “Sanity and the Metaphysics of Responsibility”. in F. Schoeman (ed.), Responsibility, Character, and the Emotions: New Essays in Moral Psychology (pp. 46–62). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
外文期刊論文
Benson, Paul (1987). Freedom and Value. The Journal of Philosophy, 84(9), 465–486.
Benson, Paul (1991). Autonomy and Oppressive Socialization. Social Theory and Practice, 17(3), 385–408.
Benson, Paul (1994). Free Agency and Self-Worth. The Journal of Philosophy, 91(12), 650–668.
Bruckner, Donald W. (2009). In Defense of Adaptive Preferences. Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition, 142(3), 307–324.
Christman, John (1987). Autonomy: A Defense of the Split-level Self. Southern Journal of Philosophy 25, 281–93.
Christman, John (1991a). Autonomy and Personal History. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 21(1), 1–24.
Christman, John (1991b). Liberalism and Individual Positive Freedom. Ethics, 101(2), 343–359.
Dworkin, Gerald (1976). Autonomy and Behavior Control. The Hastings Center Report, 6(1), 23–28.
Frankfurt, Harry. G. (1971). Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person. The Journal of Philosophy, 68 (1), 5–20.
Friedman, Marilyn (1986). Autonomy and the Split-Level Self. The Southern Journal of Philosophy, 24, 19–35.
Superson, Anita (2005). Deformed Desires and Informed Desire Tests. Hypatia, 20(4), 109–126.
Westlund, Andrea (2003). Selflessness and Responsibility for Self: Is Deference Compatible with Autonomy? The Philosophical Review, 112(4), 483–523.
外文網路資源
Stoljar, Natalie (2022). "Feminist Perspectives on Autonomy" in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2022 Edition). Edward N. Zalta & Uri Nodelman (eds.). URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2022/entries/feminism-autonomy/>。查閱日期：2023年3月31日。
Superson, Anita (2023). "Feminist Moral Psychology" in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2023 Edition). Edward N. Zalta & Uri Nodelman (eds.). URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2023/entries/feminism-moralpsych/>。查閱日期：2024年10月6日。
Zwolinski, Matt, Benjamin Ferguson, and Alan Wertheimer, "Exploitation", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2022 Edition), Edward N. Zalta & Uri Nodelman (eds.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2022/entries/exploitation/>。查閱日期：2024年10月21日。
中文書籍
Berger, John（2023），《觀看的方式》。吳莉群譯。三版。台北市：麥田出版。
Berlin, Isaiah（1986），〈兩種自由概念〉，載於《自由四論》。陳曉林譯。225–296。台北市：聯經。
Johnson, Allan G.（2008），《性別打結：拆除父權違建》。成令方等譯。台北市：群學。
Lukes, Steven（2021），《權力：基進觀點》。林葦芸、陳雅馨譯。三版。台北市：商周。 |
