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| Title: | 重構費希特的承認理論：一個系統性的詮釋
Reconstructing Fichte's Theory of Recognition: A Systematic Interpretation |
| Authors: | 張明融
Chang, Ming-Jung |
| Contributors: | 謝昭銳
Tse, Chiu-Yui
張明融
Chang, Ming-Jung |
| Keywords: | 自我意識
召喚
相互承認
超驗條件
自願主義
Self-consciousness
Summons
Mutual recognition
Transcendental condition
Voluntarism |
| Date: | 2025 |
| Issue Date: | 2025-09-01 16:42:09 (UTC+8) |
| Abstract: | 費希特在《自然法權基礎》中試圖從自我設定的行動出發，推證法權概念的實在性，也就是將法權理解為自我意識的超驗條件。他主張，法權不應奠基於道德哲學，而應以主體間自由的相互關係為核心。基於此立場，費希特將主體與他者之間的相互承認視為法權的超驗基礎，藉此區分法權與道德為兩者相互獨立的科學。然而，這一推證常被批評為缺乏說服力。本文嘗試為費希特的立場提供辯護，透過重構其推論過程，說明法權作為自我意識條件的合理性，並指出相互承認同時作為超驗條件跟規範性原則。為了支持此一主張，本文進一步分析法權推論中的一項核心概念，也就是主體如何透過他者的行動而意識到自身，即主體如何受到他者的召喚。本文主張，召喚的概念必須同時具備規範性與因果性，才能為費希特的法權推證提供堅實基礎。
In the Foundations of Natural Right, Fichte attempts to deduce the reality of the concept of right by beginning with the act of self-positing. He understands right as a transcendental condition for the possibility of self-consciousness. According to Fichte, the concept of right should not be grounded in moral obligation but should instead be based on the relation between rational beings through mutual recognition. However, this deduction has often been criticized as unconvincing. This thesis seeks to defend Fichte’s position by reconstructing the steps of his argument. It argues that the concept of right, understood as a condition for self-consciousness, can be plausibly justified. To support this claim, the thesis analyzes a central concept in the deduction of right, namely the concept of summons. Through the summons, the subject becomes aware of itself. The thesis argues that the summons must possess both normative and causal dimensions in order to support the justification of the concept of right. |
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| Description: | 碩士
國立政治大學
哲學系
110154004 |
| Source URI: | http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0110154004 |
| Data Type: | thesis |
| Appears in Collections: | [哲學系] 學位論文
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