

行政院國家科學委員會補助專題研究計畫成果報告

漢語佛教哲學的真理與方法

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本研究計畫從比較研究的角度探討漢語佛教哲學，特別是天台宗智顛的哲學、華嚴宗法藏的哲學和禪宗神會的哲學，如何處理「真理」和「方法」的關係。在傳統中國佛教的說法，這是有關「教」「禪」關係的問題。「真理」的問題屬於「教」的範圍，而「方法」的問題屬於「禪」的範圍。「教」「禪」關係一直是中國佛教史上核心的問題。究竟是「從禪出教」呢？還是「禪不離教」呢？「禪教一致」？還是「教外別傳」？這些中國佛教長期關心的議題。若和印度佛教比而觀之，發現漢傳佛教的特色是不再認為**真理的證成**是關鍵的問題，而是認為**真理的開顯**才是核心的問題。印度佛教以真理的證成為首要關切，故重視因明與量論；中國佛教以真理的開顯為終極關懷，基本上認為真理證成的工作早已為印度論師完成，無需重複論證性工作。對於中國佛教來說，因明與量論不是開顯真理的必要方法，取而代之的是實相的**現象學式描述與詮釋**。現象學式描述與詮釋成為中國佛教的主要方法。不同於印度唯識學的「識的現象學」，漢傳佛教的理論特色是「智的現象學」；前者可稱為「分別的現象學」，考察「識所緣唯識所現」的經驗，而後者可稱為「無分別的現象學」，著重於描述覺悟的經驗。以智顛的天台哲學和法藏的華嚴哲學來說，他們都試圖揭顯實相，其中華嚴著意於佛境界(海印三昧)的圓融無礙，而天台則關注在三諦三觀下不斷九法界的佛境界。華嚴法藏如何從唯真心的立場開顯圓融無礙的佛境界，天台智顛如何從「一念無明法性心」的立場開展「一念三千」的境界，皆以其不同的觀法為基礎，如何從禪出教，從方法到真理，這是本計畫所要回答的問題。

關鍵詞：天台宗、華嚴宗、真理、方法、現象學

English Abstract:

This research project aims to explore the intrinsic relation between truth and method in Chinese Buddhism. In contrast to Indian Buddhism, which is inclined to justify truth claims with epistemic and logical argumentation, Chinese Buddhists tend to describe the truth with the phenomenological method. In this project, I will argue that the ontological truth in the Tiantai and Huayen Schools should be existentially disclosed in the methodical context. The method in Chinese Buddhism can be characterized as “phenomenology of insight (*jñāna*)”, while the method in Indian Buddhism, the Yogācāra School in particular, can be characterized as “phenomenology of consciousness (*viññāna*)”. The former is similar to Heidegger’s existential phenomenology, while the latter is in parallel to Husserlian phenomenology. The only difference is that the truth in Chinese Buddhism can be seen with the enlightened eyes only. The project is mainly focused on Tiantai Zhiyi (538-597)’s method (concentration and contemplation) and truth (threefold truth).

Keywords: Chinese Buddhism, Truth, Method, Phenomenology, Tiantai, Huayen, Chan

(二)報告內容

(1) 本研究計畫之背景、目的、重要性

本研究計畫以「漢語佛教哲學的真理與方法問題」為題，乃為本人 2004-2007 年國科會計畫「大乘瑜伽行派與中觀學派之知識論爭論及其宗教性意涵的研究」之延續性計畫。該 2004-2007 年計畫以大乘佛教瑜伽行派和中觀學派關於知識論（量論）的不同哲學立場與彼此之間的交涉為重點。第一年以「初期大乘瑜伽行派的知識論與邏輯—以《解深密經·如來成所作事品》『四種道理』為考察線索」為題，第二年以「陳那《集量論》量論研究」為題，第三年以「月稱《淨名句論》批判陳那量論的研究」為題。就計畫進行至今的結論而言，發現印度大乘佛教（中觀學派與唯識學派）的教義，如中觀學「緣起性空」或唯識學「唯識無境」之真理宣稱，必須經過不同形式的證成程序。證成的方法，各家不同。大致上，瑜伽行唯識學派採取因明（邏輯與知識論）的方法，而中觀學派（龍樹和月稱）則持應成辯破（辯證）的方法。不論是因明或應成，其為真理宣稱的方法論基礎並無二致。若有差別的話，則在於瑜伽行唯識學派的邏輯論證意識十分明確，因明操作於止觀次第中的安排亦十分清楚，可以說是「方法」先於「真理」；中觀學則不同，可以說是「真理」先於「方法」，或說是「存有論」先於「方法論」（可類比於海德格和嘉達美的哲學詮釋學）。因此，若欲瞭解印度大乘佛教哲學而僅論其形上學的部分，如「緣起性空」或「唯識無境」，未能抉擇其相應的方法論，則往往淪於獨斷的教義學論述，無法瞭解其真正的哲學底蘊。

以印度大乘佛教為參照面，吾人發現中國漢傳大乘佛教哲學在「真理」與「方法」關係的問題上有完全不同的處理態度。本研究計畫即擬從比較研究的角度探討漢語佛教哲學，特別是天台宗哲學，如何處理「真理」和「方法」的關係。在傳統中國佛教的說法，這是有關「教」「禪」關係的問題。「真理」的問題屬於「教」的範圍，而「方法」的問題屬於「禪」的範圍。在中國佛教史上，「教」「禪」關係一直是核心的問題。究竟是「從禪出教」呢？還是「禪不離教」呢？「禪教一致」？還是「教外別傳」？這些中國佛教長期關心的議題，若和印度佛教比而觀之，發現其特色是不再認為**真理的證成**是關鍵的問題，而是認為**真理的開顯**才是核心的問題。印度佛教以真理的證成為首要關切，故重視因明與量論；中國佛教以真理的實證為終極關懷，基本上認為真理證成的工作早已為印度論師完成，不需要再度重複去做，因此不需要延續印度佛教的論證性工作。對於中國佛教來說，因明與量論不是開顯真理的必要方法，取而代之的是實相的**現象學式描述與詮釋**。現象學式描述與詮釋成為中國佛教的主要方法。

在這裡必須說明的是，我將佛教哲學的「真理」概念區分為「命題真理」（propositional truth）和「存在真理」（ontological truth），前者如「三法印」、「四聖

諦」或《解深密經》之「七真如」，皆以命題的形式陳述，而後者則指存在實相的「離言法性」或「真如」。事實上，關於「真如」之語義，如 袴谷憲昭所提出，一說是來自於形容詞 *tatha*(正確)的抽象名詞，義為「正確」；另說是來自副詞 *tathā*(如此，這樣)的抽象名詞，義為「如此存在」。袴谷憲昭稱前者為「論理主義」的解釋，而後者為「事實主義」的解釋。全體佛教，包括瑜伽行派，都傾向於事實主義的解釋。袴谷區分「真如」的兩種用法---邏輯知識論的用法和存有論的用法，和上述「命題真理」和「存在真理」的區分若合符節（參見袴谷憲昭，《唯識の解釋學—『解深密經』に読む》，頁 87）。當我們在前面說印度佛教強調「命題真理」的證成，並不同於說印度佛教不以「存在真理」的直觀為首要關懷。事實上，如 袴谷憲昭所指出，全體佛教，不論是印度佛教或中國佛教，緣起論或實相論，都傾向於以「存在真理」的實證為終極目標。差別的是，在印度佛教，不論是中觀或唯識，都視「論證」（邏輯或辯證法）為世俗諦的必要，並認為那是現觀法性的必要階段。反觀中國佛教，「論證」（邏輯或辯證法）作為世俗諦中的必要階段則完全受到忽略。早期佛教邏輯和知識論典籍的傳譯，如《方便心論》、《迴諍論》、《如實論》等，未曾受到應有的注意，即使後來玄奘傳譯陳那的《因明正理門論》和商羯羅的《因明入正理論》，蔚為顯學，然不及三代而絕。從哲學史來說，中國佛教（台、賢、禪、淨）在六、七世紀以後的發展，說明了對於「存在真理」的**體證興趣**完全壓倒對於「命題真理」的**論證興趣**。

漢傳佛教主要關注的是有關實相的現象學式描述與詮釋，其中實相是真理，而現象學式描述與詮釋是方法，真理唯有在現象學的還原與描述中始得以開顯。這是本計畫的要點。為此，這裡有必要就我所理解的「佛教現象學」略作說明。依胡賽爾，現象學本身就是方法，在反思個人的經驗時，首先將一般關於外在世界存在的自然態度「懸擱」（*epoché*）起來，接著描述由「能思」-「所思」的意識結構所呈現的經驗。現象學並不關心吾人所經驗到的世界是否為外在世界，因為該形上預設的世界存在已經被懸擱起來。現象學關心的是世界如何呈現在吾人的經驗中。描述是此階段的工作，其目的在於消除各種理論性的預設，讓所描述的事物如實呈現於生活世界中，而非作為科學世界中的對象。生活世界中的事物都是意識的所思項，不離於意識的意向性。這就是「事物本身」。（Herbert Spiegelberg 曾經將現象學的方法操作列為七項，後四項為觀察現象在意識中的構成、觀察顯現的方式、存在信念的懸擱、現象意義的詮釋）。

不過，若比觀於佛教哲學，上述的現象學方法乃屬於「識的現象學」，不同於漢傳佛教之為「智的現象學」；前者可稱為「分別的現象學」，考察「識所緣唯識所現」的經驗，而後者可稱為「無分別的現象學」，著重於描述覺悟的經驗。關於「識的現象學」，學界多集中在唯識學的現象學解釋，如早期的耿寧（Iso Kern）（論唯識學四分說、唯識三世），到最近的張慶熊（胡賽爾與熊十力）、倪梁康（《八識規矩頌》譯注）、吳汝鈞（《唯識現象學》）、司馬春英（《唯識思想 と現象學》）、

Dan Lusthaus (*Buddhist Phenomenology*)、Plamen Gradinarov 等，多是從胡賽爾現象學的角度重新詮釋唯識哲學。倪梁康明確的宣稱：「現象學是一門現代版的唯識學」，二者皆認為「我們無法回答意識如何超出自己之外去切中和把握外部事物的問題」，也都認為應該將關於外在世界的「形上學問題擱置起來，放棄超越的設定，緊緊面對我們的意識本身，停留在意識的內在之中」（《新譯八識規矩頌》，「導讀」，4）。這些研究對於本計畫所擬推進的漢傳佛教「智的現象學」研究很有啟發性的幫助。

關於「智的現象學」，有待進一步的考察。現象學的發展分歧為胡賽爾的超越現象學和海德格的實存現象學，前者奠基於「超越自我」(transcendental ego)，後者則回到「在世存有」(being-in-the world)。超越現象學的立場近於華嚴的性起說，而實存現象學的立場近於天台的性具說。以智顛的天台哲學和法藏的華嚴哲學來說，他們都試圖揭顯實相，其中華嚴著意於佛境界（海印三昧）的圓融無礙，而天台則關注在三諦三觀下不斷九法界的佛境界。華嚴法藏如何從唯真心的立場開顯圓融無礙的佛境界，天台智顛如何從「一念無明法性心」的立場開展「一念三千」的境界，皆以其不同的觀法為基礎，如何從禪出教，從方法到真理，這是本計畫所要回答的問題。「智的現象學」特別關注「智」的分析，不論是「一念心」或「唯心」的分析。至於禪宗，特別是神會，本計畫將特別著重保羅呂克所強調的存有、文本與行動的關係，試圖從神會語錄發現詮釋學的殘餘，作為未來教禪再度合流的伏筆。

(2) 國內外有關本計畫之研究情況、重要參考文獻之評述

有關天台、華嚴、禪宗的研究文獻，可謂汗牛充棟，無法也沒有必要一一列舉說明。本研究的方法上以牟宗三先生在其《佛性與般若》(上、下冊)對法藏、智顛、神會思想的疏解為主要參照，釐清其判釋，進而指出牟氏的存有論詮釋固然深有洞見，也有所不見。其所不見之處，本計畫將指出，主要是將實相的展示從觀法中抽離出來，未能正視諸家的觀法對於真理開顯的重要性。如此，若僅論其真理，而未能將「真理」置於「方法」的實踐程序中，其所展現的存有論真理必流於抽象；相反地，唯有將實相論重新置入觀法實踐中，才能開顯真理的實義。本計畫以「智的現象學」概括漢傳佛教的方法，即旨在於補充牟氏存有論詮釋的不足處。因此，談到國內外有關本計畫之研究情況與重要參考文獻，必須先提到牟宗三的《佛性與般若》，其論法藏華嚴思想見該書上冊第二部第六章「起信論與華嚴宗」(頁 481-572)，講述華嚴經大旨、真如不變隨緣、隨緣不變，海印三昧與法界緣起，以及判教。牟氏論天台智顛思想，主要見於該書下冊第三部「天台宗之性具圓教」第一分之四章。事實上，牟氏對於實相與止觀的關係十分清楚：「止觀是行者主觀修行功夫，實相是止觀功夫所證顯之境，而實相境是就『一念無明法性心即具十法界』而證顯者。無苦可捨，無集可斷，無道可修，無滅可證，

即是在『三道即三德』下，在『不斷斷』中證顯實相也...存有論的色(非色之色)、如(非如之如)、所(非所之所)是由『一念心即具十法界』之存有論的圓具而來。存有論的心、智、能(非心之心、非智之智、非能之能)是由圓頓止觀而來。」(頁 753-754)唯牟氏多就存有論而說，而未細說如何從止觀修行到實相開顯的過程。關於禪宗部分，見《佛性與般若》下冊「法登論天台宗之宗眼兼判禪宗」一章的「判攝禪宗」一節(頁 1039-1070)。論及禪宗時，牟氏試圖判釋慧能和神會何者較為契合佛教究極的立場，也就是「圓教」的立場。這涉及禪教是否可以合說。一般多就禪宗發展的史實而言禪教合一，宗密就華嚴而言禪教合一，就是典型的例子；牟氏則一反舊說，順著宋法登的《圓頓宗眼》依天台宗而言禪教合一，認為慧能禪可契合於天台圓教，而神會禪則就其為華嚴禪教而屬別教。牟宗三認為整個禪宗，包括慧能和神會，都肯定如來藏自性清淨心，屬於真常心系，這一點和呂澂、印順的觀點沒有不同。不同的是，牟氏進一步抉擇如來藏三義：一、即真如理以言如來藏，此為阿賴耶系統(世親)所說的理佛性；二、如來藏即是自性清淨心，這是一般所說的真常心系所說的如來藏自性清淨心，此心性具有實體義，也即此實體義的心性說「直指本心，見性成佛」；三、如來藏原有的實體性格被打散，僅就實相而詭譎地使用「如來藏」概念，那就是天台圓教的如來藏。以這三義來看，神會禪屬於第二義，其心性有實體性格，慧能禪則近於第三義，其心性並不宜以實體視之。同樣地，牟氏這裡的興趣仍擺在存有論上，其與止觀實踐的關係如何，仍待進一步細論補充。由於本計畫的哲學分析以牟宗三的觀點為主要參照，故先說明如上。

(3) 研究方法、進行步驟及執行進度。

本計畫的研究方法基本上是哲學的分析與詮釋，首先設定所擬研討的哲學問題，

也就是漢傳佛教的「真理」與「方法」關係的問題，然後就研究對象(漢傳佛學的天台、華嚴、禪)選取相關文獻，如天台智顛的《釋禪波羅蜜次第法門》、《修行止觀坐禪法要》、《摩訶止觀》，華嚴法藏的《華嚴發菩提心章》、《華嚴經探玄記》、《修華嚴奧旨妄盡還源觀》，和禪宗神會的《南陽和上頓教解脫禪門直了性壇語》、《菩提達摩南宗定是非論》、《南陽和尚問答雜徵義》，作為文獻解讀的所本，考察個別處理「真理」與「方法」關係的問題。在實際進行的步驟上，則在上述的研究方法之外，必須額外進行現象學的研讀，特別是就 E. Husserl, *Ideas: a General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology* (Trans. By W. R. Boyce Gibson, 1963)進行細讀。該書是胡賽爾的成熟之作，為瞭解他的現象學(特別是超驗現象學)最恰當的著作。另外也必須研讀其他有關現象學與佛教哲學的比較研究，如上所述的倪梁康、吳汝鈞、司馬春英、Dan

Lusthaus、Plamen Gradinarov 諸人的研究。必須聲明的是，本研究進行漢傳佛教哲學和現象學的會通，藉以開發新議題，推進佛教哲學和當代哲學的對話，以生發出新的哲學意義，其目的並非是有關現象學的專家研究。現象學的專家研究不是本研究的重心，而是作為漢傳佛教的比觀對象與詮釋資源。

(4) 研究成果

本計畫的研究成果共發表四篇論文，其中三篇出版中：

5. Lin Chen-kuo, 2011 (forthcoming), "Phenomenology of Awakening in Zhiyi's Tientai Philosophy," in Morny Joy, ed., *After Appropriation: Explorations in Intercultural Philosophy and Religion*. Calgary, Canada: The University of Calgary Press.
6. 〈天台止觀與智的現象學〉，發表於「第六屆南北哲學論壇」，香港中文大學哲學系，2010年12月20-21日。
7. "Disclosing the Truth in the Methods of Buddhist Meditation: A Proposal for the Future of Philosophy and Religion," presented at the First German-Chinese Conference, "Philosophy AND Religion," Freie Universität Berlin, Berlin, Germany, 2010/7/19-22.
8. 〈真理與意識---從佛性論爭到朱陸異同的二種東亞哲學類型〉，發表於「華人處境中的宗教研究」研討會，香港中文大學，1月21-23日，2010。
9. "Truth and Mind in the Vijñaptim ātra-Tathāgatagarbha Controversy: A Comparative Approach," presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Academy of Religion, Montreal, Nov 7-10, 2009.

Phenomenology of Awakening in Zhiyi's Tiantai Philosophy

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“Buddhism can be paralleled only with the highest formations of the philosophical and religious spirit of our European culture. From now on it will be our destiny to blend that Indian way of thinking which is completely new for us, with the one which is for us is old, but which in this confrontation becomes alive and strengthened.”¹

—Edmund Husserl

I. Introduction

In this article I will explore the Buddhist phenomenology of awakening as exemplified in the philosophical writings of Zhiyi (538-597), the founder of the Tiantai School of Buddhism. The phrase “phenomenology of awakening” was deliberately coined in contrast to “phenomenology of mundane experience.” In the Buddhist context, the former may be referred to as “phenomenology of insight” whereas the latter is classifiable as “phenomenology of consciousness.” In both forms of phenomenology, method is required for the disclosure of truth. However, there are different articulations of truth through different methods employed in different religious and philosophical systems. This article will be mainly concerned with how the truth of awakened experience is disclosed through the meditative method in the Buddhist phenomenology of Zhiyi.

Before delving into the discussion proper, I would first like to highlight several preliminary methodological notes. In complying with the formative ideas of this volume, which attempts to investigate the ways in which Western philosophy and religion can be rethought through non-Western categories, I would like to raise two questions. First, in what sense can Zhiyi’s Tiantai philosophy be characterized as a form of phenomenology? Second, in what way can Husserlian phenomenology be further developed into a phenomenology of awakening as envisioned in the Buddhist tradition? For the first question, I would argue that Buddhist philosophy in general

¹ Cited in Karl Schuhmann, “Husserl and Indian Thought,” in D. P. Chattopadhyaya, Lester Embree, Jitendranath Mohanty, eds., *Phenomenology and Indian Philosophy* (Albany, N. Y.: State University of New York Press, 1992), 26.

can be characterized as phenomenological, and that Zhiyi's philosophy is no exception. Viewing Buddhist philosophy in terms of phenomenology has been the trend in recent decades, and the compatibility of the Buddhist and Western ways of philosophizing has been brilliantly explored by several leading scholars, such as J. Mohanty, Iso Kern, Dan Lusthaus, Plamen Gradinarov, and Ni Liangkang. Most of them are interested in teasing out from Yogācāra Buddhism its phenomenological elements, such as the intentional structure of cognition. They insist that the mode of philosophizing needs to shift from metaphysics to epistemology, and then from epistemology to phenomenology. According to the phenomenological approach, both the object of cognition and the act of cognition are seen as two poles in the same structure of consciousness for the reason that consciousness is always conscious of both itself and something else. For both Husserl and Yogācāra, the structure of consciousness consists of three parts: in addition to the object and act of cognition, there also exists the *self-awareness* of consciousness. It is in the domain of consciousness that all experience occurs, including the experience of "things themselves" in both the Buddhist and Husserlian senses. Things themselves should not be regarded as something separate from our conscious experience. Hence, all we need concern ourselves with is *how* things appear in our experience of consciousness, and what we should *not* concern ourselves with is metaphysical speculation. This is the phenomenological attitude shared by Zhiyi and Husserl.

And as we begin to appreciate the similar phenomenological trends in non-Western philosophies, including especially Buddhist philosophy, we should, however, be cautious not to fall into one-sided readings. To gloss over substantive differences in doing comparative philosophy will inevitably result in miscategorizations, such as for example, picturing Mencius as Kant, or Zhuangzi as Heidegger. Taking hermeneutical directives from Ricoeur and Gadamer, I prefer to adopt the method of dialogical reading, hoping that the "other" can be brought into critical conversation. For this essay, therefore, I would like to see in Zhiyi's philosophy the possibility of a contribution to the mainstream of phenomenology. And here arises the second question: Is it possible for phenomenologists to learn anything new from Zhiyi's Buddhist philosophy? What exactly can be added to the diversity of the phenomenological legacy from the canons of Buddhist philosophy?

In order to clearly address these questions, this study has been divided two sections. The first section will attempt to lay out the Buddhist distinction between mundane experience and awakened experience. The two forms of knowledge, mundane knowledge (*vijñāna*) and trans-mundane insight (*prajñā*) will be closely

examined. For convenience, I use “knowledge” to mean “mundane knowledge” and “insight” to mean “trans-mundane knowledge.”² In the second part, I will focus on Zhiyi’s soteriological phenomenology with special attention to the problems of truth, meditation, and insight.

II. Knowledge and Insight

A possible contribution to Husserlian phenomenology might be best found by way of exploring the Buddhist distinctions of enlightened experience and non-enlightened experience. The former arises from the realization of non-discriminative knowledge (*nirvikalpa-jñāna*), whereas the latter, mundane experience, results from discriminative knowledge (*vijñāna*). Through this distinction, we see the inseparability of experience and knowledge.

But before fully fleshing out the distinctions in Buddhist theory, let us look into Husserl first, who was not completely ignorant of Buddhism as religion and philosophy. In a book review written in 1925 for Karl Eugen Neumann’s German translation of the *Suttapitaka*, Husserl praised Buddhism as “a religiosity which looks purely inward in vision and deed—which, I should say, is not ‘transcendent’, but ‘transcendental’—enters the horizon of our religious and ethical as well as of our philosophical consciousness.”³ Although Husserl’s remark is very brief, it nonetheless demonstrates that he did view Buddhist philosophy from the perspective of transcendental phenomenology. Here the term “transcendental” is used by Husserl to mean the attitude that is “directed itself to the life of consciousness—in which the ‘world’ is for us precisely that, the world which is present *to us*—we find ourselves in a new cognitive attitude [or situation],” whereas in the natural attitude “the world is for us the self-evidently existing universe of realities which are continuously before us in unquestioned givenness.”⁴ Husserl seemed quite excited to learn that this “transcendental” insight has long been seen as the guiding principle of Buddhist meditation, that is, the constitution of the world is taken as the object of consciousness

² Since the term *vijñāna* has different usages depending upon context, it will not be translated consistently throughout the article. I felt the best way to avoid confusion was to add the Sanskrit term after the translation, though it may appear somewhat awkward.

³ Karl Schuhmann, *ibid.*, 25.

⁴ Edmund Husserl, “Phenomenology,” in Peter McCormick and Frederick Elliston, eds., *Husserl: Shorter Works* (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981), 27. Regarding the term “transcendental” in Husserl’s usage, scholars have varying interpretations. Dan Zahavi insists that “the specific and unique *transcendental*-phenomenological question is: What are the conditions of possibility for appearance as such?” See Dan Zahavi, *Husserl’s Phenomenology* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003), 54. According to D. W. Smith’s interpretation, the term applies to “pure consciousness in abstraction from its connection with natural or cultural objects or activities.” See D. W. Smith, *Husserl* (London and New York: Routledge, 2007), 447.

in meditative contemplation. Unlike the natural attitude in which the existence of the external world is uncritically assumed, in Buddhist meditation a practitioner is trained to withdraw from all metaphysical assumptions about the world and reside in solitude for sober contemplation. The practitioner believes that unless metaphysical assumptions about the existence of world have been methodically “bracketed,” she will be unable to clearly discern the way that objects appear in consciousness. This mode of thinking may be properly regarded as a shift from “natural attitude” to “phenomenological attitude.”⁵

As mentioned above, the distinction between the enlightened experience and the non-enlightened experience is central to Buddhist philosophy. This distinction can be understood either in terms of ontology or of epistemology. As an ontological distinction, it involves the notion of two *realms* of existence. In view of epistemology, however, the distinction is rather seen as two ways of knowing, i.e., enlightenment and ignorance. According to the Buddhist theory of two truths, these two aspects are inseparable. Methodologically speaking, we should proceed from epistemological analysis to ontological exposition, asking: How does our knowledge of the world become discriminated and concealed? Conversely, what are the conditions for the possibility of unconcealed or non-discriminated knowledge? The Buddhist answer can be found in the various analyses of cognition. Briefly, ignorance (concealment) appears as the result of discriminated knowledge, whereas enlightenment (non-concealed knowledge) is realized by non-discriminated insight. Unless fundamental transformation from the cognitive state of discriminated knowledge to the cognitive state of non-discriminated insight has been accomplished, salvific liberation remains impossible.

In the *Abhidharmaśābhāṣya* of Vasubandhu, *viññāna* and *jñāna* are taken as synonymous with cognition/knowledge. *Viññāna* is defined as cognition relative to each object (*viṣayaṃprativijñapti*).⁶ It is also understood as *upalabdhi* (apprehension), which is etymologically derived from the root \sqrt{labh} , meaning “to seize, get possession of, acquire, receive, obtain, or find.”⁷ In the usage of epistemology, *viññāna* (consciousness) refers to cognition which *seizes* something as its object

⁵ In spite of the above “insight,” Husserl’s “oversight” can be seen in his characterization of Buddhism as “transcendental [subjectivity],” a notion which would seem to contradict the Buddhist doctrinal position of no-self. Historically, the Husserlian notion of “transcendental subjectivity” has been more or less compatible with the Mahayana Buddhist doctrine of mind-only (*citta-mātra*) or consciousness-only (*viññapti-mātra*), though not of course with Early Buddhism.

⁶ *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya of Vasubandhu, Chapter I: Dhātunirdeśa*, ed., Yasunori Ejima (Tokyo: The Sankibo Press, 1989), 17; Bhikkhu K L Dhammajoti, *Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma* (Hong Kong: Center of Buddhist Studies, The University of Hong Kong, 2007), 293.

⁷ Monier Monier-Williams, *Sanskrit-English Dictionary*, 205.

(*viṣaya*) and *makes it known* to the one who cognizes. Accordingly, cognition never exists in itself; it must be the cognition of something. For instance, visual-consciousness never exists without form as the visual object. By the same token, visual-consciousness also needs the visual faculty as the condition for its arising. However, knowledge cannot be explained by the function of sensory *viññāna* only. It requires *prajñā* (understanding) in conjunction with sensory perception for the conditions of knowledge to obtain. In this respect, *prajñā* is defined as the discernment/examination of objects.⁸ In contrast to the longstanding misconception of *prajñā* as “mystical wisdom,” interpreting it rather as the “source of true knowledge” better coheres with the actual usage of the term in the literature. Instead of alluding to something mysterious, most Buddhist philosophers employ the notion of *prajñā* in the epistemological sense. Keeping this in mind, we should resist the tendency to mystify the notion of “insight” in Zhiyi’s philosophy.

Historically, the distinction between “insight/correct knowledge” (*samyagjñāna*) and “discriminated knowledge” (*viññāna*) as two forms of knowledge seems to make its first appearance in Yogācārin literature. In the *Yogācārabhūmi*, “insight/correct knowledge” is defined as “intuitive knowledge of things themselves (*tathatā*)” in contrast to “discriminated knowledge” which is embedded in conceptualization and verbalization. Three kinds of insight are listed: (1) trans-mundane insight, (2) mundane insight, and (3) trans-in-mundane insight. The first refers to intuitive knowledge of the nonexistence of external objects. The second refers to *abstract* knowledge of things in themselves which is acquired through conceptual thinking (*vikalpa*). The third one refers to the trans-mundane knowledge which is realized within the context of the mundane.⁹ In the *Mahāprajñāpāramitāśāstra*, we find another account of three forms of insight (correct knowledge) similar to those elaborated in Yogācārin literature. They are (1) insight of all phenomena (*sarvajñatā*), (2) insight of paths (*margajñatā*) and (3) insight of all modes of phenomena (*sarvākārajñatā*).¹⁰ As we shall see below, this theory of threefold insight plays an

⁸ Cf., Bhikkhu Dhammajoti, *Abhidharma Doctrine and Controversy on Perception* (Sri Lanka: Center for Buddhist Studies, 2004), 18-19.

⁹ *Yogācārabhūmi*, T.30.696.a

¹⁰ In contrast to Abhidharma epistemology, *prajñā* and *viññāna* are rather placed in opposition to each other in the Prajñāpāramitā literature. True knowledge (*prajñā*) is attainable only when one comes to realize that no knowledge is attainable. According to Prajñāpāramitā thought, just like magic, emptiness can be known through non-apprehension (*anupalabdhi*). In this regard, *prajñā* obtained through *anupalabdhi* (= *nirvikalpa*) is opposed to *viññāna*, which is obtained through *upalabdhi* (= *vikalpa*). In other words, Prajñāpāramitā thinkers stand for “negative epistemology” instead of “positive epistemology.” The problem of “non-apprehension” or “negative cognition” was taken up again via the positive understanding by the later Buddhist philosophers such as Dignāga and Dharmakīrti. The historical development of negative epistemology does not concern us at this stage. For *anupalabdhi* in the Prajñāpāramitā literature, see Edward Conze, “The Development of Prajñāpāramitā Thought,” in *Thirty Years of Buddhist Studies* (New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal,

important role in Zhiyi's philosophy.

The distinction between knowledge and insight was also further elaborated in the Yogācārin theory of the eightfold consciousness and fourfold insight. Briefly speaking, in Yogācāra's transformative phenomenology, the eightfold consciousness (five sensory consciousnesses, apperceptive-consciousness, ego-consciousness, and storehouse-consciousness) must be transformed into fourfold insight (all-accomplishing insight, intellectual discerning insight, equality insight, and mirror insight).¹¹ That is, the five sensory consciousnesses are transformed into all-accomplishing insight, apperceptive-consciousness to intellectual discerning insight, self-consciousness to equality insight, and storehouse-consciousness to mirror insight. A brief outline of the theory of fourfold insight found in Xuanzang's *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi* is provided below (T.31.56.a):¹²

- (1) Mirror Insight (*ādarśajñāna*): "The mind associated with this insight is dissociated from conceptual constructions (*vikalpa*). Its objects of cognition and their characteristics are too subtle and difficult to be discerned... It is pure and free of impurity... Like a great mirror, it reflects the images of all physical objects."
- (2) Equality Insight (*samatājñāna*): "The mind associated with this insight sees the nondiscrimination of all existents, including self and other sentient beings. It is always associated with great compassion... It is also the special support for intellectual discerning insight."
- (3) Intellectual Discerning Insight (*pratyavekṣāñājñāna*): "The mind associated with this insight perfectly sees the particular (*svalakṣaṇa*) and the universal (*sāmānyalakṣaṇa*) of existence. It functions without any hindrance."
- (4) All-accomplishing Insight (*krtyānuṣṭhāñājñāna*): "The mind associated with this insight is capable of performing actions of body, speech, and thought for the benefits of all sentient beings."

The above theory of insight in Yogācārin philosophy can be summarized as

2000), p. 127.

¹¹ Louis de La Vallee Poussin, translated and annotated, *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi: La Siddhi de Hiuan-tsang* (Paris: Librairie Orientaliste Paul Geuthner, 1928), 685f; also cf., Maitreyanatha/ Aryāsaṅga, *The Universal Vehicle Discourse Literature (Mahāyānasūtrālamkāra)* (New York, NY: American Institute of Buddhist Studies, 2004), 98-101. For analysis of *nirvikalpa-jñāna*, see Leslie S Kawamura, "Nirvikalpa-jñāna: Awareness Freed from Discrimination," in Koichi Shinohara and Gregory Schopen, eds., *From Benares to Beijing: Essays on Buddhism and Chinese Religion* (Oakville, Canada: Mosaic Press, 1991).

¹² For Xuanzang's *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi*, also see Wei Tat's English translation: Hsuan Tsang, *Ch'eng Wei-Shih Lun: The Doctrine of Mere-Consciousness*, trans. by Wei Tat (Hong Kong: The Ch'eng Wei-Shih Lun Publication Committee, 1973), 766-781.

follows: Insight is freed from conceptual construction. Following the Abhidharma usage, the Yogācārin notion of insight refers to the cognitive function of understanding (*prajñā*), which is always associated with various forms of cognition (*viññāna*). The key factor responsible for the distinction between insight and knowledge is conceptual construction (*vikalpa*) in association with cognition. Insight is freed from conceptual construction, whereas ordinary knowledge is embedded in conceptual construction. In most Buddhist texts, *viññāna* and *vikalpa* are often taken as synonyms, with the latter being more appropriately understood as the “constitution of meaning” in the structure of noesis and noema. In addition to epistemic meaning, *vikalpa* also connotes a sense of psychological attachment. For Buddhism, knowing something is not merely a cognitive act. It is always associated with, or even dominated by, various non-cognitive or ideological factors. This is the reason why the fundamental form of insight is referred to as “insight freed from conceptual/ideological construction.” With insight one is capable of correctly cognizing the aspects of object: the particular and the universal. As Dignāga argues, these two aspects of the object are known by perception and inference respectively. Aside from this, there is nothing else one can know. According to Abhidharma, however, a yoga-practitioner is capable of directly perceiving the universal character of object.¹³ With insight one also cognizes the equality of all existents, i.e., the truth that all existents are *equally* empty of permanent essence.

There is another crucial issue left for further investigation. *Is insight, which is said to be freed from the act of conceptual construction, intentional?* If the answer is affirmative, what then is the intentional structure of insight? Can we find the same threefold intentional structure (noesis, noema, self-awareness) in insight? If insight has the same intentional structure of consciousness, then the difference between two forms of knowledge requires an explanation. Historically, this issue was debated in the Chinese Yogācāra School. Three theories were given in response to this issue in Xuanzang’s *Siddhi* (T.31.49.c-50.a): (1) Insight is void of the structure of noesis (the part of seeing) and noema (the part of the seen); (2) Insight is structured in noesis and noema; and (3) In insight noesis exists only, but not noema. The last theory, held by Dharmapāla and Xuanzang, was considered the orthodox view.¹⁴ In regards to the debate, however, it should be noted that fundamental insight is generally characterized as being devoid of subject as the grasper (*grāhaka*) and object as the grasped (*grāhya*). The duality of subject as the grasper and object as the grasped is merely a mental

¹³ See Bhikkhu K L Dhammajoti, *Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma* (Hong Kong: Center of Buddhist Studies, The University of Hong Kong, 2007), 358-360.

¹⁴ Shunkyo Katsumata, *Bukkyo in okeru Shinshiki-setsu no Kenkyū* (Tokyo, Sankibo, 1961), 172-184, 278-280.

construction, which can be eliminated due to its being void of permanent essence. However, the noesis-noema structure in insight remains without change even if the duality of subject-object is eliminated.

In sum, the difference between mundane knowledge and insight rather lies in the function of objectivating act, i.e., cognitive construction (*vikalpa*).¹⁵ In mundane knowledge, noesis (the seeing) is objectivated as the subject-as-grasper and noema (the seen) is objectivated as the object-as-grasped. In contrast, the act of objectivation ceases to function in the enlightened experience while the structure of noesis and noema remains intact in regards to insight. This interpretation can be justified by the Yogācārin theory of the three natures (*trisvabhāva*), although it differs somewhat from the orthodox position held by Dharmapāla and Xuanzang. According to the theory of three natures, the duality of grasper and grasped belongs to discursive constructions (*parikalpita*) whereas the structure of consciousness is seen as the ground of phenomena in dependent-arising (*paratantra*). This theory holds that it is discursive construction, instead of phenomena itself, that should be eliminated.

III. Zhiyi's Phenomenology of Awakening

Let us now turn to Zhiyi. What is the enlightened experience disclosed in Zhiyi's philosophy? What is Zhiyi's conception of mind/consciousness? And what is Zhiyi's response to Yogācāra and Mādhyamika? Before addressing these questions in detail, I would like to first point out that Zhiyi was more eager than his contemporaries to take on a phenomenological approach for disclosing the experience of "things themselves (Ch. *shixiang*, real phenomena)." However, he was discontented with Yogācāra's epistemological approach and also rejected the metaphysical idealism prevalent in certain Chinese Yogācāra sects. As to the Mādhyamika approach, Zhiyi was largely sympathetic. Unlike Indian Mādhyamika thinkers, however, he was not interested in doing logical and epistemological justification for the "thesis" of emptiness. For Zhiyi, the most important issue was the direct realization of "things themselves" through meditation (cessation and contemplation). Zhiyi maintained that without the direct realization of "things themselves" in meditation, truth would remain abstract and

¹⁵ Iso Kern renders "*dharsanabhāga*" (the act of seeing) by "objectivating act" and "*nimittabhāga*" by "objective phenomenon". For Yogācāra, there are two levels of objectivation, one on the mental (*paratantra*) level, the other on the discursive (*parikalpita*) level. The latter is grounded in the former. Husserl himself takes "objectivation," which is defined as "outward experience form" as the condition of objectivity of science. See Eugen Fink, *Sixth Cartesian Meditation* (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1995), 104. For Kern's interpretation, see Iso Kern, "The Structure of Consciousness According to Xuanzang," *Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology*, Vol. 19, No. 3, Oct. 1988, 282-295.

speculative, and thus completely useless for realizing enlightenment. As a devoted Buddhist practitioner, Zhiyi held meditation to be the only genuine path to awakening.

Mind and Worlds

Let us now examine Zhiyi's theory of mind/consciousness, which he holds to be the first object of meditative contemplation. In contrast to Abhidharma and Yogācāra's dualistic conceptions of mind in two aspects (deluded mind and enlightened mind), Zhiyi urges us to return to the *experience* of mind before the metaphysical categorizations of mind as deluded and pure. For Zhiyi, the practical implication of the dualistic conception of mind is that a certain period of *time* is required for accomplishing the soteriological task of transformation from the deluded state of mind to the pure state of mind. Zhiyi clearly rejects metaphysical speculation about time, which, as he believes, will in the end take us nowhere. On the contrary, Zhiyi contends that the problem of time should be treated *within* the context of meditative practice. That is, time is pragmatically conceivable only in terms of the evolving process of consciousness in meditation. For both Zhiyi and Husserl, one should methodically bracket metaphysical assumptions about the existence of mind and world in order to make the experience of worlds-in-mind fully manifested. Just like Husserl, Zhiyi asks us to turn to "contemplation of mind (*guanxin*)" in which all worlds are manifested. Let us see how Zhiyi presented his phenomenological description of mind in the famous passage on "three thousand worlds in one-instant mind"¹⁶:

A single thought exists along *with* the ten realms. A single realm exists along *with* the [other] ten realms, so there are one hundred realms. One realm exists along *with* thirty types of worlds [i.e., each of the ten realms are included in each of the three types of worlds: the world of sentient beings, the worlds of the five skandhas, and the worlds of lands]; multiplied by one hundred realms. This results in the existence *with* three thousand types of worlds. These three thousand [worlds] exist along *with* a single momentary thought. If there is no mind, that is the end of the matter. If there is even an ephemeral mind, it exists *with* three thousand [realms]. [emphasis added]

In Paul Swanson's translation, "one mind" is rendered as a "single thought" in order to "avoid the implication of a reified 'mind' as separate from mental functioning and

¹⁶ Zhiyi, *Mohezhi guan*, T.46.54.a. I adapt Paul Swanson's English translation with some modifications. Swanson's translation is available on-line at <http://www.nanzan-u.ac.jp/~pswanson/index.html>.

‘objects’ that are experienced.”¹⁷ This clarification is quite helpful. However, I did take issue with his translation of *ju* as “include.” Instead, I render it as “exist along with,” indicating the simultaneous correlativity of mind (as intentional act) and worlds (as intentional objects). That is, whenever a single thought/mind arises, there simultaneously arises the realm of objects to which it correlates. This description ties in with the classic insight of phenomenology which holds that mind is always conscious of something as its intentional object. Hence, if we follow Swanson in translating the first sentence as “A single thought *includes* the ten dharma realms,” the interpretative results will be in opposition to Zhiyi’s own phenomenological intent.

How should we then interpret Zhiyi’s famous statement, “Three thousand worlds exist *with* a single momentary thought”? It would be pretty easy to understand this statement if Zhiyi had claimed that a single thought arises with a single world. However, the theory of one-to-one correspondence between mind and world is subject to Zhiyi’s criticism because it contradicts the Buddhist teaching of emptiness. For there is nothing called “one single thought,” neither is there anything called “one single world.” Everything, including mind and world, exist inter-relatively and inter-penetratively without self-nature. Instead of being taken as an empirical description, Zhiyi’s fundamental maxim should be read as a description of “real phenomena” which have been realized through phenomenological reduction. In other words, this statement should be understood in view of insight, instead of in view of empirical knowledge. As a result of this phenomenological reduction, all phenomena are themselves shown as the objects inter-relatively constituted in the non-objectivating consciousness.

Zhiyi continues to clarify what is and what is not the proper understanding of the relation between mind and worlds. It is important to note that for Zhiyi the phenomenon of *being-with* cannot be explained by any form of metaphysics. Among various forms of metaphysics, Zhiyi rejects metaphysical idealism in particular, which includes the idealisms of both pure and deluded mind. In Zhiyi’s own words,

If all phenomena arise *from* a single moment of mind, this is a vertical [relationship]; if a mind in one moment *encompasses* all phenomena, this is a horizontal [relationship]. But these are neither [merely] vertical nor [merely] horizontal. It is just that mind *is* all phenomena, and all phenomena *are* mind. Therefore [the relationship of mind and phenomena] is neither vertical nor horizontal; they are neither the same nor different. This is mysterious and subtle,

¹⁷ See Paul Swanson, note 94 on page 64.

profound in the extreme; it cannot be grasped conceptually, and cannot be verbalized. This is what is called [contemplating] “realms of experience as inconceivable.” [emphasis added]

Zhiyi concludes that the only alternative way for disclosing the meaning of *being-with* is the method of meditation, but not through any metaphysical speculation. For Zhiyi clearly rejects two forms of metaphysics, namely transcendental idealism (of pure mind) and empirical idealism (of deluded mind). The former is characterized by Zhiyi as the “vertical” way of thinking by which phenomena is explained as being transcendently grounded in the absolute (pure) mind, and the latter as the “horizontal” way of thinking which explains phenomena through epistemological analysis. Zhiyi argues that since both forms of metaphysics are rooted in representational thinking, which is also called “conceivable thinking;” they are incapable of making real phenomena (things themselves) fully manifest. In this respect, we find that Zhiyi, Husserl, and Heidegger exploit similar lines of reasoning in formulating their rejection of metaphysics. For Zhiyi in particular, the truth of “real phenomena” is concealed within the conceivability of metaphysics.

Truth and Method

The motif of Zhiyi’s philosophy is the disclosure of the truth of real phenomena through meditation. Ontologically speaking, truth exists prior to method. Practically, truth needs to be disclosed through method. Thus, in the Buddhist tradition, truth can be realized only through the method of meditation. Though quite complicated, Zhiyi’s system of meditation can be divided into two paths: the gradual and the sudden. The sudden path of meditation is often considered the key to producing the experience of perfect and sudden awakening, while the gradual path is regarded as the preparatory step to the final goal of meditation, i.e., the aforementioned perfect and sudden awakening. However, some contend that the difference between the two paths is merely pedagogical, even if the end of Zhiyi’s own philosophy conceived as the culmination of sudden awakening. Regarding this issue, I rather see in Zhiyi’s system of meditation the gradual path as the necessary training for the superior practice of perfect and sudden awakening.

In Zhiyi’s system, a practitioner aims to disclose the experience of awakening by taking threefold truth as the object of threefold contemplation. The fruit of practice is called “threefold insight.” Therefore, in regards to the architectonics of meditation, Zhiyi’s system consists of the structure of threefold truth, threefold contemplation,

and threefold insight.¹⁸

(1) Threefold Truth: Truth can be viewed from three aspects, consisting of (i) the truth of emptiness, stated as “all phenomena are empty,” (ii) conventional truth, i.e., truth of discourse, and (iii) truth as the middle way, i.e., truth as the full disclosure through double negation of the two truths. In contrast to Mādhyamikan theory of truth, Zhiyi develops a dialectical hermeneutic to make phenomena fully disclosed in each aspect. That is, the enlightened experience will not disclose itself in the truth of emptiness and the conventional truth respectively; it must also be disclosed in the truth of the middle way. No aspect of truth should be separated from the other two aspects, because truth can never be exhausted from a single perspective. Truth shows itself only through the holistic and dialectical contemplation. According to this pattern of threefold truth, part and whole are dialectically interrelated and holistically integrated, wherein the whole can be manifested only through the dynamic dialectics of the parts.¹⁹

(2) Threefold Meditation: For Zhiyi, the meditation of cessation and contemplation is instrumental for the realization of truth. This is witnessed in Zhiyi’s magnum opus, *Mohezhiquan (Great Calming and Contemplation)*. The method of meditation is further divided into threefold cessation and threefold contemplation with correspondence to threefold truth and threefold insight. However, it must be noted that this system of meditation does not function mechanically. That is, the first contemplation does not merely take the truth of emptiness as the object. By the same token, the second contemplation does not merely take the discursive truth as the object and the third contemplation does not take the middle way as the object. For Zhiyi, one should practice contemplation dialectically and dynamically. The first step is to enter into emptiness from the conventional, which will lead to an insight that reveals the conventionality of all phenomena, i.e., the emptiness. This methodic move is similar to Husserl’s shifting from the natural attitude to the phenomenological attitude. The second move is then a return to the conventional from emptiness through a reverse dialectic. Driven by salvific compassion, a practitioner takes this move to return to the mundane world (conventional world) from the state of emptiness, which results in skillful command of the knowledge of the mundane world. In comparison, the second move in Tientai dialectical meditation is rather similar to the call for

¹⁸ “Threefold truth refers to the object which is illuminated by the one instant mind. Threefold contemplation refers to the act which is initiated by the one instant mind. Threefold insight refers to that which is accomplished by [threefold] contemplation.” See *Mohezhiquan*, T.46.55.c.

¹⁹ Zhiyi, *Fahua Xuanyi*, T.33.705.c; also cf., Paul Swanson, *Foundations of T’ien-t’ai Philosophy: The Flowering of the Two Truths Theory in Chinese Buddhism* (Berkeley, CA: Asian Humanities Press, 1989), 252-253; Mou Zongsan, *Foxing yu Boruo*, Vol. 2 (Taipei: Xuesheng Shuju, 1977) 647-671.

returning to the life-world in Husserl’s later writings. The third move is thus to realize that the previous two moves are merely provisional for the final realization of things themselves. When one arrives at this final stage, there will be attachment to neither the first truth nor the second. The practitioner will rather be illuminated by the three truths simultaneously. This final move is called the “contemplation of the middle way,” which manifests the highest form of insight, namely, the insight of all modes of phenomena.²⁰

(3) Threefold Insight: According to the *Prajñāpāramitāsāstra*, the text from which Zhiyi’s theory of threefold insight is borrowed, (i) “insight of paths” (*margajñatā*) refers to all kinds of mundane knowledge which are required for the fulfillment of religious goals, and (ii) “insight of all phenomena” (*sarvajñatā*), or “omniscience,” refers to the *abstract* truth of all phenomena gained by the elimination of ignorance, and (iii) “insight of all modes of phenomena” (*sarvākārajñatā*) refers to the *concrete* truth that is realized in all aspects of phenomena.²¹ The sequence of practice is stated as follows: Insofar as one has obtained the knowledge of the paths beforehand, one can be said to know the *abstract* truth of all phenomena. Next, one progresses to the *concrete* knowledge of all aspects of phenomena and then proceeds to cut off all habitual defilements in the final enlightenment.²²

Thus, in view of the gradual path, the three forms of insight are taken as independent of one another. On the other hand, threefold insight can be attained within a single instant of mind via the sudden path. It is in a single instant mind that threefold truth arises simultaneously with threefold insight and threefold contemplation. Now, how could all of these occur *simultaneously*? The answer to this conundrum is found in Zhiyi’s conception of mind. In addition to the intentionality of mind as *being-with*, a notion which we have already explained above, everyday mind is also characterized as both deluded *and* pure. Put it in Buddhist parlance, everyday mind has been in ignorance (*avidyā*) from the very beginning, which is equivalent to saying that mind is the function of mental construction (*vikalpa*). According to the Buddhist theory of emptiness, however, everything, including even ignorance, is empty in itself. Since ignorance is empty of itself, it follows that mind as ignorance is also empty of itself. Hence, mind should be conceived as both ignorance and emptiness. As a consequence, if mind as ignorance is taken as the phenomenological ground of phenomena, mind as emptiness, i.e., *prajñā*, must also be taken as the

²⁰ Zhiyi, *Mohezhi Guan*, T.46.24.b.

²¹ Cf., Fa Qing, *The Development of Prajñā in Buddhism: From Early Buddhism to the Prajñāpāramitā System*, Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Calgary, 2001, 92-95.

²² T. 25.258.c-260.b.

groundless ground of phenomena. Thus, in view of ignorance, mind functions in the act of objectivation, whereas in view of emptiness, mind is able to function as non-objectivating insight. Finally, in view of the middle way, mind is characterized *neither* as ignorance *nor* as emptiness. It is characterized as “inconceivable” in the sense that any form of metaphysics will fail to account for the dialectical paradox of mind. As the correlates of mind, all phenomena (the three thousand worlds) also manifest themselves as the inconceivable infinity of mutual penetration. This is the reason why Zhiyi always summarizes his system as “threefold truth within an instant mind,” “threefold contemplation within an instant mind,” and “threefold insight within an instant mind.”²³

IV. Concluding Remarks

Summing up the above exegetical analysis in response to the questions raised at the beginning: (i) In what sense can Zhiyi’s Tiantai philosophy be characterized as phenomenology of awakening? (ii) What can be added to the diversity of the phenomenological legacy when we bring Zhiyi into philosophical dialogue with Husserl? To begin with, Zhiyi and Husserl belong to different traditions. Zhiyi is religion-oriented, and all of his philosophizing is directed toward a soteriological goal. Husserl’s philosophical enterprise, on the other hand, is science-oriented, a fact attested by his dream of establishing phenomenology as the most rigorous science. Although in his later years Husserl became more devoted to ethics and religion, he never considered his philosophical task as a path to spiritual liberation. In spite of the historical differences, however, we do see similarities in the two philosophical systems. On the one hand, Husserl contends that truth consists in two aspects: truth as proposition and truth as evidence. The truth as proposition is based upon truth as evidence “where objects and states of affairs are given intuitively as they themselves are or as given in person.”²⁴ On the other side, Zhiyi placed the theory of threefold truth within the methodical context of meditation. Truth manifests itself only in the mental experience of contemplation. Hence, Zhiyi’s famous dictum, “threefold truth in an instant mind,” might now be better understood in light of Husserl’s theory of “evidence as the experience of truth, i.e., as an intentional act in which the intended object is presented intuitively, though in different degrees of fulfillment.”²⁵

In view of Zhiyi’s “classification of teachings,” on the other hand, Husserl’s

²³ Zhiyi, *Weimojing Xuanshu*, T.38.524.c-529.b.

²⁴ Dieter Lohmar, “Truth”, in Lester Embree, et al., *Encyclopedia of Phenomenology* (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1997), 708.

²⁵ *Ibid.*

phenomenology belongs to the gradual path, whereas Zhiyi considered his own system as the perfect and sudden path which leads to a final realization of the truth of inter-relativity and inter-penetration of phenomena, i.e., the three thousand worlds in one single thought. At the final moment of awakening, one realizes that the world of the rich, the world of the poor, the world of humanity, the world of animals, the world of plants, the world of gods, and the world of ghosts are all interrelated to one other. And as far as any one world is manifested in the mind, all other worlds are also simultaneously manifested. As a result, the experience of awakening is never exclusionary. True awakening, which manifests the enlightened world, must be experienced *along with* all other worlds that have yet to be enlightened. True liberation must be experienced *along with* all other worlds that are still in suffering. This is the core spirit of Zhiyi's phenomenology of awakening.

天台止觀與智的現象學

林鎮國

只有佛教能與歐洲文化中的哲學與宗教精神的最高形式
相比擬。從現在起，我們注定要融合全新的印度思考模
式，在這樣的交會下，我們舊的思維將更顯生氣蓬勃。²⁶

—埃德蒙德·胡塞爾

導言

本文以天台智顛（538-597）的圓頓止觀為例探討佛教「智的現象學」的可能內涵。「智的現象學」一詞乃用來區別以世俗經驗為考察對象的「識的現象學」。在這兩種現象學中，真理需要藉由方法開顯，不同的宗教與哲學系統也會以不同的方法對真理提出不同的解讀。本文的目的即在於闡釋智顛如何在其天台現象學中以獨特的禪修方法揭顯有關真理的覺悟經驗。

在進入正式的討論前，我想先提出一些初步的方法論說明。本文試圖藉由非西方的範疇重新思考西方哲學與宗教的議題，提出兩個問題，第一、在何種情況下智顛的天台哲學可以被視為智的現象學？第二、胡塞爾的現象學可以何種方式進一步發展為在佛教哲學傳統所見的「智的現象學」？關於第一個問題，我將說明一般佛教哲學皆可具有現象學性格，智顛的哲學也不例外。

從現象學的角度檢視佛教哲學在這幾年已成為趨勢，彼此的契合性也已經由許多學者精闢地探討過，例如 J. Mohanty、Iso Kern、Dan Lusthaus、Plamen Gradinarov、陳榮灼、吳汝鈞、倪梁康、司馬春英等人。他們大部分著眼於佛教瑜伽行唯識哲學，爬梳其現象學的元素，特別是意識的意向性結構，指出認知的對象與認知的行為是同一意識結構的兩端，因為意識總是同時覺知其自己與他物。對於胡塞爾與瑜伽行者而言，意識的構成包含三個部份，除了認知對象（相分）與認識行為（見分）外，還包含意識的自我覺知（自證分）。所有的經驗皆在意識的活動中產生，包含佛教與胡塞爾所瞭解的「事物自身」的經驗；「事物自身」不應被視為與我們的意識經驗分離之物，因此我們只須要關注事物如何在我們的意識經驗中呈現，而非關注有關事物存在的形上學思辨，這樣的現象學態

²⁶ 引述自 Karl Schuhmann, “Husserl and Indian Thought,” in D. P. Chattopadhyaya, Lester Embree, Jitendranath Mohanty, eds., *Phenomenology and Indian Philosophy* (Albany, N. Y.: State University of New York Press, 1992), 26。本文原以英文 “Phenomenology of Awakening in Zhiyi's Tiantai Philosophy” 發表於 2008 年在芝加哥舉行的美國宗教學會年會，由林恕安中譯，再經本人潤飾而成。

度顯然為佛教與胡塞爾所共享。

然而，當我們開始在非西方的哲學傳統，特別是佛教哲學，看到類似的現象學面向時，我們更應謹慎地不要落入片面的比附。在做比較哲學時，若掩蓋了實質的不同，將不可避免地導致表面上的類比。本文不擬進行二種哲學系統的比較，而希望以呂格爾與高達美的詮釋學進路，採取對話閱讀的方式，將他者帶入批判性的對談中。因此本文想了解的是，智顛哲學對現象學主流的可能貢獻為何？衍生的第二個問題則是，現象學家能否從智顛的佛教哲學中學習到新的事物？佛教哲學到底有什麼可以增添現象學的多樣性？

為了清楚地說明這些問題，此研究將分為兩部份，第一部分將試圖釐清在佛教中世俗經驗與覺悟經驗的區別，檢視兩種意識的型態—識 (*vijñāna*) 與智 (*jñāna/prajñā*)。為了方便起見，我以「識」表示日常經驗的意識，並以「智」表示覺悟經驗的意識。²⁷ 在第二部份，我將著重闡釋智顛的解脫現象學 (*soteriological phenomenology*)，尤其是在真理、禪修與智的問題上。

識與智

佛教哲學對胡塞爾現象學的可能貢獻也許可以在探索覺悟經驗與非覺悟經驗之區別中找到。前者由無分別智 (*nirvikalpa-jñāna*) 的證得而產生，而後者，也就是世俗經驗，則由分別識 (*vijñāna*) 所生；在這樣的區別中，我們必須了解經驗與意識的不可分離。

在完整說明佛教理論中的區別前，讓我們先看看胡塞爾的理論。胡塞爾並非完全不熟悉佛教的宗教哲學。他在 1925 年曾對卡爾·尤金·紐曼 (Karl Eugen Neumann) 對《經藏》(*Suttapitaka*) 的德譯寫過書評，讚揚佛教是：「一種如此純粹內在視域與行為的宗教性，我應該說，它不是超絕的 (*transcendent*)，而是超越的 (*transcendental*)，進入我們宗教、倫理與哲學意識的視野中。」²⁸ 雖然胡塞爾的評論相當簡短，卻說明了他視佛教哲學為一種超越的現象學的看法。此處，胡塞爾所使用的「超越的」一詞表示「引導吾人至意識生命的態度，於此意識中『世界』如此地呈現於我們面前，我們發現自己處在一個新的認知態度或情境」，而在自然態度中，「世界對我們而言則是自明的現實，持續地在我們面前毫無質疑的既有存在。」²⁹ 對於像胡塞爾這樣對佛學僅具初步認識的西方哲學家

²⁷ 既然 *vijñāna* 這個語詞依於不同的文脈而有所不同，此語詞在此文中將沒有一致性的翻譯；雖然看起來有點奇怪，但我認為最好避免困擾的方式是在翻譯後加上梵文。

²⁸ Karl Schuhmann, *ibid.*, 25. 同註一，第 25 頁。參見劉國英，〈胡塞爾論佛教〉，《現象學與人文科學》，第 3 輯（現象學與佛家哲學專輯）（香港：香港中文大學現象學與人文科學研究中心，2006）。

²⁹ Edmund Husserl, "Phenomenology," in Peter McCormick and Frederick Elliston, eds., *Husserl: Shorter Works* (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981), 27. 在胡塞爾的用法中，關於 "transcendental" 這個語詞，學者有許多不同的詮釋，Dan Zahavi 認為獨特的超

來說，能夠一針見血地以「超絕的」和「超越的」來分辨佛教哲學的性格，確是令人驚異。對胡賽爾來說，「超絕的」指的是對超出意識之外的關於世界存在的形上學預設，正是必須予以懸擱的東西；「超越的」則是反觀主體，在純粹主體性上探問客觀認識的可能性條件的態度，也就是胡賽爾所稱的現象學態度³⁰。我們將指出，佛教的止觀實踐正是這種現象學態度的表現。

胡塞爾顯然認識到長久以來佛教視為禪修指導原則的超越論洞見，在於將世界的構成視為在禪修中的意識對境，完全不同於自然態度對於外在世界的存在不加批判的設定。在佛教禪修中，行者必須懸置所有關於世界的形上學假設，安住於靜觀。修行者相信在方法上除非將世界的形上學假設置入括弧中，他將無法清楚地察覺對境顯現在意識中的狀態；這種思考模式可以稱為從自然態度轉換為現象學態度。³¹

如同上述，覺悟經驗與非覺悟經驗的區別是佛教哲學的核心，這樣的區別可以透過存有論或知識論來解釋；就存有論的區別而言，它指涉二種存在領域，而從知識論的角度而言，則此區別被視為兩種不同的認識方式---覺悟與無明。根據佛教對二諦的見解，此二者（存有論和知識論）是無法分開而談的。就方法來說，我們則應該從知識論的分析進至存有論的說明，探問：我們對世界的知識如何遭到分別與遮蔽？相反地，不被遮蔽與不被分別的知識在何種條件下如何可能？佛教對此問題的答案可以在不同的認知分析下找到。簡言之，無明（遮蔽）為分別智的結果，而覺悟（非遮蔽）則由非分別智所證。除非從分別智的認知狀態根本地轉變為非分別智的認知狀態，解脫救渡將不可能發生。

以世親的《俱舍論》(*Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*) 為「識」(*viññāna*) 與「智」(*jñāna*) 都是認知的同義詞，「識」被定義為對向於所知境的認識 (*viṣayampratīvijñapti*)³²，同時它也被理解為「了知」(*upalabdhi*)，此字的字源由表示「把握、得到、具有、獲得及尋得」的字根√*labh*所衍生³³。在認識論

越現象學問題問：甚麼是現象的可能性的條件？參見 Dan Zahavi, *Husserl's Phenomenology* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003), 54。Zahavi 顯然認為胡賽爾接受了康德的「超越的」概念，而根據 D. W. Smith's 的解釋，「超越的」概念用來指涉從自然或文化的情境或活動中抽離出的純粹意識。見 D. W. Smith, *Husserl* (London and New York: Routledge, 2007), 447。

³⁰ 現象學中關於「超絕的」和「超越的」的概念區分，還可以參考倪梁康，《胡賽爾現象學概念通釋》（北京：三聯書店，1999）頁 455-460。

³¹ 雖說對於上述的「智」，胡塞爾的洞見可以在他視佛教為超越的[主體性]這樣一個似乎與佛教教義無我的立場相違的概念。從歷史的角度來說，胡塞爾之超越的[主體性]的概念雖不見於早期佛教，但已多少與大乘佛教唯識 (*citta-mātra* 或 *viññapti-mātra*) 教義兼容。

³² *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya of Vasubandhu, Chapter I: Dhātunirdeśa*, ed., Yasunori Ejima (Tokyo: The Sankibo Press, 1989), 17; Bhikkhu K L Dhammajoti, *Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma* (Hong Kong: Center of Buddhist Studies, The University of Hong Kong, 2007), 293.

³³ Monier Monier-Williams, *Sanskrit-English Dictionary*, 205.

的用法上，*vijñāna*表示取某物為對境 (*viṣaya*)，並使某物為該取者所知；據此，認知從未自己存在，它必須是關於某物的認識。例如，眼識若無色作為對境便不可能存在，同樣的道理，眼識也需要眼根作為生起的條件。然而認識無法單由覺知的功能識 (*vijñāna*) 所解釋，它需要結合「慧」(*prajñā*) 心所作為獲得知識的條件。在這裡，「慧」指對境的識別活動。³⁴相對於將「慧」誤解為神祕的智慧，佛教文獻通常將其解釋為正確知識的來源。大部分的佛教哲學家都從認識論來使用「慧」這概念，而非如鈴木大拙一般地從禪宗的用法來指涉某種神秘性的直觀。瞭解到這一點，我們應該拒絕將智顛哲學中的「智」的概念予以神秘化。

從歷史來看，正智 (*samyajñāna*) 與分別識 (*vijñāna*) 為識的兩種形式首先出現在瑜伽行派的文獻中。在《瑜伽師地論》中，正智被定義為事物自身 (真如) 的直觀認識，而分別識則涉及概念及名言。智可再分為三種：(1) 出世間智、(2) 世間智、(3) 世間出世間智。出世間智指的是以真如為對象的直觀認識；世間智是指藉由概念分別而得，以言說相為對象的知識；世間出世間智則是指在世間的情境下證得關於出世間的正智。³⁵在《大智度論》中，我們也發現類似於瑜伽行文獻中對此三智的解釋：(1) 一切智 (*sarvajñatā*) (2) 道種智 (*margajñatā*) (3) 一切種智 (*sarvākārajñatā*)³⁶。正如我們將看到以下的論述，三智的理論在智顛哲學中扮演重要的角色。

識與智的區別也在漢傳唯識學派的八識四智理論中獲得進一步的發展；簡單來說，在瑜伽行的轉依現象學 (*transformative phenomenology*) 中，八識 (五識、意識、末那識及阿賴耶識) 必須轉化為四智 (成所作智、妙觀察智、平等性智、大圓鏡智)³⁷，也就是說，前五識轉化為成所作智，意識轉為妙觀察智，末那識轉為

³⁴ Cf., Bhikkhu Dhammajoti, *Abhidharma Doctrine and Controversy on Perception* (Sri Lanka: Center for Buddhist Studies, 2004), 18-19.

³⁵ T.30, 696a.

³⁶ 相較於阿毗達磨的認識論，智與識似乎在般若文獻中處於相對的立場。行者唯有了知無任何識可得，才能證得真智。根據般若的教義，唯有透過不可得 (*anupalabdhi*) 才能了知空性。因此，透過不可得之智與由分別可得而來的識正相對反；也就是說，般若學者的立場為否定的知識論 (*negative epistemology*) 而非肯定的知識論 (*positive epistemology*)，而不可得或否定認知的問題由後來的佛教哲學家，再次地獲得積極的處理。不過此處否定知識論的發展歷史不是我們主要的考量。在般若文獻中有關「不可得」的概念可見 Edward Conze, "The Development of Prajñāpāramitā Thought," in *Thirty Years of Buddhist Studies* (New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal, 2000), p. 127。近年關於 *anupalabdhi* 的問題由 Birgit Kellner 的研究而受到注意。

³⁷ Louis de La Vallee Poussin, translated and annotated, *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi: La Siddhi de Hiuan-tsang* (Paris: Librairie Orientaliste Paul Geuthner, 1928), 685f; also cf., Maitreyanatha/Aryāsaṅga, *The Universal Vehicle Discourse Literature (Mahāyānasūtrālamkāra)* (New York, NY: American Institute of Buddhist Studies, 2004), 98-101. 對於 *nirvikalpa-jñāna* 的分析，見 Leslie S Kawamura, "Nirvikalpa-jñāna: Awareness Freed from Discrimination," in Koichi

平等性智，阿賴耶識轉為大圓鏡智。關於四智的理論概要可以在玄奘的《成唯識論》看到³⁸。為求較為清晰的解讀，我將每段引文的英文摘譯擺在引文下供參考：

- 一、大圓鏡智相應心品。謂此心品離諸分別，所緣行相，微細難知，不妄不愚，一切境相，性相清淨，離諸雜染，純淨圓德現種依持，能現能生身土智影，無間無斷，窮未來際，如大圓鏡，現眾色像。³⁹
- 二、平等性智相應心品。謂此心品觀一切法自他有情悉皆平等，大慈悲等，恒共相應，隨諸有情所樂示現受用身土影像差別，妙觀察智不共所依，無住涅槃之所建立，一味相續，窮未來際。⁴⁰
- 三、妙觀察智相應心品。謂此心品善觀諸法自相共相，無礙而轉，攝觀無量總持之門及所發生功德珍寶，於大眾會能現無邊作用差別，皆得自在，雨大法雨，斷一切疑，令諸有情皆獲利樂。⁴¹
- 四、成所作智相應心品。謂此心品為欲利樂諸有情故。⁴²

上述瑜伽行派哲學有關智的理論略解如下：智是離分別概念的，依循阿毗達磨的用法，瑜伽行派對智的看法是表示慧心所(*prajñā*)的認知功能，此慧心所總是相應於不同型態的識而作用，而區分智與識的關鍵因素在正於概念分別(*vikalpa*)與識相應，與智則不相應。智不涉及概念分別，而一般的識則涉及概念分別。在大部分的佛教文本中，識(*vijñāna*)與分別(*vikalpa*)常被視為同義，後者更適合被理解為在能意(*noesis*)與所意(*noema*)的意識結構下所進行的意義構成活動。另外，除了知識論的意義外，分別也意味心理層面的執取。對佛教而言，了解某物並不單只是認知行為，它還涉及或甚至受到許多非認知或觀念因素所支配。這是為何「智的根本形態」被認為是離分別的原因，行者以此智能夠正確地認知對境，不論是自相或共相。如同陳那所述，此對境的兩面向可為現量與比量所知，除此之外，沒有任何其它方式可以認識對境。然而，根據阿毗達磨，瑜伽

Shinohara and Gregory Schopen, eds., *From Benares to Beijing: Essays on Buddhism and Chinese Religion* (Oakville, Canada: Mosaic Press, 1991).

³⁸ 玄奘的《成唯識論》(T31.56a)之英文翻譯，見 Wei Tat 的 Hsuan Tsang, *Ch'eng Wei-Shih Lun: The Doctrine of Mere-Consciousness*, trans. by Wei Tat (Hong Kong: The Ch'eng Wei-Shih Lun Publication Committee, 1973), 766-781.

³⁹ Mirror Insight (*ādarśajñāna*): “The mind associated with this insight is dissociated from conceptual constructions (*vikalpa*). Its objects of cognition and their characteristics are too subtle and difficult to be discerned... It is pure and free of impurity... Like a great mirror, it reflects the images of all physical objects.”

⁴⁰ Equality Insight (*samatājñāna*): “The mind associated with this insight sees the nondiscrimination of all existents, including self and other sentient beings. It is always associated with great compassion... It is also the special support for intellectual discerning insight.”

⁴¹ Intellectual Discerning Insight (*pratyavekṣāñjñāna*): “The mind associated with this insight perfectly sees the particular (*svalakṣaṇa*) and the universal (*sāmānyalakṣaṇa*) of existence. It functions without any hindrance.”

⁴² All-accomplishing Insight (*kṛtyānuṣṭhāñjñāna*): “The mind associated with this insight is capable of performing actions of body, speech, and thought for the benefits of all sentient beings.”

行者能夠直接了解對境的共相⁴³，行者依於此智可以認知所有存在事物的平等性，也就是所有存在皆平等地空無自性。

另一重要的主題將留待進一步探究，那就是離分別智是否有意向性？如果答案是肯定的，那麼，此智的意向結構為何？我們是否能在此智中找到相同的意向性架構(見分/能意，相分/所意與自證/自我覺知)？如果此智有相同的意向性架構，便需要解釋認識的兩種形式--識與智--之間的差別。從歷史來看，此主題也曾在中國瑜伽行派中爭論過，在玄奘的《成唯識論》(T31.49c-50a)中就提到三種關於智的結構的解釋：(1)智為見相俱無，(2)智為相見俱有，(3)智為見有相無；其中護法與玄奘所持的第三種看法被認為是正統的見解⁴⁴。一般將根本智理解為能取所取皆空，能取的主體與所取的客體之二元性只是心識的構成，而此二元性可由空性的認知而被消除。然而對智來說，即使能所二元已經消除，見相二分的架構依舊不變。這是智為相見俱有的觀點。《成唯識論》則以「見有相無」為正義，認為「雖有見分而無分別，說非能取，非取全無。雖無相分而可說此帶如相起，不離如故，如自證分緣見分時，不變而緣，此亦應爾。」意思是說，智有見分，然此見分不起分別的作用，只有直觀的作用；作為智的直觀的對象是真如，真如並非相分，其能作為智的認識對象，乃緣於智挾帶如相而起而不起分別。即此而言，此觀點和「相見俱有」說並沒有太大的差別。

總之，識與智的差別在於分別(*vikalpa*)，也就是客體化行為的作用⁴⁵。在識的活動中，見分被客體化為能取之主體，而相分被客體化為所取之客體。相反的，客體化的行為在覺悟經驗中停止其功能，但見分(能意)與相分(所意)的意識結構則維持不變。雖然此解釋與護法及玄奘所主張的正統立場有些不同，但此說可以從瑜伽行的三性理論得到證明；依據三性論，能取所取二元性屬於遍計執，而識在依他起中被視為現象的底基，無可取消，這個理論認為要遮除的是現象的虛妄分別而非意識現象自身。⁴⁶

⁴³ 見 Bhikkhu K L Dhammajoti, *Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma* (Hong Kong: Center of Buddhist Studies, The University of Hong Kong, 2007), 358-360.

⁴⁴ 勝又俊教，《仏教における心意識の研究》(東京：山喜房佛書林，1961)，172-184、278-280。

⁴⁵ Iso Kern 以「客體化行為」與「客觀現象」分別翻譯「見分」和「相分」。對於瑜伽行者而言，客體化分為二層面，一為心識層面(*paratantra*，依他起性)，另一為名言的層面(*parikalpita*，遍計所執)，後者立基於前者。胡塞爾自己將客體化定義為作為科學客觀性之條件的外向經驗形式(outward experience form)。見 Eugen Fink, *Sixth Cartesian Meditation* (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1995), 104. 至於 Kern 的解釋，見 Iso Kern, "The Structure of Consciousness According to Xuanzang," *Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology*, Vol. 19, No. 3, Oct. 1988, 282-295..

⁴⁶ 倪梁康在其〈客體化行為與非客體化行為的奠基關係問題---從唯識學與現象學的角度看「識」與「智」的關係〉(2008年11月15日發表於政治大學哲學系)一文中，明確地界定與區分客體化行為與非客體化行為：「所謂客體化行為或心王，并不仅仅是指含有或指向客体的行为，而且更主要是指能够原本地构造出客体的行为；而所谓非客體化行為或心所，并不是指不含有或不指向客体的行为，而是指不能原本地构造出客体的行为。例如，作为非客體化行為，

智顓的智的現象學

在說明唯識哲學關於識與智的區分之後，我們接著來檢視智顓的主張：什麼是在智顓哲學中所揭露的覺悟經驗？智顓對心識的主張為何？智顓對瑜伽行派及中觀學派的看法又為何呢？在說明這些問題前，我想先指出智顓比起他同時代的佛教思想家更傾向採取現象學的路徑來揭示實相的經驗。他不滿瑜伽行派的認識論路徑，並拒絕普見於中國初期瑜伽行派（地論師）所主張的唯心論形上學。至於中觀學派的的路徑，智顓則多表支持；然而不像印度的中觀學者，他對於以邏輯與知識論證成空性的作法沒有興趣。對智顓而言，最重要的課題是如何藉由禪修（止觀）現證實相。智顓認為若沒有在禪修中現證實相，真理將永遠只是抽象的理論而已，對修證覺悟完全無用。身為虔誠的佛教修行者，智顓認為只有禪修才是真正的覺悟之道。

心與世界

現在，讓我們來檢視智顓對心識的主張。他認為心識是禪修止觀的首要重點。相對於阿毗達磨與瑜伽行派以虛妄與覺悟兩面向的二元性來區分識與智，智顓敦促我們在形上學分類上將心分為虛妄與清淨之前回到心的當下經驗。對智顓而言，心的二元概念的實用意義在於教導行者在一段時間內完成從虛妄分別轉化到心之純淨狀態的救渡任務。智顓清楚地拒絕這種以對於時間的形上思辨為前提的理論，認為形上學思辨對我們毫無益處。相反地，智顓聲稱時間的問題只能在禪修的脈絡中來看待，也就是說，只有在涉及禪修的意識活動過程時間才能獲得恰當的理解。

對智顓與胡塞爾而言，行者應將有關心與世界存在的形上學預設在方法操作上置入括弧，使「一念三千」的經驗得以完整地彰顯。如同胡塞爾一般，智顓要求我們轉向心的觀照，藉以開顯由心所具的各種世界。讓我們看看智顓如何在其膾炙人口的「一念三千」說呈現他對於心的現象學描述：⁴⁷

夫一心具十法界，一法界又具十法界百法界，一界具三十種世間，百法界即具三千種世間，此三千在一念心；若無心而已，介爾有心即具三千。⁴⁸

“信（相信）”这种心识活动不是没有客体，而是有客体的。它必须有自己的对象，须有“所信”。信的客体或是人，或是物、或是神，或是动物。但“信”仍然不是客体化行为，因为它不能像表象那样构造出它的客体，而是必须借助于对人、物、神、动物等的表象来获得自己的客体。在此意义上，表象在逻辑上先于信。」（頁 4）可惜的是，該文並未如副標題所示，針對「識」與「智」的區分做出進一步的說明。不同於倪梁康的比較研究，本文認為在唯識學傳統中，「識」與「智」的區分就在於客體化行為和非客體化行為的區分中。

⁴⁷ 智顓，《摩訶止觀》（T46, 54a），Swanson 的英文翻譯可見於

<http://www.nanzan-u.ac.jp/~pswanson/index.html>。

⁴⁸ “A single thought exists along *with* the ten realms. A single realm exists along *with* the [other] ten realms, so there are one hundred realms. One realm exists along *with* thirty types of worlds [i.e.,

在保羅·史文生(Paul Swanson)的英文翻譯中,「一心」譯為「一念 (single thought)」以「避免將心實體化而成為離開心識作用及其經驗對境而獨立的東西」⁴⁹。此說明相當有幫助,然而我不同意他將「具」翻譯為「包含」(include),而認為「具」應該譯為「伴隨存在」(exist along with)以表示心(作為意向性活動)與世界(作為意向相關項)同時發生的結構性關係;也就是說,每當一念生起時,所有意向活動相關項的對境也同時生起。此描述與現象學的傳統見解相呼應,在現象學中心總是意識到它所意向的某物。因此,如果我們順著Swanson的第一句翻譯「一念包含十法界」,這樣的解釋將造成與智顛的現象學意圖相反的立場。

那麼,我們應如何詮釋智顛最著名的「一念三千」呢?若智顛已宣稱一念心伴隨一世界的生起,則此文句相當容易了解;然而,心與世界之間一一對應理論受到智顛的批判,因為此將抵觸佛教對緣起空性的教法。因為沒有任何事物可稱為一念,也沒有任何事物可稱為一世界,所有的事物包含心與世界在內皆是以無自性地相互關聯相互交涉的方式存在。智顛這句名言應視為藉由現象學的還原而來的關於實相的描述,也就是說,此段文句應該從「智」的角度來,而非從「識」的角度理解。現象學還原使得所有現象本身在非客體化的意識活動中顯現為緣起的對境。

智顛繼續釐清什麼是對於心與世界的恰當理解。要注意的是,對智顛而言,「具」的現象無法以任何形式的形上學來說明;在各式形上學中,智顛特別拒絕唯心論,不論是自性清淨心與虛妄唯識的唯心論。智顛提到:

若從一心生一切法者,此則是縱;若心一時含一切法者,此即是橫。縱亦不可,橫亦不可,祇心是一切法,一切法是心故,非縱非橫,非一非異,玄妙深絕,非識所識,非言所言,所以稱為不可思議境,意在於此(云云)。

智顛的結論是止觀實踐是發掘「具」的意義的唯一可選擇方式,而非透過任何形上學的思辨。如上所言,智顛清楚地拒絕形上學的兩種形式[自性清淨心的]超越唯心論及[虛妄唯識的]經驗唯心論;前者被智顛歸類為縱向思維,主張現象由作為先驗基礎的清淨心所說明,而後者被視為橫向思維,以透過認知分析的方式來說明現象。智顛認為此兩種形上學皆根植於表象思維,他稱之為「可思議」,無法使實相完全地展現。在此處,我們發現智顛、胡塞爾、海德格皆從同一理路來拒斥形上學,尤其是智顛,在形上學的可思議性下,實相的真理必然遭到隱蔽。

each of the ten realms are included in each of the three types of worlds: the world of sentient beings, the worlds of the five skandhas, and the worlds of lands]; multiplied by one hundred realms. This results in the existence *with* three thousand types of worlds. These three thousand [worlds] exist along *with* a single momentary thought. If there is no mind, that is the end of the matter. If there is even an ephemeral mind, it exists *with* three thousand [realms].“ [emphasis added]

⁴⁹ 見 Paul Swanson, 第 64 頁, 第 94 註釋。

真理與方法

智顓哲學的主旨在於藉由禪修以發現實相的真理。就存有論而言，真理存在於方法前；而在經驗上，真理需要藉由方法開顯。佛教傳統則強調需要藉由禪修的方式證悟真理。雖然相當複雜，智顓的禪修系統大致可以分為兩類：漸修與頓修。頓修之道常被視為產生圓頓經驗的關鍵，而漸修之道則被視為到達禪修最高境界也就是圓滿頓悟的準備步驟。然而，即使是智顓的哲學被視為圓頓境界的高峰，有些人聲稱兩者的差別只是在於教學法上的不同；針對於此，我寧可說在智顓的禪修系統中，漸修是達到更殊勝的圓滿頓悟之必要修練過程。

在智顓的止觀系統中，行者將三諦視為三觀的對境，以致力於發掘覺悟經驗，其修成之果則稱為三智。對於禪修次第而言，智顓的系統包含三諦、三觀、三智的對應架構⁵⁰：

(1)三諦：空諦，表述為一切法皆空。假諦，也就是世俗諦。中諦，藉由雙重否定而發現的圓滿中道真理。相對於中觀的實相理論，智顓發展一套辯證的詮釋系統使得萬法的每一側面得以完整地開顯，也就是說，覺悟經驗不會分別開顯於空諦與假諦中，它必須也開顯於中諦；沒有任何一諦應該與其它二諦分離，因為真理從不窮盡於單一的觀點，真理只從整體與辯證觀照中顯現自己。根據此三諦的模式，部分與整體為辯證地相互關聯且全然地整合，唯有藉由部分動態的交互辯證整體才能展現⁵¹。

(2)三觀：對智顓而言，止觀的禪修是了解實相的途徑，此觀點可見於智顓的《摩訶止觀》。禪修方式可進一步分成三止、三觀與三諦、三智的相應。然而，必須注意的是，這禪修系統並非機械性地操作，換句話說，第一觀並非只是以空諦作為對境。同樣道理，第二觀並非只是以假諦為對境，第三觀並非只以中諦為對境。對智顓而言，行者應辯證地、動態地修觀。第一步驟是從世俗進入空性（從假入空），進而引領至顯現萬法之世俗性(假名性)的空性智慧。此方法類似於胡塞爾所說的從自然態度轉換為現象學態度。第二步則透由反面的辯證從空入假，由救渡之慈悲所驅動，行者從空性轉向世俗，從而產生俗世知識的方便法門。相較之下，天台辯證性的禪修更類似於胡塞爾晚期回到生活世界之呼求。由此，第三步驟了解到前兩步驟只是權宜的，最終目的是為了實相的全盤朗現。當行者到達此最終階段，不再執著於空諦與假諦時，行者將同時為三諦所啟悟，這個最終階段稱為中道觀，開展出最高形式的智慧，也就是認識萬法所有狀態的智慧⁵²。

(3)三智：智顓的三智理論由《般若經》而來：道種智(*margajñatā*) 指宗教實踐所

⁵⁰ 「所照為三諦。所發為三觀。觀成為三智。」見《摩訶止觀》T.46, 55c.

⁵¹ 智顓，《法華玄義》(T33, 705c)；又參見 Paul Swanson, *Foundations of T'ien-t'ai Philosophy: The Flowering of the Two Truths Theory in Chinese Buddhism* (Berkeley, CA: Asian Humanities Press, 1989), 252-253；牟宗三(1977)，《佛性與般若》下冊，頁 647-671。

⁵² 智顓，《摩訶止觀》(T46.24b)。

需要的各種世俗知識。一切智(*sarvajñatā*)指藉由遮除無明而得的抽象性真理。一切種智(*sarvākārajñatā*)指了解萬法所有面向的具體性真理⁵³。獲得三智的修行的步驟如下：行者必須事先獲得修道的知識（道種智），才能證得萬法的抽象性真理（一切智）；最後行者進展至一切種智，證得具體性真理⁵⁴。因此，基於漸修之道，三智分別獨立作用，另一方面，可以藉由頓修在一剎那心中證得三智，也就是在一剎那心中，三諦隨著三智與三觀同時生起。

問題是，三諦三觀三智如何能夠同時生起呢？這個難題的答案可在智顛對心的概念中找到。除了上述「心具」的意向性解釋之外，根據智顛的說法，心同時既是無明，也是法性。一念心是無明心，這從經驗上反省即可知。然而無明即法性，因為無明本身無自性，也就是說，無明也是空，因此倒過來可以說空性（法性）是無明的本質，故說「無明即法性，法性即無明」。一念心是無明心，也是法性心，合說「一念無明法性心」⁵⁵。若無明心為現象的基礎，則法性心也必然是現象的無基礎的基礎(*groundless ground*)。因此，從無明的角度而言，心有客體化的作用，因為無明心是分別心；從法性的角度而言，心也可以有非客體化的作用，因為法性心是無分別心。最後，從中道的角度而言，心既不能被視為無明，也不能被視為空性，而應被視為不可思議。也就是說，任何形式的形上學都無法說明心的弔詭性。作為一念心的意向相關項，三千世界的萬法在一念無明法性心中展現為交相互涉的不思議性。這也是智顛的哲學系統總結為一心三諦、一心三觀、一心三智的根本理據。⁵⁶

結語

總結以上的分析，回應本文一開始所提出的問題：智顛的天台哲學在何種情況下可以視為一種「智的現象學」？當我們促成智顛與胡塞爾的哲學對話後，有什麼的佛教哲學可以增添現象學的多樣性？首先必須指出，智顛與胡塞爾分屬不同的文化傳承，智顛哲學是宗教取向，其所有的哲理都指向救渡之目標。胡塞爾的哲學性格則是科學取向，這可從他試圖建立現象學為一門嚴格的科學得到佐證。雖然胡塞爾晚年對倫理學與宗教表現出興趣，他從未認為其哲學任務為一種精神解脫之道。儘管有所差異，我們也看到二種哲學系統的相容性。一方面胡塞爾主張真理可以從兩方面來看：作為命題的真理和作為明證的真理。作為命題的真理奠基在作為明證的真理之上，「在那裡客體與事態如其所是地直觀地給予或親證地給予」⁵⁷。而對智顛來說，在止觀的脈絡下安立三諦，真理只能在觀修的明證中展現；因此，智顛的名言「一心三諦」也許在胡塞爾關於「明證作為真理

⁵³ Cf., Fa Qing, *The Development of Prajñā in Buddhism: From Early Buddhism to the Prajñāpāramitā System*, Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Calgary, 2001, 92-95.

⁵⁴ T 25, 258c-260b.

⁵⁵ 參見牟宗三，《佛性與般若》。

⁵⁶ 智顛，《維摩經玄疏》(T.38, 524c-529b).

⁵⁷ Dieter Lohmar, "Truth," in Lester Embree, et al., *Encyclopedia of Phenomenology* (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1997), 708.

的經驗，也就是明證作為一種意向性行為，在該行為中意向對象直觀地呈現，雖然體現的程度有所不同」的理論中可以得到較好的理解。⁵⁸

另一方面，若從智顛的判教來看，胡塞爾的現象學屬於漸教，而智顛則自認為圓頓之教，此圓教引領行者認識到現象相互關聯相互交涉的最終真理，「一念三千」。此一念心對三千世界的觀照方式，可以是次第觀，也可以圓頓觀。不論是次第觀或圓頓觀，三千世界的實相均以空、假、中的方式開顯。胡賽爾現象學著重於次第觀，觀意向活動的充實或缺如；觀意向活動的充實即是觀有，觀意向活動的缺如即是觀無。換上天台的說法，觀有就是觀假，觀無就是觀空。不同的是，智顛強調「三止三觀，在一念心，不前不後，非一非異」（《摩訶止觀》，T46.131.b）和「三智一心中得」（T46.26.b）的圓頓觀法，讓行者了解到不論是富裕的世界、貧困的世界、人界、動物界、植物界、天界、鬼界，皆互相關聯，只要一界於心展現，所有其他世界也同時展現。因此，覺悟經驗絕非是排他的、獨我的，展現覺證世界的真正覺悟必伴隨所有其他尚未覺證的世界，真正的解脫必然伴隨著所有其他仍在受苦的世界，這是智顛圓頓觀法的真正用心所在，也是智的現象學之核心精神。

⁵⁸ 同前。

Disclosing the Truth in the Methods of Buddhist Meditation: A Proposal for the Future of Philosophy *and* Religion

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In understanding tradition not only are texts understood, but insights are gained and truths acknowledged. But what kind of insight and what kind of truth?

Hans-Georg Gadamer⁵⁹

Let me start from meditating on the main theme of the conference, “Religion *and* Philosophy,” from the perspective of Asian traditions.⁶⁰ Nowadays it has become commonsensical to claim that unlike the European traditions, Asian religion and philosophy have never been separated from each other since the beginning, the feature of which is often considered as the core of tradition. By contrast, the dualistic conflict between religion and philosophy is said to occur in the modern West only. However, if we look into what happens in Asia, we will see that there is no exception to the disintegration of philosophy and religion as the result of the world-wide project of Enlightenment. A new episteme arose in the late eighteenth century in Japan and China when the lexicons of *zongjiao* (*shūkyō* 宗教) and *zhexie* (*tetsugaku* 哲學) were coined as the equivalents of “religion” and “philosophy” to account for both European and Asian traditions.⁶¹ Institutionally, philosophy as an academic discipline was established in East Asia a century before, while in Chinese-speaking regions the study of religion has appeared in the university system only in last two decades. The belatedness of the study of religion is an interesting phenomenon, which can be interpreted differently in light of local and global change. On the one hand, this phenomenon can be taken as a sign of the re-enchanting effect of post-modernity in the age of globalization, indicating Asia is no exception to the returning of the sacred in the overwhelming tide of secularization. On the other hand, it indicates that the separation of philosophy and religion as part of the project of Enlightenment has been

⁵⁹ Hans-Georg Gadamer, “Introduction,” *Truth and Method* (New York: Crossroad, 1975), p. xi.

⁶⁰ This presentation is based on my previous two articles, “Truth and Method in the *Samdhinirmocana Sūtra*” (*Journal of Chinese Philosophy*, 37: 2, 261-275, 2010) and “Phenomenology of Awakening in Zhiyi’s Tiantai Philosophy” (presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Academy of Religion, Chicago, Nov 1-3, 2008). Since both articles deal with the same topic in truth and method, they are brought in the comparative framework to make explicit the gist of Buddhist philosophy in general.

⁶¹ Hsi-yuan Chen, *Confucianism Encounters Religion: The formation of Religious Discourse and the Confucian Movement in Modern China* (PhD dissertation, Harvard University, 1999).

finally localized. Regardless the apparent conflict of interpretations, the mission for reclaiming the holistic unity of religion and philosophy, if there is any feasibility of such kind of project, becomes ironically and equally urgent for the East Asian traditions.

I must say that my proposal is not driven by the romantic anti-modernist sentiment. I have no any intention either to do the negation of philosophy and religion as the separated domains or to promote traditionalism, because, as claimed by Jürgen Habermas thirty years ago, the project of the Enlightenment in the differentiation and specialization of different cultural domains is directed to “the enrichment of everyday life.”⁶² However, we should not overlook the reified autonomy of philosophy and religion which leads to the disintegration of human existence. As the response to the above-mentioned situation, I therefore attempt to show the way in which one can rigorously and critically *do* philosophy within the methodical context of religious practice. For doing so, strategically I choose to focus on the relationship between truth and method in two Buddhist schools, namely the Yogācāra School in India and the Tiantai School in China. The theme I focus here is reminiscent of Hans-Georg Gadamer’s magnum opus, *Truth and Method*. For Gadamer, what concerns him mostly is the experience of truth that “transcends the sphere of the control of scientific method wherever it is to be found.”⁶³ Following Heidegger’s steps, Gadamer is skeptic of the concealing function of positivistic method in the human sciences. In opposite to Gadamer’s anti-methodic stance, however, Paul Ricoeur’s proposal of hermeneutic detour seems much appealing to me when he claims that truth can be disclosed only through the dialectics of multiple methods, including semantic analysis, philosophical reflection, archeology of the subject, critical theory, and so on. As for Ricoeur, we must “resist the temptation to separate *truth*, characteristic of understanding, from the *method* put into operation by disciplines which have spring from exegesis.”⁶⁴ That is, the disclosure of truth cannot be possible without the mediation of method, although concealment as the result is inevitable. As we will see later, the Ricoeurian methodological pluralism comes closer to the Buddhist position.

As for this paper, “method” is referred to the diverse ways of religio-philosophical exercise, including *doing* logic and epistemological analysis, whilst “truth” refers to realization of things themselves either in the form of proposition or in the experience of true being. In the Buddhist terms, “method” is called “dharma-gate” (*fa-meng* 法

⁶² Jürgen Habermas, “Modernity *versus* Postmodernity,” *New German Critique*, 22 (1981): 9.

⁶³ Hans-Georg Gadamer, “Introduction,” *Truth and Method*, p. xii.

⁶⁴ See Paul Ricoeur, “Existence and Hermeneutics,” in *The Conflict of Interpretations* (Evanston, Northwestern University Press, 1974), p. 11.

門), the gates through which the dharma (truth) can be attained. According to the Buddhist tradition, the dharma-gates as the pedagogical instruments are as numerous as the diverse propensity of sentient beings. Those methods are conceived as *upāya*, i.e., the means for enlightenment and liberation. In this connection, doing philosophy is merely one of the numerous dharma-gates through which radical freedom can be achieved at the final stage.

Regarding the Buddhist conception of truth, there is more than one equivalent in Sanskrit. Among the others, *satya* is the first candidate for truth. Derived from the root \sqrt{as} (be, exist), etymologically *satya* means “reality” at the first place. It is used as an ontological concept. However, the etymological origin of *satya* does not prevent its derivative usage as “truth expressed in words.” A good example is seen in the Chinese rendering of *satya* as *di* 諦, meaning “correctness” or “rightness” expressed in words. *Satya* meaning as both “reality” and “correctness” is also witnessed in the Buddhist theory of Two Truths, i.e., the ultimate truth (*paramārtha-satya*) and the conventional truth (*saṃvṛti-satya*). The ultimate truth is referred to as the reality that can be immediately and ineffable experienced, whereas the conventional truth is referred to as the reality expressed in words. Although truth in words is always considered as conventional only, it is nevertheless required in the Buddhist tradition as the necessary step for the realization of the ultimate truth.

In addition to *satya*, there are also several Buddhist terms for the meaning of truth, such as *tattva*, *tathatā*, and *bhūta*. In Mahāyāna Buddhism, however, the central conception of truth is “*tathatā*” (in Chinese, *zhenru* 真如). Similar to the usage of *satya*, the meaning of “*tathatā*” can be known in its two usages, namely truth as correctness and truth as fact, which reflect two Buddhist theories of truth, i.e, logicism and factism. Logicism is more concerned with the judgment of truth and falsity in propositions, while factism is rather committed to the disclosure of facticity.⁶⁵ As we will see below, truth in Indian Buddhism is conceived from both the perspectives of ontology and epistemology. In this paper, truth as the disclosure of facticity is named “ontological truth,” while truth as correctness is named “propositional truth.”

⁶⁵ According to Hakamaya Noriaki’s etymological exegesis, as derived from the adverb stem *tathā* (thus), *tathatā* is firstly used to mean “thusness” or “sheer fact.” Although this etymological interpretation has been commonly adopted in exegesis, Hakamaya also points out another usage of *tathatā* as “correctness,” which is said to derive from the adjective stem *tatha* (true, correct). See Hakamaya Noriaki, *Yuishiki no Kaishakugaku* 《唯識の解釋學》 (Tokyo: Shunjusha, 1994), “Preface,” ii-iv, 86-88; also cf. Hakamaya Noriaki, “Critical Philosophy versus Topical Philosophy,” *Pruning the Bodhi Tree: The Storm over Critical Buddhism*, eds., Jamie Hubbard and Paul Swanson (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 1997), 56-80.

According to Indian Buddhism, truth is realized within the course of meditation in the sequence that the knowledge of propositional truth must precede the knowledge of ontological truth. Put it in another way, the ontological truth can be disclosed only because one has acquired the propositional truth first. However, if we look at Chinese Buddhism, we will see that they have completely different conception of truth. For instance, the Tiantai Buddhist holds the view that the full disclosure of truth cannot be separated from mundane knowledge. Truth is possible simply because ignorance exists. If there is no ignorance, there is no truth either. The paradoxical theory of truth *in* ignorance, which was rarely seen in Indian Buddhism, becomes the hallmark of the Chinese Buddhist thinking.

Truth and Method in Yogācāra Buddhist Meditation

Taking the Indian Yogācāra Buddhist School as an example, I will try to demonstrate the way how the ontological truth can be realized in the final stage of meditation through the logical and epistemological analysis, which is conducted at the middle stage in the progressive course. Let us look at the Yogācāra Buddhist manual of meditation. First, there are two pre-requisites which should be fulfilled before practicing calming and discerning, i.e., relying on scriptures and dwelling on the vow of attaining the Supreme Wisdom of Enlightenment. In the initial stages of meditation, reading scriptures plays a vitally important role. A Buddhist text is taken as a hermeneutic device, which has two features. First, it is the hermeneutical vessel carrying the experiential message of enlightenment. Second, particularly in light of the Abhidharma heritage, a Buddhist text provides an inclusive taxonomy by which all states of affairs can be classified for contemplative analysis.

After reading scriptures, the course of meditation is further divided into four steps in accordance with four meditation objects: (1) "the image of object with non-discrimination" (*nirvikalpa-pratibimba*),⁶⁶ (2) "the image of object with discrimination" (*savikalpa-pratibimba*),⁶⁷ (3) "the limits of states of affairs" (*vastu-paryantatā*)⁶⁸ and (4) "the accomplishment of the task" (*kārya-pariṇiṣpatti*).⁶⁹ The first step is to fix one's mind on an image without any conception and thinking.

⁶⁶ Alex Wayman's rendering of *nirvikalpa-pratibimba* (無分別影像) is "the image devoid of predication." See *Analysis of the Śrāvakaśālistambī Manuscript*, 86. *Vikalpa* refers to a wide range of mental activities, including perception, conception, and judgment.

⁶⁷ Alex Wayman's rendering of *savikalpa-pratibimba* (有分別影像) is "the image attended with predication". See *Analysis*, 86.

⁶⁸ *vastu-paryantatā* 事邊際.

⁶⁹ *kārya-pariṇiṣpatti* 所作成辦.

This is called "calming" (*śamatha*), that is, the calming down of the mind-body.⁷⁰ As far as one's mind-body is calmed down, then he is qualified to move forward to discern/analyze the object of contemplation. The method of discerning is called *vipaśyanā*.

Insofar as all states of affairs are categorized as the meditation objects, e.g., "five aggregates," "twelve sense bases," "eighteen realms," and "four noble truths," the practitioner is ready to attain "all-inclusiveness of knowledge" (*yāvadbhāvikatā* 盡所有性). More important is the realization of "all-inclusiveness of truth" (*yathāvadbhāvikatā* 如所有性) insofar as the truth (*tathatā*) of each and every state of affair is realized.⁷¹ For enlightenment will not be completed and liberation will be impossible, if there is any truth of a particular state of affair is left unrealized.

Seeing the states of affairs as they are in the concentrated state of mind is achieved at the third stage of meditation, i.e., the stage of "the limits of states of affairs." In this stage, calming and discerning are operating synchronically. By the same technique of mediation, due to the unflinching efforts of calming-discerning meditation one is finally capable of attaining the fundamental transformation (*āśraya-parāvṛtti* 轉依) in the last stage of "the accomplishment of the task." Only after one's mind has been fundamentally transformed to non-discriminative insight, the Buddhist practitioner is able to attain the ontological truth, that is, experiencing the things in themselves without any conceptual trace left.

As our problematic is concerned, we want to ask: in which stage of meditation can we find the conventional activity of philosophy? The philosophical activity, such as analysis, reasoning, argument and justification, which is called *yukti* in the Indian Buddhist tradition, takes place at the stage before the final realization, i.e., the stage of "the limits of the state of affairs." In that stage, a practitioner is said to be able to comprehensively know the truth of all existents. It should be noted that these truths are stated propositionally. The well-known example is Four Noble Truths. The Yogācārin will add another truth-statement to the list: "All conditioned existents are consciousness-only."

⁷⁰ Alex Wayman's rendering of *śamatha* as "calming the mind" seems to fail to take into account the fact that the body also needs to be calmed. It is stated in the text that both bodily alleviation (*kāya-praśrabhī*) and mental alleviation (*citta-praśrabhī*) are required as the preconditions for philosophical contemplation. See *SNS*, T.16.698.a; Lamotte, 89.

⁷¹ The term *yāvadbhāvikatā* (盡所有性) is defined in the *SNS* as the limit of all states of affairs, pure and impure, such as those comprised in five aggregates, six internal sense bases, and six external sense bases. See *SNS*, T.16.699.c. The same account is also seen in the *Śrāvakabhūmi*, T.30.427.b-c.

As the objects of contemplation, those propositional truths are investigated with the method of philosophical analysis (*yukti*). The Yogācārins practice four methods of reasoning, i.e., (1) reasoning to know the dependence of existence on others (*apekṣā-yukti* 觀待道理), (2) reasoning to know the effectual function of existence (*kārya-kāraṇa-yukti* 作用道理), (3) reasoning for proof (*upapatti-sādhana-yukti* 證成道理), and (4) reasoning to know the true nature of existence (*dharmatā-yukti* 法爾道理) are employed to examine the basic Buddhist truths.⁷² Among them, the reasoning for proof as the prototype of the Buddhist theory of knowledge is mostly important. The truth that is analyzed with the method of reasoning cannot be other than the propositional truth, while the ontological truth would be disclosed only consequently at the final stage of meditation, i.e., the “accomplishment of the task.”

At the final stage of meditation, the “accomplishment of the task,” the propositional truths need to be deconstructed and substituted by the intuition of ontological truth. The distinction between the final stage and the previous stages lies in the radical transformation of cognition. At the previous stages of meditation, the objects in the form of images are known by the analytical mind. The truth of these objects is attained through logical and epistemological analysis. However, it is at the final stage of meditation that one comes to know the objects devoid of image/concept through pure perception, which is also called “non-conceptual insight.” That is, the ontological truth of the state of affairs is fully disclosed at the final stage. By contrast, the propositional truths attained at the previous stages have their provisional function only.

As mentioned above, reading the scriptures in which the Buddhist truth is embodied is hermeneutically required at the beginning stage of meditation. However, a practitioner does not merely accept the Buddhist truths as dogmas. She is rather asked to examine and verify by herself the truths that have been taught. In the course of meditation, such sort of examination and verification of the propositional truths is carried out in the method of reasoning for proof. Five conditions are said to be fulfilled for the validity of proof: (1) direct perception (*pratyakṣa*), (2) inference that is based on perception, (3) analogy (*upamāna*), (4) soundness of argumentation, and (5) scriptural authority (*āgama*).⁷³ Among the five conditions, perception, inference and scriptural authority are considered to be the valid means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*) in Buddhist

⁷² *Yogācārabhūmi*, T.30.451.c. Also see Yoshimizu Chizuko, “*Samdhinirmocanasūtra* nitsuite shishu no yukti ni tsuite,” *Journal of Noritasan Institute for Buddhist Studies*, 19 (1996): 160. Whether the meaning of *yukti* is understood as “reasoning” or “reason” will be explained below.

⁷³ *SNS*, T.16.709.b; Lamotte, 156, 263.

epistemology.⁷⁴

In sum, as the relation between truth and method is concerned, we found that, for the Yogācārins, truth would not be obtained without being situated in the course of meditation. Truth and method are mutually related. On the one side, the Yogācāra's methodical practice is designed as a progressive course of meditation. On the other side, the levels of truth are also differentiated in accordance with different stages of meditation. Roughly, there are two levels of truth, i.e., propositional truth (truth expressed in propositions) and ontological truth (true being). The latter is obtained at the last stage of meditation, while the former is obtained at the stage preceding to the last stage. Between two stages, there is radical transformation of mind, i.e., from the conceptual mind to the non-conceptual mind. The conceptual mind takes propositional truth as its object, while the non-conceptual mind takes ontological truth as its object. Between two levels of knowledge, the deconstructive practice called "wedge-evicted-by-wedge" is required for achieving such a radical transformation.

Truth and method in Tiantai Buddhist Meditation

When we turn to the Chinese side of Buddhist development, we find a completely different conception of truth in the methodical course of meditation. The example we choose for comparison is Zhiyi's (智顓 538-597) doctrine of Threefold Truth, Threefold Insight, and Threefold Contemplation, which is the foundation of the Tiantai School, the first Sinitic form of Buddhism. Comparing the strong inclination toward logic and epistemology in Indian Buddhism, Zhiyi and most of Chinese Buddhists do not think that they are obliged to justify the Buddhist truth through logical and epistemological analysis. What truly matters for them is not the problem of epistemic justification. On the contrary, they rather assume the validity of the truth declared by the Buddha. For them, the key issue is rather to find the adequate method of meditation by which truth can be practically witnessed.

The questions we would like to address here are: What is the enlightened experience envisioned in Zhiyi's philosophy? What is Zhiyi's conception of truth with reference to the theory of mind/consciousness? Firstly, Zhiyi was more eager than his contemporaries to take a phenomenological approach for disclosing the experience of "things themselves (Ch. *Shixiang* 實相)." By "phenomenological approach" I take it to mean the rejection of metaphysical attitude, which can be seen in Zhiyi's discontent with Yogācāra's epistemological approach as well as his rejection of the metaphysical

⁷⁴ SNS, T.16.709.c-710.a; Lamotte, 264.

idealism prevalent in some Chinese Buddhist sects. For Zhiyi, the most important issue was the direct realization of “things themselves” through the practice of meditation (cessation and contemplation).

Before examining Zhiyi’s teaching of meditation, we have to understand his theory of mind/consciousness, because he holds that mind itself is the first object of meditative contemplation. In contrast to Abhidharma’s and Yogācāra’s conceptions of mind in two aspects (deluded mind and enlightened mind), Zhiyi urges us to return to the *experience* of mind before the metaphysical categorizations of mind as deluded and pure. For Zhiyi, the practical implication of the metaphysical conception of mind is that a certain period of *time* is required for accomplishing the soteriological transformation from the deluded state of mind to the pure state. Zhiyi clearly rejects such kind of metaphysical speculation about time, which, as he believes, will in the end take us nowhere. On the contrary, Zhiyi contends that the problem of time should be treated *within* the domain of consciousness. That is, time is conceivable only in terms of the evolving process of consciousness right in meditation. For both Zhiyi and phenomenology, one is asked to methodically bracket metaphysical assumptions about the existence of mind and world in order to make the experience of worlds-in-mind fully manifested. Just like Husserl, Zhiyi asks us to turn to “contemplation of mind (*guanxin* 觀心)” in which all worlds are manifested.

In the famous passage on “three thousand worlds in one-instant mind,” Zhiyi describes the mind in the phenomenological style:⁷⁵

A single thought exists along *with* the ten realms. A single realm exists along *with* the [other] ten realms, so there are one hundred realms. One realm exists along *with* thirty types of worlds [i.e., each of the ten realms are included in each of the three types of worlds: the world of sentient beings, the worlds of the five skandhas, and the worlds of lands]; multiplied by one hundred realms. This results in the existence *with* three thousand types of worlds. These three thousand [worlds] exist along *with* a single momentary thought. If there is no mind, that is the end of the matter. If there is even an ephemeral mind, it exists *with* three thousand [worlds].

In Paul Swanson’s English translation, “one mind” is rendered as a “single thought” in order to “avoid the implication of a reified ‘mind’ as separate from mental

⁷⁵ Zhiyi, *Mohezhiqian* 摩訶止觀, T.46.54.a. I adapt Paul Swanson’s English translation with some modifications. Swanson’s translation is available on-line at <http://www.nanzan-u.ac.jp/~pswanson/index.html>.

functioning and ‘objects’ that are experienced.”⁷⁶ This clarification is quite helpful. However, I did take issue with his translation of *ju* 具 as “include.” Instead, I render it as “exist along with,” indicating the simultaneous correlation of mind (as intentional act) and worlds (as intentional objects). That is, whenever a single thought/mind arises, there simultaneously arises the realm of objects to which it correlates. This description ties in with the classic insight of phenomenology which holds that mind is always conscious of something as its intentional object. Hence, if we follow Swanson in translating the first sentence as “A single thought *includes* the ten dharma realms,” the interpretative results will be in opposition to Zhiyi’s own phenomenological intent.

How should we then interpret Zhiyi’s famous statement, “Three thousand worlds exist *with* a single momentary thought”? This statement would be pretty easy to understand if Zhiyi had claimed that a *single* thought arises with a *single* world. However, the theory of one-to-one correspondence between mind and world is subject to Zhiyi’s criticism because it contradicts the Buddhist teaching of emptiness. For there is nothing called “one single thought” per se, neither is there anything called “one single world” per se. Including mind and world, everything exist inter-relatively and inter-penetratingly without essence. Instead of being taken as an empirical description, Zhiyi’s famous motto should be read as a description of “real phenomena” which have been realized through phenomenological reduction. In other words, this statement should be understood in view of insight (Skt. *prajñā*, Ch. *zhi* 智), instead of in view of empirical knowledge. As a result of this phenomenological reduction, all phenomena are themselves shown as the objects inter-relatively constituted in the non-objectivating act of consciousness.

Zhiyi continues to clarify what is and what is not the proper understanding of the relation between mind and worlds. It is important to note that for Zhiyi the phenomenon of *being-with* cannot be explained by any form of metaphysics. Among various forms of metaphysics, Zhiyi rejects metaphysical idealism in particular. In Zhiyi’s own words,

If all phenomena arise *from* a single moment of mind, this is a vertical [relationship]; if a mind in one moment *encompasses* all phenomena, this is a horizontal [relationship]. But these are neither [merely] vertical nor [merely] horizontal. It is just that mind *is* all phenomena, and all phenomena *are* mind. Therefore [the relationship of mind and phenomena] is neither vertical nor

⁷⁶ See Paul Swanson, note 94 on page 64.

horizontal; they are neither the same nor different. This is mysterious and subtle, profound in the extreme; it cannot be grasped conceptually, and cannot be verbalized. This is what is called [contemplating] “realms of experience as inconceivable.”

Zhiyi concludes that the only alternative way for disclosing the meaning of *being-with* is the method of meditation, but not through any metaphysical speculation. For Zhiyi clearly rejects two forms of metaphysics, namely transcendental idealism (of pure mind) and empirical idealism (of deluded mind). The former is characterized by Zhiyi as the “vertical” way of thinking by which phenomena is explained as being transcendently grounded in the absolute (pure) mind, and the latter as the “horizontal” way of thinking which explains phenomena through epistemological analysis. Zhiyi argues that since both forms of metaphysics are rooted in representational thinking, which is also called “conceivable thinking” (conceptual thinking), they are incapable of making real phenomena (things themselves) fully manifest. In this respect, we find that Zhiyi, Husserl, and Heidegger explore similar lines of reasoning in formulating their rejection of metaphysics. For Zhiyi in particular, the truth of “real phenomena” is concealed within the conceivability of metaphysics.

Next, we move forward to Zhiyi’s perfect-sudden mode of meditation. The motif of Zhiyi’s philosophy is the disclosure of real phenomena as truth through meditation. Though quite complicated, Zhiyi’s system of meditation can be divided into two paths: the gradual and the sudden. The sudden path of meditation is often considered the key to producing the experience of final awakening, while the gradual path is regarded as the preparatory step to the final goal of meditation, i.e., the perfect awakening. However, some contend that the difference between the two paths is merely pedagogical, even if the end of Zhiyi’s own of philosophy conceived as the culmination of sudden awakening. Regarding this issue, I would rather like to see in Zhiyi’s system of meditation the gradual path as the necessary training for the superior practice of perfect and sudden awakening.

In Zhiyi’s system, a practitioner aims to disclose the experience of awakening by taking “threefold truth” as the object of “threefold contemplation.” The fruit of practice is called “threefold insight.” In regards to the architectonics of meditation, Zhiyi’s system consists of the structure of threefold truth, threefold contemplation, and threefold insight:⁷⁷

⁷⁷ “Threefold truth refers to the object which is illuminated by the one instant mind. Threefold

(1) Threefold Truth: Truth can be viewed from three aspects, consisting of (i) the truth of emptiness, stated as “all phenomena are empty,” (ii) conventional truth, i.e., truth of discursive reality, and (iii) truth as the middle way, i.e., truth as the full disclosure through double negation of the two truths. In contrast to Mādhyamika theory of truth, Zhiyi develops a dialectical hermeneutic to make phenomena fully disclosed in each aspect. That is, the enlightened experience will not disclose itself in the truth of emptiness and the conventional truth respectively; it must also be disclosed in the truth of the middle way. That is, no aspect of truth can be separated from the other two aspects, because truth can never be exhausted from a single perspective. Truth shows itself only through the holistic and dialectical contemplation. According to this pattern of threefold truth, part and whole are dialectically interrelated and holistically integrated, wherein the whole can be manifested only through the dynamic dialectics of the parts.⁷⁸

(2) Threefold Meditation: For Zhiyi, the meditation of cessation and contemplation is instrumental for the realization of truth. According to Zhiyi’s magnum opus, *Great Calming and Contemplation* (*Mohezhi guan* 摩訶止觀), the method of meditation is further divided into threefold cessation and threefold contemplation with correspondence to threefold truth and threefold insight. However, it must be noted that this system of meditation does not function mechanically. That is, the first contemplation does not merely take the truth of emptiness as the object. By the same token, the second contemplation does not merely take the conventional truth as the object and the third contemplation does not take the middle way as the object. For Zhiyi, one should practice contemplation dialectically and dynamically. The first step is to enter into emptiness from the conventional, which will lead to an insight that reveals the conventionality of all phenomena, i.e., the emptiness. This methodic move is similar to Husserl’s shifting from the natural attitude to the phenomenological attitude. The second move is then a return to the conventional from emptiness through a reverse dialectic. Driven by salvific compassion, a practitioner takes this move to return to the mundane world (conventional world) from the state of emptiness, which results in skillful command of the knowledge of the mundane world. In comparison, the second move in Tiantai dialectical meditation is rather similar to the call for returning to the life-world in Husserl’s later writings. The third move is thus to realize

contemplation refers to the act which is initiated by the one instant mind. Threefold insight refers to that which is accomplished by [threefold] contemplation.” See *Mohezhi guan*, T.46.55.c.

⁷⁸ Zhiyi, *Fahua Xuanyi*, T.33.705.c; also cf., Paul Swanson, *Foundations of T’ien-t’ai Philosophy: The Flowering of the Two Truths Theory in Chinese Buddhism* (Berkeley, CA: Asian Humanities Press, 1989), 252-253; Mou Zongsan, *Foxing yu Boruo*, Vol. 2 (Taipei: Xuesheng Shuju, 1977) 647-671.

that the previous two moves are merely provisional for the final realization of things themselves. When one arrives at this final stage, there will be no attachment to either the first truth or the second. The practitioner will rather be illuminated by the three truths simultaneously. This final move is called the “contemplation of the middle way,” which manifests the highest form of insight, namely, the insight of all modes of phenomena.⁷⁹

(3) Threefold Insight: According to the *Prajñāpāramitāsāstra*, the text from which Zhiyi’s theory of threefold insight is borrowed, (i) “insight of paths” (*margajñatā*) refers to all kinds of mundane knowledge which are required for the fulfillment of religious goals, and (ii) “insight of all phenomena” (*sarvajñatā*), or “omniscience,” refers to the *abstract* truth of all phenomena gained by the elimination of ignorance, and (iii) “insight of all aspects of phenomena” (*sarvākārajñatā*) refers to the *concrete* truth that is realized in all aspects of phenomena.⁸⁰ The sequence of practice is stated as follows: Insofar as one has obtained the knowledge of the paths beforehand, one can be said to know the *abstract* truth of all phenomena. Next, one progresses to the *concrete* knowledge of all aspects of phenomena and then proceeds to cut off all habitual defilements in the final enlightenment.⁸¹

Thus, in view of the gradual path, the three forms of insight are taken as independent of one another. What is peculiar to Zhiyi’s system is that threefold insight can be attained within a single instant of mind via the sudden path. It is in a single instant mind that threefold truth arises simultaneously with threefold insight and threefold contemplation. Now, how could all of these occur *simultaneously*? The answer to this conundrum is found in Zhiyi’s conception of mind. In addition to the intentionality of mind as *being-with*, a notion which we have already explained above, everyday mind is also characterized as both deluded *and* pure. Put it in Buddhist parlance, everyday mind has been in ignorance (*avidyā*) from the very beginning, which is the same as saying that mind is the function of mental construction (*vikalpa*). According to the Buddhist theory of emptiness, however, everything, including even ignorance, is empty in itself. Since ignorance is empty of itself, it follows that mind as ignorance is also empty of itself. Hence, mind should be conceived as both ignorance and emptiness. As a consequence, if mind as ignorance is taken as the phenomenological ground of phenomena, mind as emptiness, i.e., *prajñā*, must also be taken as the groundless ground of phenomena. Thus, in view of ignorance, mind functions in the

⁷⁹ Zhiyi, *Mohezhi guan*, T.46.24.b.

⁸⁰ Cf., Fa Qing, *The Development of Prajñā in Buddhism: From Early Buddhism to the Prajñāpāramitā System*, Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Calgary, 2001, 92-95.

⁸¹ T. 25.258.c-260.b.

act of objectivation, whereas in view of emptiness, mind is able to function as non-objectivating insight. Finally, in view of the middle way, mind is characterized *neither* as ignorance *nor* as emptiness. It is characterized as “inconceivable” in the sense that any form of metaphysics will fail to account for the dialectical paradox of mind. As the correlates of mind, all phenomena (the three thousand worlds) also manifest themselves as the inconceivable infinity of mutual penetration. This is the reason why Zhiyi always summarizes his system as “threefold truth within an instant mind,” “threefold contemplation within an instant mind,” and “threefold insight within an instant mind.”⁸²

Summing up, we see the similarity between Zhiyi’s Tiantai philosophy and Husserl’s phenomenology. On the one hand, Husserl contends that truth consists in two aspects: truth as proposition and truth as evidence. The truth as proposition is based upon truth as evidence “where objects and states of affairs are given intuitively as they themselves are or as given in person.”⁸³ On the other side, Zhiyi placed the theory of threefold truth within the methodical context of meditation. Truth manifests itself only in the various modes of experience. Hence, Zhiyi’s famous dictum, “threefold truth in an instant mind,” might now be better understood in light of Husserl’s theory of “evidence as the experience of truth, i.e., as an intentional act in which the intended object is presented intuitively, though in different degrees of fulfillment.”⁸⁴

In view of Zhiyi’s “classification of teachings,” his own system is considered as the perfect and sudden path which leads to a final realization of the truth of inter-relativity and inter-penetration of phenomena, i.e., the three thousand worlds in one single thought. At the final moment of awakening, one realizes that the world of the rich, the world of the poor, the world of humanity, the world of animals, the world of plants, the world of gods, and the world of ghosts are all interrelated to one other. And as far as any one world is manifested in the mind, all other worlds are also simultaneously manifested in the same mind. As a result, the experience of awakening is never exclusionary. True awakening, which manifests the enlightened world, must be experienced *along with* all other worlds that have yet to be enlightened. True liberation must be experienced *along with* all other worlds that are still in suffering. This is the core spirit of Zhiyi’s phenomenology of awakening.

Concluding Remarks

⁸² Zhiyi, *Weimojing Xuanshu*, T.38.524.c-529.b.

⁸³ Dieter Lohmar, “Truth”, in Lester Embree, et al., *Encyclopedia of Phenomenology* (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1997), 708.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*

After we have gone through the intellectual journey from the Indian Yogācāra School to the Chinese Tiantai School, we are surprised to see both similarity and dissimilarity displayed in two forms of Buddhist systems. In the Yogācāra School, logic and epistemological analysis are required as the central condition for the final realization of truth. In the Tiantai School, the skillfulness in exercising the paradoxical dialectics of the threefold contemplation is the key to the multidimensional disclosure of true being. The former belongs to the gradual and progressive path, while the latter belongs to the sudden and paradoxical path. For the Yogācāra, pure mind is the foundation of the liberating world. For the Tiantai, the things themselves are viewed as the paradoxical totality of purity and impurity, which can be fully displayed through the mind qua emptiness and ignorance. In spite of the distinction as such, both the Yogācāra and the Tiantai can be characterized to be the different forms of Buddhist phenomenology, because both of them agree that the world cannot be uncritically assumed to exist outside of the experience of consciousness. Both reject the naïve notion of external object. Both also agree that philosophy should be taken as method only, but not as a metaphysical system. Even they possess different philosophical stance, their ontology makes sense only within the domain of experience. Last but not least, although in both forms of Buddhism philosophical methods play the central role for the disclosure of truth, the moral discipline and religious compassion are equally important for achieving the altruistic liberation. To borrow Buddhist dictum, wisdom and compassion are required as two wheels of one cart. So are the same for the future of philosophy *and* religion in the age of post-Enlightenment.

真理與意識——從佛性論爭到朱陸異同的二種哲學類型

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摘要

如來藏思想與唯識學之間的爭論，特別是在漢傳佛教傳統的脈絡，其哲學意涵如何？擴大言之，該爭論在整體東亞哲學的發展上有何影響？我們又該如何評估該爭論的影響？關於這些問題，本文的回應主要選取七世紀末法寶和慧沼的爭論作為考察的起點，指出如來藏思想與唯識學的對立在漢語語境下確立了新的哲學論述方向，影響十一世紀以降宋明新儒學的發展路線，特別是心學與理學的對立。此論爭的哲學問題首度被法寶和慧沼表述為心與理之同一或差異的問題，也就是後來宋明理學中「心理二分」或「心即理」二種形上學之爭的問題。從結論上來說，奘傳唯識學（慧沼）和程朱理學主張心理二分，而如來藏思想（法寶）和陸王心學則主張心即理，彼此之間既有歷史的連續性，也顯示出哲學類型的普遍性。本文結論時，將試圖從現象學的視角，特別是從胡賽爾到海德格的發展，重新照明主導千年東亞哲學的二種哲學類型義蘊。

關鍵詞：

理、心、佛性、唯識、如來藏、慧沼、法寶、朱熹、陸象山、現象學

Truth and Mind in the Vijñaptimātra-Tathāgatagarbha Polemics: A Comparative Approach

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Abstract

As this article attempts to demonstrate, the universality of philosophical significance as seen in the Vijñaptimātra-Tathāgatagarbha controversy between Huizao (648-714) and Fabao (627-705) is also witnessed in the Neo-Confucian debate between Zhu Xi (1130-1200) and Lu Xiangshan (1139-1193) in the 12th century. More surprisingly, the same pattern of philosophical conflict has continued from the 7th century down to the early 20th century. The best case is the debate among Lü Cheng (1896-1989) and Xiong Shili (1885-1968), which had been centered upon the criticism of the *Awakening of Faith* ignited by Ouyang Jingwu and his school.

The philosophical problem in the polemic is raised to spell out the condition of

subjectivity for attaining Buddhahood for the Buddhists and Sagehood for the Confucians. Two theories are developed within each tradition to cope with this problem. (1) The first theory, which I label it as “Cognitive Theory,” contends that the condition of the possibility of attaining Buddhahood or Sagehood is found in the mind which is capable of cognizing truth. Truth is taken as the object of cognition, while mind is the subject of cognition. *Truth is independent of mind.* Accordingly, Buddhahood can be attained only when one has cognized truth objectively. This theory is held by both Yogācāra and Zhu Xi. (2) The second theory, which I name it as “Ontological Theory,” holds that the condition of the possibility of Buddhahood or Sagehood is found in the subjectivity which is transcendently grounded in truth. *Truth is not independent of mind.* Truth is rather seen as the transcendental ground of mind. This theory even goes further to claim that mind *is* truth. To claim that mind *is* truth is the same as claiming that truth is found in the self-realization, or self-disclosure, of mind, which is in turn grounded in truth. This theory is held by both the Tathāgatagarbha School and Lu Xianshan.

In the conclusion, I take an excursion to phenomenology to account for the debates between the cognitive theory and the ontological theory. The insight we obtain from phenomenology is that truth in formal logic should be also evidenced in eidetic intuition. Simply put, truth should not be separated from the *experience* of truth which is possible only in the activity of mind. I also go further to explore the different conceptions of truth in Husserl and Heidegger with hope to shed new light on the debates.

Key words: Vijñaptimātra, Tathāgatagarbha, Yogācāra, phenomenology, Heidegger

一、前言

如來藏思想與唯識學之間的爭論，特別是在漢傳佛教傳統的脈絡，其哲學意涵如何？擴大言之，該爭論在整體東亞哲學的發展上有何影響？我們又該如何評估該爭論的影響？關於這些問題，本文的回應主要選取七世紀末法寶（約627-705）和慧沼（648-714）的爭論作為考察的起點，指出如來藏思想與唯識學的對立在漢語語境下確立了新的哲學論述方向，影響十一世紀以降宋明新儒學的發展路線，特別是心學與理學的對立。此論爭的哲學問題首度被法寶和慧沼表述為心與理之同一或差異的問題，也就是後來宋明理學中「心理二分」或「心即理」二種形上學之爭的問題。從結論上來說，瑩傳唯識學和程朱理學主張心理二分，而如來藏思想和陸王心學則主張心即理，彼此之間既有歷史的連續性，也顯示出哲學類型的普遍性。值得注意的是，這種從中世到近世的哲學史連續性和普遍性仍然主導著中國現代哲學的發展，試看二十世紀呂澂和熊十力，或馮友蘭和牟宗三之間的分歧，即可一目了然。我們甚至可以說，由儒學與佛學交互辯證所共構的東亞哲學傳統，在更深的層面上是由雙方內部各有的二種形態哲學理論所主導，儒佛之爭不過是表面的宗派對立而已。

這二種具有普遍性的哲學型態如何規定其各自不同的理論性格？這是當代中國哲學關注的問題。牟宗三即主張，如來藏思想（以《起信論》為代表）是先驗分解的路數（心是先驗的主體性），而唯識學是經驗分解的路數（阿賴耶識是經驗的主體性），二者皆有明確的形上學任務，即為一切存在（一切法）提供形上學的說明⁸⁵。此二種路數的分別也見於陸王心學和程朱理學的不同。前者主張心是先驗性的心，理既是超越的（超越於心），也是內在的（內在於心）；後者則主張心是氣之靈者，是經驗主體，理則是超越而不內在於心⁸⁶。因此，這爭論也可被視為內在論和外論，或先驗論和經驗論之間的爭論。⁸⁷

本文基本上接受將如來藏思想和唯識學的理論分歧規定為內在論和外論，先驗論和經驗論之爭論的說法，然而不能同意單從形上學而發的詮釋，主要的理由是，不論是佛學或是儒學，他們關切的不完全在於純粹形上學的建立，而是在於吾人具體經驗的說明與轉化。回到經驗本身，也就是胡賽爾現象學所說的

⁸⁵ 牟宗三，《佛性與般若》（台北：學生書局，1977），上冊，頁453。

⁸⁶ 「先驗的」是“transcendental”的漢譯，而「超越的」是“transcendent”的漢譯。參見倪梁康，《胡賽爾現象學概念通釋》（修訂版）（北京：三聯書店，2007）。牟宗三和台灣學界則譯為「超越的」。

⁸⁷ 該論爭在東亞哲學的普遍性還可見於晚近日本學界所引發的批判佛教和場所佛教、批判哲學和場所哲學之爭（袴谷獻昭），或是基體論和緣起論之爭（松本史朗）。關於該論爭本人多年前處理過，這裡就不再涉及。雖然如此，日本批判佛教之爭可作為本文的參照。參見拙作，《空性與現代性》（1999）。內在論(internalism)與外在論(externalism)原是知識論的分類，前者指信念之證成與否決定於心靈內部的因素，後者則主張信念之證成決定於心靈之外的因素。這裡討論「理」是否內在於心的問題，既是知識論的問題，也是形上學的問題。

回到事物本身，其經驗必然是意識經驗，其作為超越對象的理也不能脫離意識經驗而存在。這種現象學的觀點，唯識學和程朱理學都能同意，至於如來藏思想和陸王心學那就更不用說了。即此而言，從現象學的進路來解釋雙方立場的差異，比起形上學的詮釋更為貼切。本文結論時，將試圖從現象學的視角，特別是從胡賽爾到海德格的發展，重新照明主導千年東亞哲學的二種哲學類型。不同於牟宗三和批判佛教學者，本文並不提出判教式的評價與仲裁。判教涉及更多宗教立場的問題，不是單純的哲學問題。

二、語境與轉譯：「理」與中國初期佛性論

在印度，「如來藏」概念的出現比「佛性」概念還早；在中國，「佛性」概念的使用則比「如來藏」還來得普遍。在本文，這二概念基本上可以交替使用，但是考慮到法寶和慧沼的論辯，仍以「佛性」為主要論題。法寶和慧沼的論辯延續了五世紀以來中國佛教徒所關注的一切眾生是否皆可成佛的問題，這問題隨著玄奘學派在七世紀後半葉成為顯學而再度受到熱烈的討論，造成「五性各別」的立場和「一乘佛性」立場之間的尖銳對決。首先登場的對諍見於靈潤、義榮和玄奘門下神泰的辯論，稍後才有法寶和慧沼的對諍⁸⁸。慧沼造《能顯中邊慧日論》，主要以法寶的《一乘佛性究竟論》和《一乘佛性權實論》為批判的對象，藉以護衛玄奘學派的師說，而後者顯然以窺基的三乘五性說為批判的對象⁸⁹。關於論辯的年代，法寶的《究竟論》和《權實論》可能成書於 695-699 年間，慧沼的《慧日論》成書自然在這期間之後⁹⁰。我們大約可以合理地推估，該場重要的論爭應該發生於七、八世紀之交。

慧沼和法寶的佛性爭論，其背景應上溯到六世紀唯識學在中國的早期傳播和容受過程。值得注意的是，當時中國的佛教學者以特定的概念架構來表達他們對於該問題的認識。在釐清他們的理論內容之前，我們有必要先瞭解他們用來表達理論的概念架構以及相應的漢語詞彙。如果印度佛教漢化的現象的確存在，那麼考察關鍵的漢語佛教詞彙如何型塑當時的佛教論述將是必要的工作。

在早期的文獻中，「理佛性」和「行佛性」，或簡稱為「理性」和「行性」，

⁸⁸ 關於靈潤和神泰的佛性論辯論，見常盤大定，《仏性の研究》（東京：國書刊行會，1973）220-240。關於法寶和慧沼的爭論，廖明活充分利用日本學界的研究成果，在其《中國佛性思想的形成和開展》（台北：文津出版社，2008）一書中有詳盡的梳理，值得參考。

⁸⁹ 間中潤對照《慧日論》、《究竟論》和《權實論》之後指出，《慧日論》主要以《究竟論》為破斥的對象。參見間中潤，〈『一乘佛性究竟論』と『能顯中邊慧日論』との関連検討〉，《印度學佛教學研究》，35/2，1987：164-168。

⁹⁰ 參見間中潤，〈『一乘佛性究竟論』と『能顯中邊慧日論』との関連検討〉166；根無一力，〈慧沼の研究〉，龍谷大學佛教學會編，《唯識思想の研究：山崎慶輝教授定年記念論集》（京都：百華苑，1987），186-187。根無一力，〈一乘佛性究竟論の撰述と時代的背景〉，《叡山學院研究紀要》第9號，尚未見。

是構成六七世紀漢傳佛性論的關鍵詞彙。吉藏（549-623）在論及前代關於佛性本有或始有的時候，便提到地論師的主張：「佛性有二種：一是理性，二是行性。理非物造，故言本有；行藉修成，故言始有。」⁹¹ 根據這條文獻，將佛性分為理性和行性早見於地論師。在吉藏的簡要說明中，「理性」指的是成佛的先驗根據或條件，而「行性」是成佛的經驗根據或條件；前者是無為法（「理非物造」），後者是有為法（「行藉修成」）。至於無為法（不受因果律決定的存在）如何為成佛之因，亦即無為法如何有因果作用，即是爭論的核心問題。這種佛性論範疇的區分和七世紀大致相同，但是否肇始於六世紀地論師的說法，則有待於進一步的探討⁹²。這裡不擬深論這問題，僅指出七世紀從「理」與「行」二範疇來界定佛性，有其早期概念史的淵源。

「理性」一詞亦見於地論師淨影慧遠（523-592）的佛性論：「言理性者，癡緣談實，實之處無緣。以無緣故，真體一味，非因非果，與《涅槃》中非因果性，其一也。」⁹³ 慧遠這裡強調理性作為佛的本質是絕對的無為法，非因非果，也是一切存在和眾生所共同具有的不變本質。值得注意的是，淨影慧遠也在他處指出心理不二，理性並不離心而存在：「心外無別如理，如理之外亦無別心，如外無心，心不異如，心外無如，如不異心。」⁹⁴ 慧遠稱此心理不二之心為「真識心」。將如下述所見，慧遠「理外無心，心外無理，理不異心，心不異理」的觀點，遠早於法寶以「理心」為佛性的說法，證明法寶的佛性論繼承了地論師的真心系統。

關於「理」、「行」與「理心」的關鍵詞，我們也在淨覺撰於八世紀初的《楞伽師資記》所記載的初期禪修文獻發現一些線索。淨覺明白地提及求那跋陀羅（Gunaḥhadra, 349-468）的「理心」說：「今言安心者，略有四種。一者背理心，謂一向凡夫心也。二者向理心，謂厭惡生死，以求涅槃。趣向寂靜，名聲聞心也。三者入理心，謂雖復斷障顯理，能所未亡，是菩薩心也。四者理心，謂非理外理，非心外心，理即是心。心能平等，名之為理；理照能明，名之為心。心理平等，名之為佛心。」⁹⁵ 這裡所言之「背理心」、「向理心」、「入理心」之「理」應是指真如理，此可從「斷障顯理」看出。作為究竟真實的「理心」，求那跋陀羅則解釋為「非理外理，非心外心」（不是理外之理，心外之心）⁹⁶，而是「理即是心」，其理由是「心能平等，名之為理」（心的平等無分別狀態，就是真如，也就是空理）；「理照能明，名之為心」（平等無分別的真如理具有照明的作用）。心與

⁹¹ 吉藏，《大乘玄論》，大 45·39 中。

⁹² 晚近藉由敦煌文獻的考索，關於地論宗的研究有相當的進展。日本學界的研究近況，參考石井公成，〈敦煌文獻中の地論宗諸文獻の研究〉，《駒澤短期大學佛教論集》，第一集1995：91-96；青木隆，《地論宗》，大久保良峻編著，《新・八宗綱要》（京都：法藏館，2001），318-340。

⁹³ 《大乘義章》，大 44·473·中。

⁹⁴ 《大乘義章》，大 44·473·上。

⁹⁵ 《楞伽師資記》，大 85·1284·中。

⁹⁶ 「非理外理，非心外心」疑是「非理外心，非心外理」之誤。

理一，心理平等，心即是理，就是佛心。這裡可以看出，如來藏思想解答作為無為法的真如（理）如何在成佛的實踐過程起作用的老問題，答案就在「理心」（＝自性清淨心＝佛心）。和所有的存在一樣，心的本質也是緣起性空。問題是，空性（真如）如何開顯？不論是唯識學或如來藏思想，他們都同意由於二障（煩惱障和所知障）空性（真如）才受到遮蔽；雙方立場分歧的是，唯識學主張空性的開顯來自正聞熏習，特別是無漏種子（本有與新熏）的作用，斷障證如，而如來藏思想則主張「真如心」（理心）本身擁有覺悟力量（本覺）才是空性開顯的主要原因（淨影慧遠即言「理能照明」）；關於心與理的關係，前者主張理在心之外，可以稱為外在論，而後者則主張理在心之內，理與心一，可以稱為內在論。

淨覺的《楞伽師資記》在記錄菩提達摩的「二入四行」教法時，也提及理行範疇，將「二入」分為「理入」和「行入」：「理入者，謂藉教悟宗，深信凡聖含生，同一真性，但為客塵妄覆，不能顯了。若也捨妄歸真，凝住壁觀，無自 [無] 他，凡聖等一，堅住不移，更不隨於言教，此即與真理冥符，無有分別，寂然無 [為]，名之理入。」⁹⁷該文獻明白地顯示出如來藏思想的立場（「深信凡聖含生，同一真性」），指出禪觀修行的目的是為了達到心與理，正智與真如，兩相冥符，無有分別的境界，也就是回歸到「真性」所開顯的真理境界。

根據印順的推算，菩提達摩大約於 530 年入滅，那麼「二入四行」的教法有可能流行於六世紀初。⁹⁸不過，我們仍然無法完全確定淨覺的記載是否為忠實可信的歷史文獻。這二條文獻僅能作為「理」與「心」，「理」與「行」範疇出現在六世紀或更早之前的參考材料，說明這些概念範疇並不是直接來自印度，而是來自中國本土的思想土壤。關於這一點，湯用彤早在其《漢魏兩晉南北朝佛教史》論及道生（卒於 434 年）的佛性論時，就已經敏銳地觀察到：

佛性之義，《涅槃經》反覆譬解，不厭求詳。生公陳義，要言有三：一曰理，一曰自然，一曰本有。《涅槃集解》卷一引生公曰：「真理自然」。生注《維摩》曰：「理既不從我為空」。《法華注》曰：「窮理乃 觀」。皆所以狀佛性也。此開後來以理為佛性之說，而於中國學術有大關係。⁹⁹

湯用彤強調「理為佛性」之說「於中國學術有大關係」，確有見地，然未及深論。荒牧典俊後來接續湯說¹⁰⁰，明確地指出由於佛教引進「理」的哲學概念使得中

⁹⁷ 同注 9。

⁹⁸ 印順，《中國禪宗史》（台北：正聞出版社，1971），頁 4。

⁹⁹ 湯用彤，《漢魏兩晉南北朝佛教史》（台北：漢聲，1973 影版），642。

¹⁰⁰ 荒牧典俊引用湯用彤，〈謝靈運辨宗論書後〉：「自生公以後，超凡入聖，當下即是，不須遠求，因而玄遠之學乃轉一新方向，由禪宗而下接宋明之學，此中雖經過久長，然生公立此新義實此變遷之大關鍵也。」荒牧典俊，〈中國對佛教的接受——“理”的一大變化〉，《世界宗教研究》第 1 期，1988 年。關於這問題的深入研究，參見伊藤隆壽，《中國佛教の批判的研究》（東京：大藏，1992）。

國思想從中世（魏晉南北朝隋唐）到近世（宋元明清）發生根本性的變化：「竺道生、謝靈運認為鳩摩羅什講的『甚深法性』就是郭象所說的『理』，並且用印度中觀哲學的真俗、真假二諦的區別，對中國傳統的『情與理』、『事與理』、『有與無』等作了解釋，確立了佛教的『理』的哲學。」¹⁰¹荒牧指出，中國佛教徒使用來自印度佛教的二諦（世俗諦/勝義諦）來解釋中國固有的「理與情」、「理與行」、「理與事」等範疇：勝義為理，世俗為事；佛性為理，禪觀為行。¹⁰²其實，中國佛教徒藉由二諦論重新解釋理事關係，固然是關鍵性事實，相反地，從固有的理事範疇或理行範疇重新解釋二諦，更是瞭解佛教在中國受容過程的重要因素。我們唯有從辯證的角度來看，才能看出後來宋明理學的理氣論和中世佛教哲學之間既有連續性，也有斷裂性的關係。¹⁰³

三、真理的動力：法寶的佛性論

接著下來我們來看法寶的佛性論。在久下本的《權實論》，法寶開宗明義提出他以「理心為本」的佛性論主張：

夫生死涅槃，理心為本；理為迷悟之境，心為迷悟之體。迷即理名如來藏性，心名二種生死；悟即理名法身、涅槃，心名報佛、化佛。迷與理不可說其先，生死无始；悟與真不可論其後，佛智无終。生死无始而有終，佛智有初而无盡。心之與理，无後无先。由此理心為其本性，亦曰正因。迷有輕重，六趣不同；悟有淺深，三乘性別。迷悟之業為其客性，亦曰緣因。一切眾生，理心平等，正因同也；迷悟有別，緣因異也。正因同故，皆應證得阿耨菩提；緣因異故，分其五性。¹⁰⁴

這一段宣示性的主張有幾項重點：（一）法寶順著《涅槃經》的說法，將佛性分為正因與緣因，正因又曰本性，緣因又曰客性。法寶主張一切眾生皆有理心為其本性，也就是以理心為成佛的正因（根本因）。成佛與否的緣因（輔助因）則在於「迷悟之業」，也就是種種或迷或悟的後天行為（意念、言說、行為）。就前者一切眾生皆有理心而言，一切眾生皆可成佛，故唯一佛乘。就後者眾生迷悟之業有別而言，則有三乘五姓差別。眾生是否可以成佛，因現實（緣因）上有不同的條件，會有不同的結果。有的眾生可以成為聲聞，有的可以成為菩薩，有的可以成佛，有的則根本無法成佛。然而就本性（正因）而言，眾生皆可成佛，因為皆有理心作為成佛的根據。

¹⁰¹ 同上。

¹⁰² 同等重要的範疇是「體用」，此不及論。

¹⁰³ 宋明理學多從形上學的角度談論理氣關係，特別是從《易經》「形而上」、「形而下」之分來談。這不同於佛教的二諦論同時兼有存有論和知識論二側面。

¹⁰⁴ 法寶，《一乘佛性權實論》，1-2/50, 53。引自久下陸，《一乘佛性權實論の研究上》（東京：隆文館，1985）。所引頁數，前為該書所附金澤文庫寫本，後為正文所附校本。

(二)「生死涅槃，理心為本」，一般都將這句話視為存有論命題，用來說明理心作為生死（迷的世界）與涅槃（悟的世界）的存有論根據。事實上，該命題不宜僅當作形上學的唯心論來瞭解，而應該視為對生死與涅槃二種存在形態的現象學式的詮釋。¹⁰⁵對法寶來說，迷的存在，也就是生死輪迴的非本真存在，乃來自心之迷；悟的存在，也就是涅槃解脫的本真存在，乃來自心之悟。心的迷悟，繫於理的隱顯。眾生淪於迷的存在狀態時，並不可以說理不存在，而應說是理處於遮蔽的狀態。迷則理藏，悟則理顯。這就是「迷即理名如來藏性」的意思：理在迷的存在狀態中，猶似如來在胎藏中，尚未呈顯；理在悟的存在狀態中，則稱為法身、涅槃。換言之，法身、涅槃即是理的開顯狀態。心在迷的狀態下，則稱之為生死（分段生死和變異生死），在悟的狀態下，則以報佛、化佛的形式呈現。

(三)理心是就主體性而言，此主體性可再分析為理和心二部分：「理為迷悟之境，心為迷悟之體。」在這裡，法寶顯然繼承地論師淨影慧遠關於「理」的用法，將「理」等同於「真如」(*tathatā*)、「法性」(*dharmatā*)和「實際」(*bhūta-koṭi*)的同義詞¹⁰⁶。若從現象學來看，在主體性的意識構造中，理可以說是意識構造的所思項(*noema*)，而心是能思項(*noesis*)。理是所思，故曰：「理為迷悟之境」；心是能思，故曰：「心為迷悟之體」。作為能思與所思的心與理，不外是同一意識主體內部的構成項，二而不二，故綜合地稱之為理心。

法寶根據如來藏系經典，進一步說明作為主體性的理心由如來藏和阿賴耶識所共構。其中，如來藏作為主體的普遍性根據，也就是真如、理，法寶謂之「一切眾生平等共有」，阿賴耶識則是用來說明主體的個別性根據，也就是心，法寶謂之「一一眾生各各別有」。二者並非各自獨立，而是同一主體的二重結構。此可見於《權實論·破法爾五性章》：

種性不同者，諸經論中或說理心正因本性，或說三種熏習為生死因，或說聞熏習等緣因客性為聖道因。本性正因者，一切六趣三乘身土，皆以真如本識為本性正因也。於中有別有共。別者謂第八識，一一眾生各各別有；共者謂如來藏性，一切眾生平等共有。¹⁰⁷

法寶持典型的如來藏佛性論的立場，主張成佛的正因本性為「理心」，又稱之為「真如本識」，明白地以「理」解「真如」，而以「心」解「本識」，二者之間是

¹⁰⁵ 海德格在《存有與時間》即曾提出「本真的存在」和「非本真的存在」的區分，見 Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York: Harper & Row), 68.

¹⁰⁶ 慧遠，《大乘義章》：「如、法性、實際義，出《小品經》。此三乃是理之別目。」大 44·487·中。

¹⁰⁷ 法寶，《一乘佛性權實論》，75/356。

普遍性和特殊性，先驗性和經驗性，或以佛教本身的名相來說，無為法和有為法的和合關係。這種主體性構造的內部關係，歷來是唯識與如來藏思想爭論的重點。法寶顯然認為，各別經驗性的心識並不足以完整說明生死輪迴與涅槃還滅的世界構成。相對地，只有內具普遍性和先驗性真理的主體性，才能作為世界構成的根據。此先驗性的根據不能僅是「識」而已，必須是以「理」（真如）為本性的「理心」（真如本識）。真理必然是在存有之「此」中開顯，這最切近的「此」就是心識。於心識之此，真理以自反的方式開顯自己。也唯有在心識之場域，真理才有自證自顯的作用可言。如下所見，這種如來藏的觀點不同於唯識師堅持從認識論的角度視理為認識對象（所緣）。根據唯識家，真理必須透過認識而起作用，真理本身則是無作用可言，因為真理是無為法，也是純粹的客體性。

關於主體性的雙重構造，法寶引述許多如來藏經典的典型譬喻，說明此先驗的主體性「如摩尼寶珠，體性清淨，若有置於日月光中，隨其所應，各雨其物。阿賴耶識亦復如是，是諸如來清淨之藏與習氣合，變似眾色，周於世間，若無漏相應，即雨一切諸功德法。」¹⁰⁸寶珠體性光明，以之為喻，暗示了理心經由自我認識以開顯真理的可能性。相對地，自我認識的障蔽則以外來的習氣作為原因來說明。法寶再度引述《大乘密嚴經》說明理和心的關係等同於如來藏和阿賴耶識的關係：

又如來藏與藏識，諸經論中，或說為同，或說為異，皆不相違。如《密嚴經》下卷云：「如來清淨藏，亦名無垢智。常住無終始，離四句言說。佛說如來藏，以為阿賴耶。惡慧不能知，藏即賴耶識。如來清淨藏，世間阿賴耶。如金與指環，展轉無差別」。准此經文，雙說理心二本性也。如來清淨藏，是理也；世間阿賴耶，是心也。如金，是理也；指環，是心也。金為環體，喻真諦也；環為金相，喻俗諦也。藏即賴耶識者，藏為真也，識為俗也。諦雖是二，解常應一。¹⁰⁹

我們可以將作為正因佛性的理心概念分解為理和心、如來藏和阿賴耶識之間的關係，二者之間猶二諦之不一不異，法寶並以鑛中之金為喻，必須經由「爐冶人功，方得有金」，說明二者之間比存有論的關係更多的是宗教實踐的關係。在這裡，法寶小心地避免將理實體化、外在化，他引述《密嚴》、《楞伽》、《優婆塞戒》等經，謂「凡位中有如來藏性，如鑛中金性相，本無今有」，「因緣故而得有金」，「若說石中先有金性，是名外道」¹¹⁰。理並非在發心修行之先之外而存在，而是在修行成佛之後，由果望因，才安立理的先驗性和普遍性。實際上，只能說理和

¹⁰⁸ 同上，76/359。此譬喻引自《大乘密嚴經》，見大16·741·中。

¹⁰⁹ 同上，77-78/362, 367。

¹¹⁰ 同上，80/375。

心不一不異，「如金與指環，展轉無差別」。說其不異，才可以說「心外無理，理外無心」；說其不一，才可以維持無為法和有為法，真諦和俗諦的區分。

問題是，在理心的結構中理（如來藏）為成佛的先驗根據，作為經驗根據的身語意業則是心（阿賴耶識）。用傳統漢傳佛教的講法，理是性，心是相，理是無為法，心是有為法。問題在於，性相如何融通？無為法如何作用於有為法呢？這問題類似笛卡兒心物二元論所面對的難題：思維性的心如何作用於擴延性的物呢？對於佛性論爭來說，作為無為法的理若能起作用，為成佛之因，那已經不能說是無為法，而是有為法了，因為無為法無因果作用可言，有因果作用的全是有為法。針對這問題，法寶的答覆如下：

問：理有何力，能有者定當成佛？答：《佛性論》第二云：「此清淨事能有二，一、於生死苦中，能生厭離；二於涅槃，欲求願樂。若無清淨之性，如是二事，即不得成。」又唐《攝論》云：「又佛法界，普為一切作證得因，令諸菩薩悲願纏心，勤求佛果。」又《寶性論》第二云：「以彼實有清淨性故，不得說言彼常畢竟無清淨心」。又《起信論》云：「真如熏習，義有二種。乃至以有力故，能令眾生，厭生死苦，樂求涅槃。」《涅槃經》三十二云：「汝言眾生悉有佛性，得無上菩提，如慈石者，善哉善哉。以有佛性因緣力故，得無上菩提。若言不須脩聖道者，是義不然。」¹¹¹

法寶引述諸經論說明如來藏（真如、理）本身即具有能夠引生厭苦求樂的力用，不是凝然不動的真理。這些經論的論證是從可觀察到的宗教經驗，也就是人皆有厭苦求樂的解脫論意欲，推論出眾生具有清淨本性作為該宗教性經驗的可能性的條件。這是先驗論證，也就是從既有經驗推論出該經驗的可能性的原因或條件，該原因或條件必然是先驗的，而非經驗的¹¹²。法寶引述的《佛性論》最能表示這種先驗論證。他也承續如來藏經典的譬喻修辭，以水中明珠能清濁水，比喻理性的積極性作用，並得出結論：「若有理性，定當成佛。」¹¹³

四、作為認識對象的真理：慧沼的回應

¹¹¹ 《究竟論》，卅續 95·495 下。又見《權實論》，久下本 69-79/332-336。後者引證經論略有不同。

¹¹² 康德的「先驗分析」或「先驗論證」是用來展示客觀世界的構成必然基於吾人先天 (*a priori*) 的範疇，而概念範疇則可從判斷的邏輯形式推述出來。參見 Allen Wood, *Kant* (Blackwell, 2005), 40-45。法寶這裡的論證當然和康德的目的不同，但是作為從經驗現象推論出構成該現象的先驗條件，則有形式上的類同。

¹¹³ 《究竟論》，卅續 95·495·下：「法寶的《一乘佛性究竟論》：又見准此等文，其理佛性，如水清珠，能清濁水。水若常動，雖珠有力，水不得清。眾生亦爾，雖有理性，能生善法，妄心常動，無漏不生。若制之一處，無事不辨。又水性清，動即常濁，止即自清。眾生亦爾，本性清淨，若妄心恒動，即生死輪迴。妄心不動，即寂滅涅槃。准此教理，若有理性，定當成佛。既信一切眾生平等悉有理性，豈得執一分眾生不成佛邪？」

法寶順著《涅槃經》將佛性分為正因本性和緣因客性二種，並從如來藏思想的進路以理心規定前者。理心也就是真如心，將真如（無為法）和心（有為法）合而為一，強調直接就實踐主體性（心識）當下的真如性（理性、法性）作為覺悟解脫的根據。在這一點上，法寶完全不能同意正統唯識學以真如作為認識對象（所緣）的立場。從歷史的角度來說，法寶的如來藏思想乃針對玄奘唯識學派的種姓論和三乘論而發。法寶入玄奘門下，學《大毘婆沙論》和《俱舍論》等，《宋高僧傳》譽為「三藏奘師學法之神足」，嘗作《俱舍論疏》，和普光二人並稱，「若什門之融叡焉」¹¹⁴。法寶雖入玄奘門下，然教學立場和師門相左。待《權實論》和《究竟論》一出，立刻招來慧沼撰《能顯中邊慧日論》，予以強烈的反駁。¹¹⁵

在討論慧沼針對法寶的駁議之前，我們先看他關於佛性的理論。慧沼將佛性分解為三類：理性、行性和隱密性。（一）所謂理性，慧沼依《佛性論》解為「人法二空所顯真如」，並引《涅槃經》強調真如理性的先驗性¹¹⁶。理就是真如，又稱真如理。真如（理）為一切法之法性，眾生亦不例外，皆以真如（理）為性。由於理性遍在，即使極惡之人一闡提也具有理性。所謂「若是理性，闡提不斷」¹¹⁷。但是，光有理性，並不足成佛。若要成佛，需有行性。

（二）行性，此為成佛的動力因或實踐因。《慧日論》曰：「行性者，通有漏無漏一切萬行。若望三身，無漏為正生了，有漏為緣，疎名生了。無漏正名佛性，有漏假名，非正佛性。」¹¹⁸慧沼這裡將行性界定為作為成佛的現實條件，此現實條件可以再分為有漏法和無漏法，前者是成佛的緣因，後者是成佛的正因。作為成佛正因的無漏種子，其無漏現行，凡夫並不具有，至於無漏種子，則有些眾生的具有，有些不具有，例如一闡提就不具有無漏種子¹¹⁹。法相宗主張一闡提不能成佛，理由在於不具有無漏種子。這一點和法寶的主張不同。法寶主張，成佛的主要條件是眾生遍有的理心，不僅是理性而已。理心既是普遍的，成佛的可能性也就是普遍的。

（三）隱密性，此從「煩惱即菩提」的不二詭辭說無明煩惱悉是佛性，強調成佛不離世間煩惱法。¹²⁰慧沼在這裡另立隱密性為佛性，顯然強調佛性論的實踐

¹¹⁴ 贊寧，《宋高僧傳》，大 50·727·上。

¹¹⁵ 參考廖明活，《中國佛性思想的形成和開展》，第六章，「慧沼的佛性思想」。

¹¹⁶ 《慧日論》：「言理性者，《佛性論》云：為除此執故，佛說佛性。佛性者，即是人法二空所顯真如。由真如故，無能罵所罵。通達此理，離虛妄過。《涅槃》第二十五：善男子，佛性者，非陰界入，非本無今有，非有已還無。第八云：開示如來祕密之藏，清淨佛性，常住不變。三十三云：如佛所說，眾生佛性，猶如虛空。廣說非三世故，如虛空無故，非三世攝，佛性常故，非三世攝等。」大 45·439·上。

¹¹⁷ 《慧日論》，大 45·440·下。

¹¹⁸ 《慧日論》，大 45·439·上。

¹¹⁹ 《慧日論》，大 45·440·下：「若論行性，復有二種，謂有漏、無漏。此二種性有無不定。若有漏性，一切有情，種子定有。現行之者，或成不成。若無漏者，據現行說，凡夫不成。」

¹²⁰ 《慧日論》，大 45·439·中：「隱密性者，如《維摩經》云：塵勞之儔為如來種等。《涅槃》

必須正視負面的存在，不能僅一味強調眾生皆有理心的理想主義。如果沒有無明煩惱，也就沒有轉迷成悟、轉染成淨的宗教實踐的必要。

關於三種佛性的內在關係，慧沼顯然將重點放在行性上，特別是無漏種子的熏習與現行，才是成佛的真正關鍵。至於理性，慧沼雖然引述《佛性論·三因品》，指出真如為應得因（真如作為應得的目標，即此而稱之為因，類同於亞里斯多德之目的因）。實際上，「真如因果，體無別故」¹²¹，真如作為因和作為果是無分別的，本身既不可視為因，也不可視為果。以真如（理）為佛性，僅表示佛的本質（法身）是真理而已。理不可以有生因或了因的作用。這一點是法寶和慧沼之間最為關鍵的區別。相對地，法寶主張理（真如）有力用，可以發揮應得因（目的因）的作用。慧沼則主張，真如是無為法，無作用可言，實際上有作用的只能是阿賴耶識的種子。法寶引述《起信論》證明真如體「能生一切世出世善因果」之用，慧沼則回應說：「真如豈有作用？若有作用，同諸行故。¹²²」有作用的只能是有為法（諸行），心識的認識活動就是為法。唯識家主張，在成佛的過程中，真如只能是所緣緣，不能是親生因。

關於真如在成佛過程所扮演的角色上，法寶和慧沼展開一場關於「真如所緣緣種子」的爭論。該問題見於《瑜伽師地論》討論種子的一段文獻：若阿賴耶識中的種子都是雜染的，那麼清淨的出世間法從甚麼性質的種子而生？如果說是來自雜染種子，那是不合理的，因為雜染種子如何能生出清淨無漏的出世間法呢？如果不是來自阿賴耶識中的雜染種子，那又會是甚麼種子呢？《瑜伽師地論》提出的答案是：「諸出世間法從真如所緣緣種子生，非彼習氣積集種子所生」¹²³。問題是，甚麼是「真如所緣緣種子」？是本有嗎？是新熏嗎？根據玄奘的教學，這些問題在印度論師之間，如勝軍、護月、難陀、護法等人，早已提出各種不同的解釋。據保留在窺基的《瑜伽師地論略纂》和遁倫的《瑜伽論記》的玄奘口義¹²⁴，印度論師有新熏和本有的解釋：一、勝軍主張新熏說，認為在見道以前瑜伽行者觀十二部經為所緣，由於十二部經不外是佛所證真如（清淨法界）所流出，以經教為所緣即可說是以（影像）真如為所緣。待入見道後，其無漏智始以真如本身為所緣，其所熏成的種子稱為「真如所緣緣種子」。窺基《略纂》又云：「由決擇分世第一法，緣真如教法為所緣故。以此為因緣種子，生見道智，即說世第一法，名真如所緣緣種子。以緣教法影像真如修習為緣故，言從真如所緣緣

三十三云：如來未得阿耨菩提時，一切善不善無記，悉名佛性。《涅槃》二十二云：一切無明煩惱等結悉是佛性，何以故？佛性因故。從無明行及煩惱得善五陰。」

¹²¹ 《慧日論》，大 45·440·中。

¹²² 《慧日論》，大 45·426·中。參見久下本《權實論》，92-93/420, 424。

¹²³ 《瑜伽師地論》，大·30·589·上。

¹²⁴ 參見袁輪顯量，〈真如所緣緣種子と法爾無漏種子〉，《佛教學》第 30 號，1991，48-53；廖明活，〈中國佛性思想的形成和開展〉，第八章，「初唐時期佛性論爭的真如所緣緣種子問題」；張文良，〈法寶的“真如種子”與“真如所緣緣種子”說〉，《南昌航空大學學報》（社會科學版），第 10 卷第 1 期，2008。

種子生。¹²⁵」值得注意的是，這裡「真如」可以分為「影像真如」（教法真如）和「法界真如」，前者可稱為「表象真理」，後者可稱為「存有真理」；前者可以言說或命題表示，後者則是事實本身¹²⁶。這裡以真如為所緣，從修道論來看，先以「影像真如」為認識對象，然後才以「法界真如」為認識對象，其所熏成的種子都只能說是新熏，並非本有。二、護月主張本有說，認為在入道前緣教法真如，名「真如所緣緣」，熏習本有無漏種子，使之成熟，才能緣著真如，此時所緣才是事實的真如。其所言之修習過程和勝軍的說法沒有不同，差別的只是無漏種子究竟是新熏或本有¹²⁷。後來為法相宗正統的護法，主張同於護月的本有說，兼採新熏。此可見於《成唯識論》和《述記》。

法寶在《究竟論》針對該問題提出新解，將真如所緣緣種子生出出世間法解釋為真如生諸法，真如具有種子的能生作用。真如既是所緣緣，也是種子。真如是種子，自然有能生的作用。這裡暫且不處理「真如所緣緣種子」這複合詞在《瑜伽論》原典如何解讀的問題¹²⁸。法寶的論證主要是引經證：《大般若經》「真如雖生諸法，真如不生」、「一切聖者戒定智品從此性生」和《華嚴經》「清淨甚深智，如來性中生。」¹²⁹他另外再引《涅槃經》「第一義空為種子」和《瑜伽論》「種及界、性，名異體同」，反問：「因何（真如）許是佛性，不許是佛種邪？」¹³⁰法寶以「第一義空為種子」同於「真如為種子」，在句法上可成立；若以「種」（gotra）、界」（dhātu）和「性」（prakṛti）為同義詞而說「真如」（tathāta）是「種子」（bīja），顯然混淆此「種」（gotra）與彼「種」（bīja）的不同。無論如何，法寶藉由經證，主張「真如種子」的存在，而且更重要的是，真如既是種子，真如遍在，真如種子也就一切皆有，而不是唯識師所稱的，一部分眾生有無漏種子，

¹²⁵ 《瑜伽師地論略纂》，大·43·184·下：「問諸出世間法，從真如所緣緣種子生，非彼習氣積集種子所生者。備景法師云：若欲入解脫分時，觀十二部經教法。此教遠從清淨法界出。由緣此教，乃至在入決擇分位將證見道已前，緣教為境，修多修習力故，故言真如所緣緣。入見道已，此緣見道無漏之智，本無漏，無漏故，今緣真如既著，即熏成種。即現行智，以真如為所緣緣之種子生。即此種子，不從因緣生，唯有前世第一法為等無間緣，俱有法為增上緣，真如為所緣。至後念已，即從因緣者。又由決擇分世第一法，緣真如教法為所緣故，以此為因緣種子，生見道智，即說世第一法，名真如所緣緣種子。以緣教法影像真如修習為緣故，言從真如所緣緣種子生。此是勝軍論師義。即以此文故，言一切皆從新熏成。」

¹²⁶ 參見拙稿，〈初期大乘瑜伽行派真理與方法的問題〉，《現象學與人文科學》第3期，2006，27-49。

¹²⁷ 《瑜伽師地論略纂》，大·43·184·：「護月釋云：其自身中本有無漏種，由在解脫分等位中緣教法故，名真如所緣緣。當於此時，舊種遂增。由本有種故，得入解脫分位。又入見道時，由前已習緣真如觀，今得成熟，緣著真如，真如即是所緣緣。本有無漏之種，乃能生此現行智果。由緣真如為境，種方生現行故，言真如所緣緣種子生。」

¹²⁸ 相關研究，見山部能宜，〈真如所緣緣種子について〉，《日本の佛教と文化》（京都：永田文昌堂，1990），63-87；松本史朗，〈佛教思想論 上〉（東京：大藏出版社，2004），第二章第四、五、六節。

¹²⁹ 淺田本《究竟論》，364-366行。見淺田正博，〈法寶撰『一乘佛性究竟論』卷第四·卷第五の兩卷について〉，《龍谷大學佛教文化研究所紀要》第25號，1986年。經證出處，參見末木文美士，〈法寶の真如論一端〉，平川彰編，〈如來藏と大乘起信論〉（東京：春秋社，1990）。

¹³⁰ 淺田本《究竟論》，396-397行。另參見末木文美士，〈法寶の真如論一端〉，平川彰編，〈如來藏と大乘起信論〉（東京：春秋社，1990），頁480-481。

另一部分眾生則無，故有五性三乘之分。這是法寶的結論：「准此理教，《善戒經》等本性即是真如，平等而有，无別有為無漏種子，眾生有无不同。」¹³¹

針對法寶的解讀，慧沼質問如下：「若即真如為種能生，應但云從真如種子生出世法，何須云真如所緣緣種子生因？」¹³² 慧沼的意思是，出世清淨法是由無漏智所產生，而無漏智則來自以真如為所緣的觀行所產生，需要修行（正確的認識）而得的無漏智作為中介環節。倘若去除這認識論的中介環節，認為真如即可為種，生出萬法，包括出世間法，這會導致不假修證即可成佛的不合理結論。另外，針對法寶引述《大般若經》「真如雖生諸法，真如不生」之經證，慧沼的答覆指出，真如僅能作為一切法的增上緣，不可以作為親因緣。若說真如是一切法的親因，便會導致「一如生萬德，何有定異因」的一元論困境。也就是，一真如體生出各種不同屬性的存在，這些存在的殊異性便無法得到恰當的解釋¹³³。慧沼總結他對法寶「理心」的批判，其中的一項論證，如上所見，在於指出法寶的理論落入形上學一元論的困境：「若一切生，同有真如，共一正因，同數論等從一因起情非情等。¹³⁴」依相同的理路，慧沼指出，若一切眾生皆有理心為成佛正因，怎麼會有染淨、善惡、三界、六道、三乘等種種差別現象？慧沼顯然認為如來藏思想的一元論無法妥當說明現象世界的差異。¹³⁵

五、反思與自證：朱熹與陸象山論理與心

法寶與慧沼的佛性論爭，基本上繼承由玄奘引入的印度瑜伽行派的問題脈絡，此可從論爭所引的經論皆是印度經論看出。然而，從論爭的關鍵詞彙來看，中國傳統固有的「理」與「心」範疇，有意地替代印度佛教原有的名相（真如、阿賴耶識），這種換喻修辭相當程度地為後來的宋明新儒學分為理學和心學的發展定下基調。更重要的是，不僅是在修辭層面上法寶與慧沼的佛性論爭和宋明心學和理學之爭之間有所承續，在哲學問題上更可以看出真理和心識的關係成為東亞哲學從中世到近世的主要關注。心理二分或心理為一，理作為認識對象或是作為主體性的根本構成關係到佛教內部和儒家內部在實踐論上不同路線的競爭。此問題在儒家內的爭論以朱陸之爭最為典型。朱熹主張心理二分，格物窮理，和唯識學強調真如理為所緣的認識論進路，若合符節，而陸象山心即理的主張則和法寶的理心說前後呼應。法寶的佛性論和禪宗的心性論基本上同一理路，而朱熹批判陸象山為禪，間接說明法寶佛性論和象山心學的可共量性。

我們先看朱熹關於心與理關係的說法。欲釐清心與理的關係，必須先瞭解作

¹³¹ 淺田本《究竟論》，312-313行。

¹³² 《慧日論》，大45·429上。

¹³³ 《慧日論》，大45·426中。參見袁輪顯量，〈真如所緣緣種子と法爾無漏種子〉，61。

¹³⁴ 《慧日論》，大45·426下。

¹³⁵ 批判佛教學者，特別是松本史朗，指責如來藏思想為基體論，其論據和慧沼的批評理由相同。

為朱熹哲學核心的理氣論。理與氣作為宋明新儒學的形上學範疇類同於佛教的無為法與有為法的區分。佛教的有為法是緣起生滅的現象，而儒家的氣則指陰陽變化的現象；佛教的無為法（真如）是緣起本身或緣起法則，而儒家的理則統指道德之理與陰陽變化之理。朱熹在許多地方提到心是「氣之靈」¹³⁶，因此理與心的關係也就同於理與氣的關係，或是佛教所說的無為法和有為法的關係。

關於理與氣，朱熹強調二者之間，「分際甚明，不可亂也」：

天地之間，有理有氣。理也者，形而上之道也，生物之本也。氣也者，形而下之器也，生物之具也。是以人物之生，必稟此理，然後有性；必稟此氣，然後有形。其性其形，雖不外乎一身，然其道器之間，分際甚明，不可亂也。（〈答黃道夫〉，《朱文公文集》卷 58）

朱熹以《易傳》形上與形下，道與器的範疇來區分理與氣，並且強調這區分是必要的，不可取消。二者之間，理為先，氣為後，理為本，氣為末。這本末先後是就邏輯（形上學）來說，不是就經驗事實來說。若就經驗事實來說，朱熹則說理氣不離或理在氣中，這一點需先辨別：

問：「先有理，抑先有氣？」曰：「理未嘗離乎氣。然理形而上者，氣形而下者。自形而上下言，豈無先後！理無形，氣便粗，有渣滓。」¹³⁷

或問：「必有是理，然後有是氣，如何？」曰：「此本無先後之可言。然必欲推其所從來，則須說先有是理。然理又非別為一物，即存乎是氣中；無是氣，則理亦無掛搭處。氣則為金木水火，理則為仁義禮智。」¹³⁸

理與氣是形上學的區分，不是經驗科學的區分。此形上學區分乃從經驗推述出來，故說「必欲推其所從來，則須說先有是理」。必須注意的是，朱熹的理同時包含存在之理和價值之理，前者「如陰陽五行錯綜不失條緒，便是理」¹³⁹，後者「則為仁義禮智」，前者是自然法則，後者是道德法則。佛教則以真如為理，其內容以清淨法性來規定，道德色彩並不濃厚，然有宗教性，因為真如之相對於諸行，理之相對於事，仍有染淨迷悟的區分。

朱熹關於心的理論較為複雜，許多地方需要謹慎地從文脈上解讀，以免錯

¹³⁶ 「所覺者心之理也，能覺者氣之靈也。」「心者，氣之精爽。」《朱子語類》第一冊（北京：中華書局，1986）頁 85。

¹³⁷ 《朱子語類》第一冊，頁 3。

¹³⁸ 同上。

¹³⁹ 同上。

解。例如，朱熹也常說「心與理一」，「理在心中」¹⁴⁰，這些都是經驗描述的說法，特別是實踐結果或聖賢境界的描述，不是邏輯上的先驗區分¹⁴¹。這並不是說經驗描述的說法不可取，正好相反，朱熹的這些經驗描述正好顯示出形上學和實踐有著密切的內在關連。但是，朱熹畢竟有強烈的形上學取向，其心與理的形上學區分，目的在於強調心的認知作用和理的客觀性。他認為如果認知的客觀性未能貞定住，則易迷於本心風光，和禪家無異。這可見於朱熹批評佛教的〈觀心說〉一文：

夫心者，人之所以主乎身者也，一而不二也，為主而不為客也，命物而不命於物者也。故以心觀物，則物之理得。今復有物以反觀乎心，則是此心之外復有一心而能管乎此心者也。然則所謂心者為一耶？為二耶？為主耶？為客耶？為命物者耶？為命於物者耶？此亦不待教而審其言之謬矣。¹⁴²

此段前半是朱子的主張，後半則是對佛教觀心說的批評。朱子主張，相對於客體，心是認知主體，具有知覺與判斷的能力，其認知對象是事物之理。當此事物之理被認知時，此理是作為認知對象而非作為心外對象被認識，故可說「理在心中」，但這不等於說心與理是存有論地同一。對朱子來說，理的存有論的獨立地位不容絲毫質疑。朱子批評的佛教觀心論也許是針對禪宗，例如神秀即著有《觀心論》。神會便曾說神秀禪法為「凝心入定，住心看淨，起心外照，攝心內證」¹⁴³。朱子反對禪家自證本心的功夫，因為自證本心在理論上必須預設能觀之心與所觀之心的二分。因此他質疑：「所謂心者為一耶？為二耶？為主耶？為客耶？為命物者耶？為命於物者耶？」他批評象山為禪，也是基於同樣的理路。朱子又說：

大抵聖人之學，本心以窮理，而順理以應物，如身使臂，如臂使指，其道夷而通，其居廣而安，其理實而行自然。釋氏之學，以心求心，如口齧口，如目視目，其機危而迫，其途險而塞，其理虛而勢逆。蓋其言雖有若相似者，而其實之不同，蓋如此也。然非審思明辨之君子，其亦無能無惑於斯耶？¹⁴⁴

朱子認為儒釋不同就在於儒者「以心窮理」，佛家「以心求心」，前者「理實」，後者「理虛」。朱子批評禪宗的觀心法門，以心求心，就好像以口嚙口，以目視

¹⁴⁰ 「心與理一，不是理在前面為一物。理便在心之中，心包蓄不住，隨事而發。」《朱子語類》第一冊，頁 85。

¹⁴¹ 陳來引述《朱子語類》三十七，朱子解《論語》「仁者無憂」時說道：「仁者理即是心，心即是理，有一事來便有一理以應之，所以無憂。」認為這裡所說的「心與理一」指的是仁者修養後達到的境界，不是就存有論而言。參見陳來，《朱熹哲學研究》（北京：中國社會科學出版社 1987），頁 164。

¹⁴² 《朱文公集》卷第六十七，雜著，引自牟宗三，《心體與性體》（台北：正中書局，1969），第三冊，頁 331。

¹⁴³ 神會，《菩提達摩南宗定是非論》，見楊曾文編校，《神會和尚禪語錄》（北京：中華書局，1996），頁 29。

¹⁴⁴ 同上注。

目，是不可能的。朱子本人可能不一定清楚他的批評早見於佛教內部對自證的爭論。佛教經常使用「刀不能自割」，「目不能自視」來論證自證的不可能。朱子顯然對此有所瞭解，只是他的批評卻不是像印度佛教那般落在知識論上討論，而是直接表現出他對佛家這種功夫論落入危險迫塞之歧途的憂慮。朱子在這裡並沒明白說出危險究竟在哪裡，從他平素批評禪學來看，他憂慮的不外是學者沉溺於玩弄光景，自以為見道。

陸象山則十分不同。《象山年譜》記載鵝湖之會（1175）的朱陸異同曾說道：「鵝湖之會，論及教人，元晦之意欲令人泛觀博覽而後歸之約；二陸之意欲先發明人之本心，而後使之博覽。朱以陸之教人為太簡，陸以朱之教人為支離。¹⁴⁵」以「發明本心」概括象山學風，可以說是十分恰當。象山本來就對形上學思辨缺乏興趣，這使得他對北宋諸子的講學不能相應，自然也對朱熹的格物窮理進路不能贊同。形上學的興趣主要表現在對存有者本質的追問，這種追問基本上是在觀念中進行。象山的興趣則在於直指事物事理本身，著重於從經驗本身掌握所敞開的事理。所謂「發明本心」，就是這意思。《象山年譜》記載富陽主簿楊敬仲（1141-1226）和象山的一段對話，充分反映出象山的現象學式的興趣。有一天，楊敬仲問象山：「如何是本心？」象山以孟子四端說答之：「惻隱，仁之端也。羞惡，義之端也。辭讓，禮之端也。是非，智之端也。此即是本心。」敬仲曰：「簡兒時已曉得，畢竟如何是本心？」凡數問，先生終不易其說，敬仲亦未省。正好有賣扇子的人來要求仲裁糾紛，楊敬仲裁判雙方是非曲直之後繼續問前問。象山答曰：「聞適來斷扇訟，是者知其為是，非者知其為非，此即敬仲本心。」敬仲大覺，忽省此心之無始末，忽省此心之無所不通。先生嘗語人曰：「敬仲可謂一日千里。¹⁴⁶

這則記載顯示出，悟與不悟的區分在於認知態度的不同。當楊敬仲採取形上學的態度提問，追問什麼是「本心」時，無論象山如何回答，都無法真正地瞭解。只有當所有的形上思辨都懸擱之後，直接回到意識經驗本身，事理才能敞開，理解才能相應。象山顯然明白形上學態度和現象學態度的區分，才要求逕入經驗本身，指點本心的意義，因為在實存的情境中，本心並非作為思辨的對象，而是行為（知覺、判斷、行動）的主體。唯有主體當下回到主體，也就是回到本心，才能明證在主體經驗中的事理。換言之，事理的明證性只有在主體性經驗才可以獲得。這就是現象學的基本態度。相對地，朱子界定理為仁義禮智，此道德之理雖由良心之四端（惻隱之心、羞惡之心、辭讓之心、是非之心）表現，朱子仍主張心與理在存有論上必須嚴加區分，否則無法保住理的客觀性，象山則認為心理二分乃形上學預設，如果回到經驗本身，「是者知其為是，非者知其為非」，是非之理即不外乎心知的活動。心與理不可分，心即理。

¹⁴⁵ 陸象山，《陸九淵集》（北京：中華書局，1980），頁 491。

¹⁴⁶ 同上，頁 487-488。

綜觀陸象山的著作，他甚少進行諸如理氣問題的形上學論證，即使就其再三致意的本心，也未嘗論證以展示其義理。對他來說，論證本身就是方法上的歧出。所謂「事實湮於意見，典訓蕪於辨說」，論證分析就是意見辨說，未能使事實典訓明白，反而隱蔽不清。象山批評朱熹支離，就是這個意思。象山直接以踐履為進路，其〈與曾宅之〉書裡首揭「存誠」、「存心」工夫：

易曰：閑邪存其誠。孟子曰：存其心。某舊亦嘗以存名齋。孟子曰：庶民去之，君子存之。又曰：其為人也寡欲，雖有不存焉者寡矣。其為人也多欲，雖有存焉者寡矣。只存一字，自可使人明得此理。此理本天所以與我，非由外鑠。明得此理，即是主宰。¹⁴⁷

象山強調以「存」的工夫為先，才能「明得此理」，而此理本有，非由外鑠，明得此本有之理即是主宰。這裡有幾層意思。首先，象山並未論證理的先驗性，而是先經由「典訓」，也就是聖人經驗的宣示，指出「存心」（存其本心）的工夫是天理得以開顯的入處。天理並非透過論證而得，而是在本心的發用中呈顯。至於本心的發用，象山完全順著孟子學的路數，從四端的擴充做起。此四端之心的存養擴充過程同時就是天理的實現過程。象山在與李宰書裡發揮此義，十分透徹：

人非木石，安得無心？心於五官最尊大。《洪範》曰：「思曰睿，睿作聖。」孟子曰：「心之官則思，思則得之，不思則不得也。」又曰：「存乎人者，豈無仁義之心哉？」又曰：「至於心，獨無所同然乎？」又曰：「君子之所以異於人者以其存心也。」又曰：「非獨賢者有是心也，人皆有之，賢者能勿喪耳。」又曰：「人之所以異於禽獸者幾希，庶民去之，君子存之。」去之者，去此心也，故曰：「此之謂失其本心」。存之者，存其心也，故曰：「大人者不失其赤子之心。」四端者，即此心也。天之所以與我者，即此心也。人皆有是心，心皆具是理，心即理也。故曰：「理義之悅我心，猶芻豢之悅我口。」所貴乎學者，為其欲窮此理，盡此心也。有所蒙蔽，有所移奪，有所陷溺，則此心為之不靈，此理為之不明。是謂不得其正，其見乃邪見，其說乃邪說。¹⁴⁸

所謂本心即是「即心即理」之心，於佛教無異於法寶所言之「理心」，於儒家象山則順孟子稱為「本心」，其作為成聖成佛的先驗主體性則無不同。此本心既普遍地見之於四端（道德情感），其內容則是先驗之理（道德法則）。「人皆有是心，心皆具是理，心即理也。」理並非在心之外，而是心的自證下所開顯的本質。在這結構下，才能說「心即理」，心與理同一的本心。所謂失其本心，即是作為

¹⁴⁷ 同上，頁 4。

¹⁴⁸ 同上，頁 149。

建構意義世界的先驗主體（本心）並未被自我所覺知。如何促成本心的自我覺知就是象山或孟子所說的「存心」工夫。

象山在另外給曾宅之書中更清楚地展示本心的情感與法則的同一性：

心，一心也；理，一理也；至當歸一，精義無二。此心此理，實不容有二。故夫子曰：「吾道一以貫之。」孟子曰：「夫道一而已矣。」又曰：「道二，仁與不仁而已矣。」如是則為仁，反是則為不仁。仁，即此心也，此理也。求則得之，得此理也；先知者，知此理也；先覺者，覺此理也；愛其親者，此理也；敬其兄者，此理也；見孺子將入井，而有怵惕惻隱之心者，此理也；可羞之事則羞之，可惡之事則惡之者，此理也；是知其為是，非知其為非，此理也；宜辭而辭，宜遜而遜者，此理也；敬此理也，義亦此理也；內此理也，外亦此理也。¹⁴⁹

象山明白宣示「此心此理，不容有二」，其理由在於道德法則無法獨立於道德行為（故可說是道德內在論者）¹⁵⁰。吾人認為道德法則有其客觀性，可獨立於意識（心）之外，乃就概念或語言來表述道德法則，將道德法則脫離實踐脈絡，並以命題予以固著，如曰「人不可殺人」，故看似可和意識分離，並以此衍生的道德法則反過來規範道德行為。認識道德法則，使心合之，這是朱熹心理二分的工夫路數，也是象山所反對的。象山認為道德的根源應該回到道德經驗本身。唯有回到道德經驗，也就是道德的意向性活動，才會發現「愛其親者，此理也；敬其兄者，此理也；見孺子將入井，而有怵惕惻隱之心者，此理也；可羞之事則羞之，可惡之事則惡之者，此理也；是知其為是，非知其為非，此理也；宜辭而辭，宜遜而遜者，此理也」。子愛其親，弟敬其長，這是再平常不過的道德行為（愛、敬），其意向對象不僅是親長的具體存在，此意向活動本身就是理的活動。理不孤懸，必須就其在具體的活動中來瞭解。這一點是「即事而真」、「理事不二」的固有思維傳統。以象山所舉的例子來看，親長的具體存在是愛的意向性活動的對象，也是讓理得以體現的場域。此所以親歿之後仍無損於孝思活動的延續，因為孝思並不決定於外在對象，更不是決定於作為認知對象的理。理不孤懸，必須和心合說，即心即理，這就是就作用言理。理有作用，因為理只能在心的活動中才有開顯可言。

¹⁴⁹ 同上，頁 5。

¹⁵⁰ 我在這裡區分道德內在論和外在論，主要在於辨明道德法則在說明道德行為的地位。若道德行為需要藉由外在的道德法則（理）來說明，則稱為外在論；相反的，若不需要外在的道德法則，純粹從內在因素，即可說明道德行為，則稱之為內在論者。這和時下道德哲學的用法，將內在論界定為「接受某些道德判斷必須來自某種內在的動機」，而將外在論界定為「接受某些道德判斷可以和內在動機無關」，有所不同。參見 R. M. Hare, "Universal prescriptivism," in Peter Singer, ed., *A Companion to Ethics* (Oxford, UK: Blackwell, 1991), 458。

六、結論與對話：作為現象學問題的一種解讀

從以上慧沼和法寶的佛性論爭到朱陸異同，不論是佛教內部或是儒家內部，即使雙方對於理的內容各有不同的界定，理的全幅實現卻是雙方的共同關注。佛教所證的理是真如空理，以人法二無我或無自性來規定，而儒家肯定的則是實理，有其積極的道德價值內容。儒釋雙方內部的分歧，或稱理學，或稱心學，或強調真如理，或強調真如心，其存有論上的差異其實和各自採取的不同實踐方法密切相關。強調理的優先性者（唯識學與程朱理學）必然在工夫上主張格物窮理，而強調心的優先性者（如來藏思想和陸王心學）必然強調回歸本心。前者強調主客之間的認識，而後者則強調自證。前者有明顯的知識論取向，而後者則是存有論取向。¹⁵¹

然而雙方的差異並不影響彼此之間更為根本的共同立場：存有論不能獨立於意識哲學，真理問題必須關聯到意識問題來討論。換言之，不能孤立地問：什麼是理？不論是佛教或儒家，或各自內部的不同系統，他們從未孤立地進行形上學思辨。什麼是理的問題一定不能離開心識的活動來回答。若藉由現象學來說明，理必然和意向性有關，理是意向性的對象。離開意識的意向性活動，我們無法孤立地談論理。這是現象學的基本立場，即使唯識學和朱熹都會同意。就唯識學來說，智為心所，識為心王，智依識轉，真如理作為智的對象，不能視為心識之外的對象¹⁵²。若將真如理視為心外的存在，則不可避免自相矛盾，因為就唯識學而言，真如理的內容即是唯識性（唯識無境）。理既是識之所緣，就離不開能緣。能緣與所緣皆是識的結構，離識別無所緣。唯識宗以真如為所緣，還是不能離開識。至於朱熹，他常言「理在心中」之說必須也視為關於心與理之關係的現象學描述。

就如來藏思想（法寶）和心學（陸象山）而言，理並非心的認識對象，而是內在於主體性的先驗根據。不同於經驗主體（分別識）的能所構造，本心或理心以先驗性的理為根據，其主體性並不以分別識或孟子的耳目之官（小體）來界定，而是以理來界定。既然先驗的主體性奠基於理，理的認識與實現只能來自先驗主體性的反身性覺知（self-reflexive awareness），而不在於認知主體的對象性認識。

¹⁵¹ 本文寫至結論時，重翻牟宗三《佛性與般若》，驟然發現牟先生早以縱貫系統和橫攝系統分判真諦真心系統與玄奘妄心系統的分歧乃相應於陸王心學與朱子學的分歧：「[真諦]從亂識起，到唯真心止，空如之理始終從主體說也。此與妄心派之境智分能所而作差別說者異矣。要者是在妄心派以阿賴耶為主，而以正聞熏習為客，真如境始終是在正聞熏習所成之出世淨心之仰企中，亦在其所緣中，因此，始終是在對列之局中（一如朱子），而未能以真心為提綱，融真如理於真心中，而為一實踐存有論之縱貫系統也。...心理為一即是縱貫系統。心理為一的真如有內熏力，能生無漏功德法，所謂『性起』，即是縱貫系統。（在生死流轉方面只是緣起）。此與妄心派言真如理不生起，既不能熏，亦不受熏，賢首所謂『凝然真如』者，異矣。」牟宗三，《佛性與般若》（台北：學生書局，1977），上冊，頁 359-360。即此以觀，本文至此可以說是牟解之註腳。

¹⁵² 《成唯識論》：「智雖非識，而依識轉，識為主故，說轉識得。」（大 31·56·中）。

這種內溯主體以尋理則根源（the subjective sources of the laws of logic）的進路正是胡賽爾在批判心理主義後所提出的現象學方法：「相對的，現象學展現純粹邏輯的基本概念和理則所出的根源，回到這些[概念與理則]必須再度回溯的根源，才能給予它們瞭解純粹邏輯以及涉及的知識論批判所需的『清晰和明了』。¹⁵³」我們注意到胡賽爾使用「回溯」（traced back）、「根源」（sources）、「流出」（flow）等意象，來表達其內溯主體性的轉向，和陸王心學或受到如來藏思想影響的禪宗要求自證本心的方法非常接近。唯有回到意識經驗，這些理則才能被「清晰明白」地直觀，而不是思辨地構畫。就佛教來說，後者是分別，前者是現觀。只有在現觀自證之下，理才能全幅開顯。

對胡賽爾來說，形式邏輯的致命傷乃在於它和思維主體的分離，以致於和生活世界脫節，成為乾枯無力的學問。對治之道則唯有回到先驗性主體的根源，胡賽爾稱之為「先驗邏輯」。如John Sallis所言：「先驗邏輯僅是刻意地、論題地關連到先驗根源的形式邏輯。先驗邏輯是從根本上先驗地奠基的形式邏輯。¹⁵⁴」換言之，胡賽爾不僅未曾取消形式邏輯，還藉由現象學方法賦予形式邏輯應有的生命力，讓邏輯和主體活動重新結合。胡賽爾對於形式邏輯的批評類似華嚴宗批評法相宗的「真如凝然」。同理，法寶強調真如（理）有其力用，主要的理由就在於理不離心，理因心而有力用。由此可見，不可如批判佛教學者僅視如來藏思想為一元論形上學。相反的，如來藏思想要求徹底地回歸到先驗主體性根源，其用心乃出於實踐的要求，因為唯有回到作為先驗性根源的本心或理心（真如心），理才獲得實踐的動力。

如上所言，從佛性論爭到朱陸異同的東亞哲學發展，基本上相應於現象學關於真理的觀點：真理不能僅從形式判斷來規定，而應該奠基於明證性（evidence），使真理能夠直觀地給予¹⁵⁵。胡賽爾拒絕符應論的真理觀，因為符應論未批判地預設外在於意識的對象。就這點而言，唯識學、如來藏思想和心學都無二致。朱熹哲學則較為複雜，他主張理在氣先，帶有明顯的柏拉圖主義的色彩。然而成熟期的朱熹強調「心統性情」，將先驗的道德規範（仁義禮智＝性＝理）和經驗的道德情感（四端）收攝為心的體用關係，主張唯有經由心的中介，先驗之理才能發用於經驗之情，而為心所明證。¹⁵⁶若無心的中介，理將凝然不起作用，吾人亦無從明證之。此所以朱熹常強調「理不離知覺，知覺不離理」。即此而言，朱熹

¹⁵³ Edmund Husserl, *The Shorter Logical Investigations* (London and New York: Routledge, 2001), 86. 又見 John Sallis, "The Logic of Thinking," 發表於 2008 年 11 月 25 日在政治大學的講稿，頁 5-6。

¹⁵⁴ John Sallis, 同上，頁 8。

¹⁵⁵ Edmund Husserl, *Logical Investigations*, Investigation VI, §39. Cf., Dieter Lohmar, "Truth", in Lester Embree, et al., eds., *Encyclopedia of Phenomenology* (Dordrecht/Boston/London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1997), 708-712.

¹⁵⁶ 《朱子文集》（卷 67，〈元亨利貞說〉）：「仁義禮智，性也；惻隱、羞惡、辭讓、是非，情也；以仁愛，以義惡，以禮讓，以智知者，心也。性者心之理也，情者心之用也，心者性情之主也。」陳俊民校訂，台北德富文教基金會出版，2000 年，第七冊，頁 3361。

也是不離心來展現理。不同的是，朱熹並未將心視為先驗的主體性，因為心為氣之靈明者，雖是靈明，畢竟還是氣。此點不同於象山之心即理說。

如果佛性論爭和朱陸之爭的雙方都採取現象學的進路，吾人又如何能在現象學內部來判釋其中的分歧？這是不容易回答的問題，原因可能在於雙方的哲學動機大異其趣。佛教和理學的終極關懷是成佛成聖，成為存有的守護者和充實者。晚期胡賽爾雖然關懷歷史危機和生活世界，基本上為科學提供嚴格性的奠基是他的終生志業。這二種學問旨趣相當不同。在這一點，海德格的基本存有論反而和東亞哲學比較有親近性。至於如何在現象學內部來判釋佛性論爭和朱陸異同雙方的分歧，我們或許可以從胡賽爾在《邏輯研究》第二卷第六研究關於明證和真理的探討和海德格〈論真理的本質〉找到可能的回應線索。

胡賽爾在《邏輯研究》中關於真理的理論，基本上是為了正確性真理(truth of correctness)，例如判斷的正確性，提供現象學的奠基。他給「真理」一個完整的定義：「真理作為一個認同行為的相關物便是一個事態，而作為一個相合的認同的相關物便是一個同一性，即：在被意指之物和被給予之物本身之間的完整一致性。這種一致性是在明見性中被體驗到的，因為明見性就是相即認同的現時進行。」¹⁵⁷首先，真理是認同行為的相關物，此相關物既是事態(state of affairs)，也是同一性(identity)，作為所意和所予的一致性。胡賽爾從意向性的能所結構的所方將真理界定為意向的相關項，也是明證行為的對象。在接下來的補充定義，胡賽爾就明證行為的觀念的本質(ideal essence)來界定真理，則是從能思來界定。整體來說，胡賽爾還是強調真理為在明證性行為中被給予的對象，同時也是被意指的對象，此對象為直觀所充實本身就是真理，就是存有¹⁵⁸。這種意義的真理當然不是判斷的真理和命題的真理，而是在明證性行為中展示的事態。此真理必然是一種同一性。必須注意的是，這同一性並非古典哲學的同一性，如亞里斯多德的自我同一(auto kath auto)或印度佛教的自性(svabhāva)，而是事物之所給予和所意指之間的同一性¹⁵⁹。

相對地，唯識學將真如分為盡所有性和如所有性，也在修道進程上分為影像真如和親證真如，前者透過表象認識，後者透過直觀認識，窮盡一切法的如性。唯識學主張真如作為認識對象，這一點是和胡賽爾現象學一致的。同樣的，朱熹將理視為格物致知的對象，也是採取和胡賽爾現象學一致的知識論進路。

¹⁵⁷ 胡賽爾著，倪梁康譯，《邏輯研究·第二卷第二部分》（上海：上海譯文出版社，1999），頁122。英譯參見：Edmund Husserl, *The Shorter Logical Investigations* (London and New York: Routledge, 2001), 331.

¹⁵⁸ 同上。

¹⁵⁹ 關於古典哲學的真理論，參見 Barry Allen, *Truth in Philosophy* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993), 9-28.

關於真理問題，繼承胡賽爾而另開新局的海德格，一方面重新解釋現象學的旨趣在於讓事物顯示其本身，讓事物在光照下顯現¹⁶⁰，另一方面以「自由」、「開顯」來說明真理的本質。和胡賽爾一樣，海氏追問作為一般的真理根據，也就是符應的正確性，如何在更根本的層面上成為可能？他指出，只有先在敞開之境，讓事物敞開自己，讓存在者存在，才能使「心合於理」的符應真理（命題真理）成為可能。換言之，只有植根於自由的開放狀態，才是真理的真正本質。「真理的本質乃是自由」（*Das Wessen der Wahrheit ist die Freiheit*）¹⁶¹。「自由先被規定為在開放之境開顯的自由。這自由的本質如何被思及？那正確的表象性陳述所相應的開顯者是在開放行為所開顯的存有者。在開放之境得以開顯者的自由使存有者如其所是。自由表現為讓存有者如其所是。」¹⁶²海氏即此而以「解蔽」（*alētheia*）、「開顯」（*disclosure*）來說明真理的本質。

如果將以上海德格的真理觀和如來藏思想、心學比較，表面上看不出彼此有太多的共通處。如來藏思想和心學容易被解讀為一種先驗唯心論，主張將理心或本心解讀為存有論，甚至於宇宙論意義的先驗主體性，而海德格的哲學基調則和先驗主體性哲學互不相容。海氏哲學更多的著力是對主體形上學的解構。海德格的思維顯然有意脫掙胡賽爾的知識論進路，轉向海氏所言的基本存有論，後者試圖解消笛卡兒以降的二元論形上學，以現象學的方法揭顯作為「在世存有」的「此在」義蘊。真理的問題必須在基本存有論的範圍內考察。真理的問題就是存有的問題，或是更明確的說，存有開顯的問題¹⁶³。就理與心的關係來說，海氏自然不會同意從能所對立的存在者的（*ontic*）層面來處理，而會從更為根源的存有的（*ontological*）的層面來考察「心理二分」之前真理可能的條件，也就是存有的開顯。在佛教來看，特別是如來藏思想，存有開顯的根源性和優先性就是真如或法性的根源性和優先性。如來藏思想主張，真如直接在如來藏自性清淨心（理心）開顯，而關於生死世界的說明則歸於識心的分別活動。這是如來藏思想和唯識學的根本不同，後者更多地關注以真如為所緣的認識論問題，相對地，如來藏自性清淨心本身應該被理解為未被遍計所執執定以前如如自在的場域，此如如自在即相應於海德格所言的作為真理本質的自由。即此而言，海德格的真理論顯然更為相應如來藏思想系統，其和陸王心學的比觀亦可如是觀。透過基本存有論的分析，海德格得出結論：真的肯斷（*true assertion*）讓事物在開顯中呈現，真理就是開顯存有（*Being-uncovering*）。「因此真理絕非知與物，能與所之間的一致。」¹⁶⁴真理作為開顯存有唯有於「在世存有」才可能。這即是象山常說的「道外無事，

¹⁶⁰ Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), 51.

¹⁶¹ Martin Heidegger, "On the Essence of Truth," in *Basic Writings*, ed., by David Farrell Krell (New York: Harper & Row, 1976), 125.

¹⁶² 同上，127。

¹⁶³ Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 256: "If, however, *truth* rightfully has a primordial connection with *Being*, then the phenomenon of truth comes within the range of the problematic of fundamental ontology."

¹⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 261.

事外無道」。道就是真理，事就是「在世存有」。真理必須於「在世存有」中開顯。僧肇說：「即事而真」，也是同樣的意思。象山也會同意海德格的說法，說存有在世的自在開顯是第一義，至於道問學的知識活動，如朱熹所好，已落於第二義矣！

國科會補助專題研究計畫成果報告自評表

請就研究內容與原計畫相符程度、達成預期目標情況、研究成果之學術或應用價值（簡要敘述成果所代表之意義、價值、影響或進一步發展之可能性）、是否適合在學術期刊發表或申請專利、主要發現或其他有關價值等，作一綜合評估。

1. 請就研究內容與原計畫相符程度、達成預期目標情況作一綜合評估

達成目標

未達成目標（請說明，以 100 字為限）

實驗失敗

因故實驗中斷

其他原因

說明：

2. 研究成果在學術期刊發表或申請專利等情形：

論文： 已發表 未發表之文稿 撰寫中 無

專利： 已獲得 申請中 無

技轉： 已技轉 洽談中 無

其他：（以 100 字為限）

3. 請依學術成就、技術創新、社會影響等方面，評估研究成果之學術或應用價值（簡要敘述成果所代表之意義、價值、影響或進一步發展之可能性）（以 500 字為限）

本研究成果展示在漢傳佛傳佛教哲學的新問題意識，以「方法」與「真理」的問題設定，採取現象學的入路，重新解釋智顛的「智」的現象學，也深入探討漢傳佛教哲學中唯識學和如來藏學對證，並從胡賽爾和海德格的差異抉發其中的哲學意涵。本研究只是開端，尚待進一步深入。