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    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/100174


    Title: 地方談判籌碼的證據：對1980-2003年大陸各省投資行為的分析結果
    Other Titles: Evidence of Provincial Bargaining Power in Reform China: An Analysis of Provincial Investment Behavior 1980-2003
    Authors: 趙學維;歐宏國
    Chao, Hsueh-Wei Thomas;Ou, Hong-Kou
    Keywords: 中央地方關係;互惠式問責;地方談判籌碼;固定資產投資;官員輪調
    Central- Local Relations;Reciprocal Accountability;Local Bargaining Power;Investment in Fixed Assets;Rotation of Local Officials
    Date: 2008-10
    Issue Date: 2016-08-16 13:26:05 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: 本文修正了既有研究對於地方利益優先順位的假設，並首度結合代表中央控制與地方談判籌碼兩種觀點的主要解釋變項來分析1980到2003年間中國大陸各省級行政區國有部門的固定資產投資金額。主要的發現有：(一) 1994年分稅制改革要建立透明客觀的政府間轉移支付制度的目標並不成功，中央愈來愈傾向用不透明的專項補助來支援地方財政；(二)中共中央對於省級領導的人事調動權，確實具有抑制地方投資總體規模的效果，只是這個效果在1994年以後變得不顯著；(三)在中央委員會席次比重愈高的省份會分配到愈多的投資資金，這個效果在本研究的觀察期間都是顯著的；(四)從各省的整體投資資金規模來判斷，中央委員會席次比重擴大地方投資的效果，一直都超過中央人事調動權的抑制效果。
    We revised the problematic definition of local preferences employed by previous studies and integrate explanatory variables from both central control and local bargaining leverage hypotheses into an analysis of China’s provincial investment in fixed assets between 1980 and 2003. Our major findings are: (1) The 1994 Tax Sharing System (fengshuizhi) reform did not succeed in establishing a transparent and more rule-based revenue-sharing system; the center relied more heavily on ad hoc earmarked transfers to allocate funds. (2) Central leaders’ personnel management power over provincial leaders curtailed provincial investment size between 1980-1992, but that curtailing effect became insignificant after 1994. (3) Provinces with higher membership share at the central committee tended to receive higher investment resources from the center, that enlarging effect has been significant throughout the period under study. (4) The impact of curtailing effect on the size of provincial investment has always been overshadowed by that of the enlarging effect.
    Relation: 社會科學論叢, 2(2), 1-62
    Journal of Social Sciences
    Data Type: article
    Appears in Collections:[Journal of Social Sciences] Journal Articles

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