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Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/100881
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| Title: | 俄羅斯與外界對台灣的態度 |
| Other Titles: | Russian and Other`s Attitude toward Taiwan |
| Authors: | 奎斯特爾
Quester, George H. |
| Date: | 2002-02 |
| Issue Date: | 2016-08-30 14:28:39 (UTC+8) |
| Abstract: | 本文試圖去分析外國對於兩岸關係的態度，特別是比較俄羅斯與美國及世界其他國家對於兩岸的態度。在某些事例上，各國的動機將會相像，但是有些動機會有極其重要的差異。
俄羅斯並不像前蘇聯一樣，它現在基本上可以算做是一個民主國家，所以可能會讓人期待它種種好的一面，但也會讓人看到壞的一面（就像過去在美國、西歐國家、日本與澳洲等地所發生的情形）。可是，俄羅斯直接與中國大陸接壤，因此當然會導致一些特別正面或負面的感覺。俄羅斯人在史達林跟毛澤東時代對於與共產中國親近的關係存有一些正面的記憶，隨後因爲中、蘇共的分裂而引起了雙方在烏蘇里江沿岸瀕臨戰爭邊緣的危機，讓俄羅斯人對中國大陸產生了負面的感覺。更進一步來看，俄羅斯與中國在歷史上的關係是前者的帝國主義在後者的土地上攫取利益，這點與中國與美國的關係有極大的不同，因爲美國較常採取的作爲是對抗外國侵略者以保護中國的領土完整。
所以，種種的動機在俄羅斯處理臺灣特殊的地位政策之中都發揮了影響力。這些動機有時會使俄羅斯在台灣問題上與美國起爭執。
就如同美國一般，俄羅斯對於激怒北京一事必須要很謹慎，因爲它所懼怕的是北京的核武及傳統軍事武力。與美國或其他政治民主國家一樣，俄羅斯必須尋找海外市場，顧及海峽兩岸任一方的軍火市場。
俄羅斯面對車臣的分離運動要比美國林肯總統所要阻止的分離運動在時間點上更爲接近現代，因此對北京官方要求中國統一更富同情心。除了立即的分離問題外，後冷戰時期的南斯拉夫與高加索的例子對俄羅斯與美國奏效，對於有時在全球各地導致種族淨化大屠殺的自決較不表支持。倘若臺灣獨立的原因是因爲其經濟富裕而不願與較貧窮的大陸分享，並非是因爲兩岸的政治自由與生活方式差異太大的話，俄羅斯、美國或其他外國勢力對臺灣獨立的支持將會減弱。
美國人不但關切居住在臺灣的人民，還關切居住在香港或大陸以外其他地區中國人的福利。因此，他們或許並不希望處理模糊的臺灣地位。這種模糊可當成用來保護其他中國人緩慢成長的自由的一種工具。無論中國人民自己建立的民主過程是多麼的新穎或是不完美，俄羅斯政府對此或與美國會有相同感受。
俄羅斯可能不喜歡美國的角色，會利用北京與華盛頓之間就臺灣問題的衝突來削弱美國的權力。廣義地說，俄羅斯保留其行動自由，避免支持臺灣的自由，以致於他們可以在華盛頓與北京因這個問題而陷入戰爭時，進行調停與約束。
An attempt is made to analyze foreign attitudes on the relationship between mainland China and Taiwan, in particular comparing the attitudes of Russia with those of the United States and the rest of the world. In some cases the motivations will be very parallel, but there are also some very important differences.
Unlike the old Soviet Union, Russia is now largely a democracy, which might cause one to expect all the good the bad aspects of democracy that have been at work in the past in the United States, and in Western Europe and Japan, Australia, etc. Yet Russia still directly borders China, which can of course produce particularly positive or particularly negative feelings.
The Russians have some positive memories of close relations with Communist China in the days of Stalin and Mao, and some very negative feelings, as the Sino-Soviet split at times produced real risks of war along the Ussuri. Going back even more deeply, the historic relationship between Czarist Russia and Imperial China was indeed that of Russian imperialism at China`s expense.
A variety of motives are thus at work in the development of the Russian policy toward the special status of Taiwan, motives which would put Russia sometimes at odds with the United States on the Taiwan question.
Just like America, Russia may have to be cautious about angering Beijing, because of a fear of Beijing`s nuclear and conventional miliary forces. Just like the United States or any other political democracy, Russia may have to seek markets abroad, markets in which to sell weapons on either side of the Taiwan Strait, markets for other more peaceful exports.
Russia, facing a much more recent secession effort in Chechnya than the Southern secession the United States rebuffed under President Lincoln, may thus be more sympathetic to Beijing`s official demands for a Chinese national reunification. Beyond the immediate secession issue, the post-Cold War examples of Yugoslavia and the Caucasus will work to make Russians, and Americans and others, less supportive of self-determination around the globe, the self-determination that can lead to ”ethnic-cleansing” massacres. Support for Taiwan independence from the outside world, from Russians or Americans or anyone else, will be weakened if the independence seems tied to the greater economic affluence of Taiwan, in an unwillingness to share this with the poorer mainland, rather than to important differences in political freedom and life-style.
Americans will care about the welfare of the Chinese who live in Hong Kong and on the rest of the mainland, and not just about those who live on Taiwan. Hence, they may not wish to resolve the ambiguity of Taiwan`s status, where this ambiguity has served as lever protecting the slow growth in freedom of other Chinese; many Russians may feel the same.
Russians may resent the role of the United States, and seize upon the Taiwan conflict between Beijing and Washington as a way of reducing American power. More generously, Russians may also reserve their freedom of action, avoiding any backing for Taiwan`s freedom, so that they can mediate and moderate if Washington and Beijing should ever be getting into a war over the issue. |
| Relation: | 俄羅斯學報, 2, 67-98
Journal of Russian studies
Vestnik instituta rossii |
| Data Type: | article |
| Appears in Collections: | [俄羅斯學報] 期刊論文
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| 2-67-95.pdf | | 1888Kb | Adobe PDF2 | 380 | View/Open |
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