English  |  正體中文  |  简体中文  |  Post-Print筆數 : 27 |  Items with full text/Total items : 93779/124226 (75%)
Visitors : 28856068      Online Users : 370
RC Version 6.0 © Powered By DSPACE, MIT. Enhanced by NTU Library IR team.
Scope Tips:
  • please add "double quotation mark" for query phrases to get precise results
  • please goto advance search for comprehansive author search
  • Adv. Search
    HomeLoginUploadHelpAboutAdminister Goto mobile version
    政大機構典藏 > 學術期刊 > 廣告學研究 > 期刊論文 >  Item 140.119/103267
    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/103267

    Title: 從博奕理論(Game Theory)觀點解析環保自力救濟事件--以高雄大社石化工業區圍廠事件為例
    Other Titles: The Dynamics of Conflicts Between Corporate Organizations and Activist Groups: A Case Study
    Authors: 吳宜蓁;林瑜芬
    Contributors: 國立政治大學廣告學系
    Keywords: 大社;石化工業區;自力救濟事件;高雄;博奕理論;圍廠事件;環保
    Date: 1994-03
    Issue Date: 2016-10-25 15:29:41 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: 本研究嘗試以博奕理論(Game Theory)為分析架構,探討企業組織與抗爭行動團體之間對立衝突之過程及解決之道。研究個案為發生於民國八十二年四月至五月間之高雄縣大社鄉民圍廠事件。研究發現,大社鄉民於圍廠事件初期採行博奕理論中之「零和博奕」策略,而後轉為妥協、合作的非零和博奕策略。至於圍廠事件的抗爭對象--經濟部工業局,自始至終均以非零和博奕回應鄉民,以尋求理性解決抗爭事件。在雙方獲致合作基準後,衝突事件終得以在一個月後宣告解決。
    This study explores the conflict relationship between a corporation organization--the Bureau of Industry R.O.C.--and its protest group--the people living at Da-Shei County in Gao-Shiung. Game theory is used as the analytical framework to describe and explain the process of the conflict. The study found that, throughout the protest process, the Bureau of Industry had used non-zero-sum game as its strategy to interact with the Da-Shei people. The people, however, had interacted with the Bureau by using the strategy of zero-sum game until they talked directly with the director of the Department of Economics. The conflict was finally resolved when the two sides used to non-zero-sum-game strategy.
    Relation: 廣告學研究, 3, 69-91
    Data Type: article
    Appears in Collections:[廣告學研究] 期刊論文

    Files in This Item:

    File Description SizeFormat

    All items in 政大典藏 are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved.

    社群 sharing

    DSpace Software Copyright © 2002-2004  MIT &  Hewlett-Packard  /   Enhanced by   NTU Library IR team Copyright ©   - Feedback