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| Title: | 上市公司監理機制,多角化策略與績效關聯性之研究 |
| Authors: | 陳瓊蓉
Chen, Chiung-Jung |
| Contributors: | 陳隆麒
謝劍平
Chen, Long-Chi
Shieh, Joseph C. P.
陳瓊蓉
Chen, Chiung-Jung |
| Keywords: | 監理機制
多角化策略
公司績效 |
| Date: | 2002 |
| Issue Date: | 2009-09-18 13:35:16 (UTC+8) |
| Abstract: | 由於台灣公司因面臨有限的市場規模與資本市場發展程度不如歐美已開發國家，多角化可能是公司維持競爭力與增加獲利的一種主要方式。過去文獻主張多角化與代理問題有所關聯，著重探討多角化與績效的關係，但對於監理機制、多角化與績效的關係缺乏系統性的研究，本研究以代理理論為基礎，再以民國85年至90年的台灣上市公司為研究對象，挑選在研究期間進行新多角化活動(產業部門變動)的公司共133筆作為研究樣本，探討監理機制、多角化與短期績效的關係。此外，經由7家上市公司的個案訪談發現，多角化為長期性行為，績效於長期才能完全顯現出來，故不同於過去國內外文獻，本研究探討監理機制、多角化策略以及短期績效(133筆樣本)，中期績效(99筆樣本)與長期績效(54筆樣本)的關係。
本研究使用敘述性統計、變數相關分析、t檢定、複迴歸分析，以及聯立方程式來探討監理機制、多角化以及短期與長期績效的關係，主要實證發現有:
1.民國85至90年期間，多數多角化變動的公司集中在紡織業、化學業，以及營建業等傳統性產業，可能反映出這些產業處於成熟期產業，獲利有限，公司希望藉由多角化帶來新契機，達到成長的目標。此外，發現紡織業公司與多角化程度呈現顯著正相關。
2.公司規模愈大、成立時間愈久，多角化程度愈高；此外，公司負債比率愈高、研發比率愈高，則多角化程度愈低。
3.管理者股權在多角化變動後的年度顯著地下降，可能反映出管理者對於多角化產業的前景並不樂觀的一種表現，故在進行多角化活動的年度，立即出脫部分持股。
4.管理者股權比例與多角化程度呈現先負後正的非線性關係，管理者股權比例的轉折點大約發生在50%，實證結果與部分文獻(Denis, et al., 1997)一致。
5.機構投資人持股率與多角化程度呈現負相關，證實Pound (1988)的效率監督假說，也與過去文獻(Wright, et al., 2002)一致。
6.多角化程度與短期績效呈現顯著正相關，但與中期或長期績效，此種顯著正相關就逐漸消失，甚至轉為負相關(但不顯著)，即多角化效益有遞減的趨勢，實證發現與過去多數文獻結論(Berger與Ofek, 1995; Lang與Stulz, 1994；Lins與Servaes, 1999 )並不一致，本文試圖提出原因來詮釋實證發現。
7.非相關多角化程度愈高的公司有顯著較佳短期績效，但在中期或長期績效時，此種好績效就逐漸消失，甚至不再有較佳績效，結論與過去文獻(Jose, et al., 1986; Lubatkin與Rogers, 1989)不一致。
8.本文經由聯立方程式實證發現，管理者股權與多角化程度呈現顯著先負後正的非線性關係，且多角化程度也影響績效，即管理者股權可經由多角化來影響公司績效。
最後本研究針對上市公司與投資人提出建議，並提供後續研究的建議。
Diversification is one major way for Taiwanese firms to maintain their competitiveness and enhance profitability when they are confronted with limited local market share and are in a less developed capital market. Past studies have asserted that decisions related to diversification are often associated with the agency problems. However, past studies have chiefly focused on exploring the relationship between diversification and performance, with less attention having been devoted to the relationship of governance mechanisms, diversification and performance. Based on previous studies, Taiwan obviously lacks external control mechanisms, which are quite widespread in western countries. Hence, this paper explored whether internal control mechanisms (equity ownership and the structure of the board of directors) can be valid ways to alleviate agency problems. This paper uses agency theory to examine the relationship between the governance mechanisms, corporate diversification, and firm performance of Taiwanese TSE-listed firms from 1996 to 2001. We respectively selected 133, 99, and 54 samples to explore the relationships between governance mechanisms, corporate diversification, and short-term, intermediate-term and long-term performance.
The major empirical results are as:
1.Most diversification activities occurred in traditional industries, e.g. textile, chemistry and building industries. This may reflect that these industries are in the mature stage of the industrial cycle. Therefore, they have to achieve growth by seeking diversification in other industries.
2.Larger or older firms have higher level of diversification. Moreover, firms with higher debt ratio or RD ratio have lower level of diversification.
3.Managerial equity ownership declined significantly in the year of diversification activity. This may indicate that managers were not optimistic about their industry’s future prospects.
4.Our results clearly showed an U-shaped relationship between managerial equity ownership and level of diversification. The threshold point was at 50%, similar to that in prior studies. Moreover, diversification was found to be positively associated with short-term and intermediate-term performance (statistical significance has declined) and to be negatively associated with long-term performance. It showed that the benefits of diversification have decreased. Our findings are different from those of most previous studies. Some possible interpretations are discussed.
5.The level of diversification was negatively related to equity ownership of institutional investors, and this was confirmed by the Efficiency Monitoring Hypothesis by Pound (1988) and is consistent with prior studies.
6.In contrast to prior studies, firms with unrelated diversification have superior short-term performance. However, in the long-term, firm performance gradually declined.
7.By using simultaneous equations, we confirmed managerial equity ownership did affect firm performance through diversification.
Future research directions and suggestions for Taiwanese-listed firms and investors are also discussed in the paper. |
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| Description: | 博士
國立政治大學
企業管理研究所
88355505
91 |
| Source URI: | http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0883555051 |
| Data Type: | thesis |
| Appears in Collections: | [企業管理學系] 學位論文
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