English  |  正體中文  |  简体中文  |  Post-Print筆數 : 27 |  Items with full text/Total items : 112721/143689 (78%)
Visitors : 49612016      Online Users : 754
RC Version 6.0 © Powered By DSPACE, MIT. Enhanced by NTU Library IR team.
Scope Tips:
  • please add "double quotation mark" for query phrases to get precise results
  • please goto advance search for comprehansive author search
    •  Adv. Search
    Home ‧ Login ‧ Upload ‧ Help ‧ About ‧ Administer Goto mobile version
    政大機構典藏 > 商學院 > 金融學系 > 學位論文 >  Item 140.119/55112


    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/55112


    Title: 經理人薪酬及其避險行為
    Executive Compensation and Hedging Behavior
    Authors: 黃怡婷
    Huang, Yi Ting
    Contributors: 廖四郎
    黃怡婷
    Huang, Yi Ting
    Keywords: 高階經理人薪酬
    避險行為
    經理人誘因
    executive compensation
    hedging behavior
    managerial incentives
    Date: 2012
    Issue Date: 2012-11-01 13:50:27 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: 本研究探討經理人的風險承擔誘因與公司非以交易為目的之衍生性金融商品使用之關聯性。研究結果發現，第一，經理人之風險承擔誘因與非以交易為目的之衍生性金融商品的使用呈顯著負向關係，此結果顯示以股權為基礎之薪酬結構的確可以提高經理人之風險承擔誘因。第二，本研究比較若採不同類型之員工認股權，則指數型員工認股權較傳統型員工認股權提供較大的經理人風險承擔誘因。第三，若將股權為基礎之薪酬分為股票及員工認股權，發現經理人持有員工認股權與經理人風險承擔誘因呈正向且顯著關係；而經理人持有公司股票則與經理人風險承擔誘因呈正向關係但並不顯著。
    This study examines the relation between managerial risk-taking incentives and hedging derivatives usage. First, executives’ risk-taking incentives are negatively related to the hedging derivatives holdings, the result is consistent with equity-based compensation that promotes risk taking. Second, the indexed stock options appear to create stronger risk-taking incentives than the traditional stock options. Third, managerial risk-taking incentives are significantly related to executive stock options but not stock holdings.
    Reference: Aggarwal, R.K., Samwick, A.A., 1999. The other side of the trade-off: The impact of risk on executive compensation. Journal of Political Economy 107, 65-105.
    Allayannis, Y., Weston, J., 2001. The use of foreign currency derivatives and firm market value. Review of Financial Studies 14, 243-276.
    Armstrong, C. S., Vashishtha R., 2012. Executive stock options, differential risk-taking incentives, and firm value Journal of Financial Economics 104, 70-88.
    Berle, A.A., Means, G.C., 1932. The modern corporation and private property. MacMillan Publishing Co., New York.
    Black, F., Scholes, M., 1973. The pricing of options and corporate liabilities. Journal of Political Economy 81, 637-654.
    Calvet, A. L., Rahman A. H., 2006. The subjective valuation of indexed stock options and their incentive effects. The Financial Review 41, 205-227.
    Chen, Y.R., Y. Ma, 2011. Revisiting the Risk-Taking Effect of Executive Stock Options on Firm Performance. Journal of Business Research 64, 640-648.
    Coles, J.L., Daniel N.D., and Naveen L., 2006. Managerial incentives and risk taking. Journal of Financial Economics 79, 431-468.
    Core, J., Guay, W., 1999. The use of equity grants to manage optimal equity incentive levels. Journal of Accounting & Economics 28, 151-184.
    Core, J., Guay, W., 2002. Estimating the value of employee stock option portfolios and their sensitivities to price and volatility. Journal of Accounting Research 40, 613-630.
    DeMarzo, P., Duffie, D., 1991. Corporate financial hedging with proprietary information. Journal of Economic Theory 53, 261-286.
    Duan, J. C., Wei, J., 2005. Executive stock options and incentive effects due to systematic risk. Journal of Banking & Finance 29, 1185-1211.
    Froot, K.A., Scharfstein, D.S., Stein, J.C., 1993. Risk management: Coordinating corporate investment and financing policies. Journal of Finance 48, 1629-1658.
    Geczy, C., Minton, B.A., Schrand, C., 1997. Why firms use currency derivatives. Journal of Finance 52, 1323-1354.
    Graham, J. R., Rogers, D.A., 2002. Do firms hedge in response to tax incentives? Journal of Finance 57, 815-839.
    Grant, J., Markarian G., Parbonetti A., 2009. CEO risk-related incentives and income smoothing. Contemporary Accounting Research 26, 1029-1065.
    Guay, W., Kothari, S.P., 2003. How much do firms hedge with derivatives? Journal of Financial Economics 70, 423-461.
    Guay, W.R., 1999. The sensitivity of CEO wealth to equity risk: An analysis of the magnitude and determinants. Journal of Financial Economics 53, 43-71.
    Johnson, S.A., Tian, Y.S., 2000. Indexed executive stock options. Journal of Financial Economics 57, 35-64.
    Kempf, A., Ruenzi, S., Thiele, T., 2009, Employment risk, compensation incentives, and managerial risk taking: Evidence from the mutual fund industry. Journal of Financial Economics 92, 92-108.
    Knopf, J., Nam, J., Thornton, J., 2002. The volatility and price sensitivities of managerial stock option portfolios and corporate hedging. Journal of Finance 57, 801-813.
    Low, A., 2009. Managerial risk taking behavior and equity-based compensation. Journal of Financial Economics 92, 470-490.
    Merton, R.C., 1973. Theory of rational option pricing. Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science 4, 141-183.
    Nance, D.R., Smith, C.W., Smithson, C.W., 1993. On the determinants of corporate hedging. Journal of Finance 48, 267-281.
    Pennings, J.M.E., Garcia, P., 2004. Hedging behavior in small and medium-sized enterprise: The role of unobserved heterogeneity. Journal of Banking & Finance 28, 951-978.
    Purnanandam, A., 2008. Financial distress and corporate risk management: Theory and evidence. Journal of Financial Economics 87, 706-739.
    Rajgopal, S., Shevlin, T., 2002. Empirical evidence on the relation between stock option compensation and risk taking. Journal of Accounting and Economics 33, 145-171.
    Rogers, D.A., 2002. Does executive portfolio structure affect risk management? CEO risk-taking incentives and corporate derivatives usage. Journal of Banking & Finance 26, 271-295.
    Rogers, D.A., 2005. Managerial risk-taking incentives and executive stock option repricing: A study of US casino executives. Financial Management 34, 95-121.
    Schrand, C., Unal, H., 1998. Hedging and coordinated risk management: Evidence from thrift conversions. Journal of Finance 53, 979-1013.
    Smith, C.W., Stulz, R.M., 1985. The determinants of firms’ hedging policies. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 20, 391-405.
    Smith, C.W., Watts, R.L., 1992. The investment opportunity set and corporate financing, dividend, and compensation policies. Journal of Financial Economics 32, 263-292.
    Stulz, R.M., 1984. Optimal hedging policies. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 19, 127-140.
    Tufano, P., 1996. Who manages risk? An empirical examination of risk management practices in the gold mining industry. Journal of Finance 51, 1097-1137.
    Description: 博士
    國立政治大學
    金融研究所
    98352502
    101
    Source URI: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0098352502
    Data Type: thesis
    Appears in Collections:[金融學系] 學位論文

    Files in This Item:

    File SizeFormat
    index.html0KbHTML2385View/Open


    All items in 政大典藏 are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved.


    社群 sharing

    著作權政策宣告 Copyright Announcement
    1.本網站之數位內容為國立政治大學所收錄之機構典藏，無償提供學術研究與公眾教育等公益性使用，惟仍請適度，合理使用本網站之內容，以尊重著作權人之權益。商業上之利用，則請先取得著作權人之授權。
    The digital content of this website is part of National Chengchi University Institutional Repository. It provides free access to academic research and public education for non-commercial use. Please utilize it in a proper and reasonable manner and respect the rights of copyright owners. For commercial use, please obtain authorization from the copyright owner in advance.

    2.本網站之製作，已盡力防止侵害著作權人之權益，如仍發現本網站之數位內容有侵害著作權人權益情事者，請權利人通知本網站維護人員(nccur@nccu.edu.tw)，維護人員將立即採取移除該數位著作等補救措施。
    NCCU Institutional Repository is made to protect the interests of copyright owners. If you believe that any material on the website infringes copyright, please contact our staff(nccur@nccu.edu.tw). We will remove the work from the repository and investigate your claim.
    DSpace Software Copyright © 2002-2004  MIT &  Hewlett-Packard  /   Enhanced by   NTU Library IR team Copyright ©   - Feedback