隨著一九七三年布列登森林體系瓦解之後，國際經濟政策協調便成為工業國之間協商匯率及貨幣政策走向的最主要方式，過去的研究認為若是國內貨幣政策受到國際經濟政策的影響越小，則這種協商就越能達到效果，這種觀點逐漸發展出Michael Webb所謂「隔離及徵候處理」（insulation and symptom management）的概念，但是在資本自由化之後，國內貨幣政策若要完全隔絕於國際匯率的波動已經是越來越困難了。本文主要論點認為其實國際經濟政策協調是否能夠奏效並不在於國內貨幣政策「隔離」（insulation）的程度，而在於國內政經制度是否能夠有效的調適（adaptation），在本篇文章中我將利用Peter Gourevitch的「第二意象轉換」（second image reversed）中「由外而內」（out-inside）的概念連結國際層次與國內層次的互動關係，也就是國家在國際匯率政策協商有了具體承諾之後，國內政經制度要如何去調適。本文結論發現國際經濟政策協調之後其調適的貨幣政策通常是以國家的經濟成長與政權穩定為主要考量，而它們通常扭曲國家的產業結構與貨幣政策，這種扭曲性的經濟政策是造成九０年代金融危機最重要因素。本文將以美國、日本與德國在一九八五年廣場協議（Plaza Accord）至一九八七年羅浮宮協議（Louvre Accord）期間所進行匯率政策的協商，以及比較日本與德國在一九八五年之後貨幣政策的轉變為例來驗證理論假設。 Following the breakdown of the Bretton Woods System in 1973, International Economic Policy Coordination (IEPC) has become one of the major tools employed by industrial countries to work out agreements on exchange rate and monetary policies. Past research seems to indicate that effective IEPC often yields minimal impact upon a country’s domestic monetary policy. This perspective gradually evolves into the concept which Michael Webb calls “Insulation and Symptom Management.”Following the lifting of regulations that allow higher mobility of capital, however, it has become harder to keep the effects of fluctuations in the exchange rate from affecting domestic monetary policies. The main purpose of this thesis is to put forth the view that the effectiveness of IEPC does not rely on the degree of insulation of the domestic monetary policy; but rather relies upon the degree of adaptation demonstrated by the domestic political and economic structures. This paper uses the concept of the “Second Image Reversed,” as proposed by Peter Gourevitch, to explore the relations between activities that occur on the international level with those that occur on the domestic level. This paper seeks to answer how a given country’s domestic political and economic structures will adjust after it has reached specific agreements via IEPC. This paper concludes that even after agreements have been reached in the IEPC, the final adjusted monetary policy the nation adopts still is primarily based on such factors as the country’s interest in economic growth and its stability in the political arena. Such policies ultimately contort the nation’s industrial structure as well as the resulting monetary policy, and are seen as the major causes of the financial crisis, which ripped through the globe during the 90’s. This paper traces the progress of exchange rate negotiations between the US, Japan, and Germany from the Plaza Accord in 1985 until the establishment of Louvre Accord in 1987. Changes in the monetary policies of Japan and Germany after 1985 are used as evidence to illustrate the hypothesis.