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    政大機構典藏 > 文學院 > 哲學系 > 期刊論文 >  Item 140.119/65464
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    題名: Naturalism’s Perils, Naturalism’s Promises: A Comment on Appiah’s Experiments in Ethics/Neuroethics
    作者: 王華
    Weinberg, Jonathan M.;Wang, Ellie
    貢獻者: 哲學系
    關鍵詞: Intuitions;Naturalism;Virtue ethics;Situationism;Experimental philosophy
    日期: 2010.11
    上傳時間: 2014-04-17 16:24:53 (UTC+8)
    摘要: In his Experiments in Ethics, Appiah focuses mostly on the dimension of naturalism as a naturalism of deprivation - naturalism’s apparent robbing us of aspects of the world that we had held dear. The aim of this paper is to remind him of that naturalism has a dimension of plenitude as well - its capacity to enrich our conception of the world as well. With regard to character, we argue that scientific psychology can help provide a conception of character as dynamic, in a way that may preserve many key aspects of eudaimonistic ethics from the situationists’ challenge. With regard to intuition, we address Appiah’s worry that naturalistic explanations of the sources of our intuitions may leave us feeling that those intuitions have been thereby debunked. We suggest that it may be that feeling of debunking that should itself be debunked.
    關聯: Neuroethics, 3(3), 215-222
    資料類型: article
    顯示於類別:[哲學系] 期刊論文

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