本研究探討美證券分析師在對公用事業等受政府管制產業作股價與盈餘預測峙，是否受潛在利益衝突壓力而有策略性扭曲行為。此類產業利潤實受制於主管機關，故作者所持假設是當受管制事業公司盈餘提升時，為避免招來主管當局降低費率的要求，經理階層會寧願證券分析師不要發佈樂觀的每股盈餘預測，而在分析師對投資人作買進賣出建議時，經理人卻仍希望保有較高評價。這兩者看似矛盾，實則因分析師兩項預測資料訊息接受者的區隔，仍可並行;且證券分析師慣用的評價指標不精確，縱使主管當局會看到此評價內容，其所能擷取資訊十分有限。本研究的假設是利益衝突的壓力或會造成分析師故意壓低每股盈餘預測，但同時對股價預測卻過於樂觀。這種作法與其他產業中證券分析師慣於高估每股盈餘與股價預測的習性並不相同。本研究實證結果支持此一假設。首先，受管制與非受管制事業兩群組相比較結果顯示，分析師對受管制事業公司的盈餘預測，的確有相對低估現象;其次，以具承銷業務往來關係投資銀行的分析師與對照組分析師（未承作承銷業務投資銀行分析師或非投資銀行分析師）對受管制事業股票評價相比較，前者系統性的趨於樂觀;第三，本研究用迴歸分析檢視兩組分析師對每股盈餘成長預測，結果顯示兩者間有顯著差距，具承銷業務往來關係投資銀行分析師的盈餘預估顯著偏低。本研究的學術意義非僅限於所研究產業，它特殊的結果有助於釐清先前文獻所記述投資銀行分析師會高估其客戶盈餘與股價行為，究竟是導因於分析師對企業前景感覺樂觀而促成投資銀行積極爭取承銷等業務？抑或是分析師的策略性行為？ This study examines the extent conflicting pressure may help explain the variation in security analysts’ earnings forecasts and investment recommendations for regulated firms. A maintained hypothesis of this study is that regulators are likely to lower rates if earnings prospects are too high. If so, then executives of regulated firms may prefer that security analysts issue pessimistic earnings per share (EPS) forecasts. Although favorable price forecasts are also observable to regulators, the coarseness and vagueness of recommendations are likely to limit the amount of information regulators may extract from them. This expected direction of bias contrasts with systematic optimism in both earnings forecasts and recommendations as documented in prior studies for industrial firms. My empirical findings are consistent with the notion of reverse results of bias. First, by making inter-group comparison of earnings forecast errors between regulated and non- regulated firms, this study provides evidence that security analysts' earnings forecasts for regulated (non-regulated) firms are less (more) optimistic. Second, underwriter analysts appear to strategically bias their investment recommendations (earnings forecasts) upwards (downwards) for regulated firms. Third, regression tests that investigate the influence of firms' profitability growth outlooks on underwriter-analysts' EPS growth estimates show that the difference between an underwriter analyst's and a comparison analyst's five-year EPS growth estimates for a regulated company becomes more pronounced as the underwriter analyst's growth estimate becomes greater.