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    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/118557

    Title: 最適出口稅與民營化政策—考慮競爭模式內生化情況
    Optimal export tax and privatization in endogenous competition modes
    Authors: 沈忠慈
    Contributors: 翁堃嵐
    Keywords: 民營化程度
    Export taxes
    Price and quantity contracts
    Mixed oligopoly
    Date: 2018
    Issue Date: 2018-07-10 15:36:23 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: 本文主要探討在雙占混合競爭市場下,民營化程度與最適出口稅及社會福祉之關聯性。研究結果顯示在不考慮內生化競爭模型情況下,兩家廠商選擇Cournot 數量競爭策略或Bertrand價格競爭時,民營化程度之變動與最適出口稅及社會福祉不具關聯性,但競爭程度與最適出口稅與社會福祉具關聯性。接著考慮內生化競爭模型情況下,當兩私營廠商做競爭時,採取Cournot 數量競爭策略會達到市場均衡;當一家公營廠商與一家私營廠商做競爭時,市場均衡可能為Cournot 數量競爭策略或Bertrand價格競爭策略亦或是一家廠商採取價格競爭另一家廠商採取數量競爭策略。比較四種競爭均衡下之社會福祉後,發現Cournot 數量競爭均衡下社會福祉最大。最後考慮部分民營化程度之情況,研究顯示無論民營化程度如何變動,政府皆可透過調整出口稅以達到最適出口稅下之社會福祉。
    This paper investigates the effect of privatization on welfare or the optimal export taxes policy in differentiated mixed oligopoly. The main findings of our paper is as follows:(1) If the two firms take the same competition, i.e., Cournot or Bertrand competition, and the degree of privatization has no effect on welfare or the optimal export taxes. (2) We analyze the strategic variables are determined endogenously. If degree of privatization , two private firms will take Cournot competition strategy;If degree of privatization , two firms will take q-q competition strategy or p-p competition strategy or q-p competition strategy or p-q competition strategy. In this case, social welfare is higher if the state-own firm and private firm choose quantity contract. Finally, when the equilibrium under Cournot competition in a mixed duopoly with partial privatization, Government how adjust export tax to maximize social welfare.
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    Description: 碩士
    Source URI: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0105255009
    Data Type: thesis
    DOI: 10.6814/THE.NCCU.PF.001.2018.F07
    Appears in Collections:[財政學系] 學位論文

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