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    政大機構典藏 > 學術期刊 > 會計評論 > 期刊論文 >  Item 140.119/122829
    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/122829

    Title: Asymmetric Sensitivity of CEO Cash Compensation to Restructuring Charges and Restructuring Charge Reversals: The Impacts of Compensation Committee Effectiveness
    Authors: 許慧雯
    Hsu, Hui-Wen
    Tsai, Liu-Ching
    Contributors: 會計評論
    Keywords: Restructuring charges;Restructuring charge reversals;CEO compensation;Compensation committee effectiveness
    Date: 2018-07
    Issue Date: 2019-04-02 09:05:46 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: This study examines whether CEO cash compensation is less sensitive to restructuring charges than to the reversals of restructuring charges, i.e., an asymmetric treatment for restructuring charges and the related reversals. In addition, given that executive compensation design itself may be an agency problem, we also examine whether this asymmetric treatment varies with compensation committee effectiveness. Using a US sample of firm-year observations, this study finds that there is an asymmetric compensation sensitivity to restructuring charges and restructuring charge reversals. Furthermore, we find that highly effective compensation committees reduce the compensation weight more on restructuring charges and restructuring charge reversals compared to compensation committees characterized by low effectiveness. The overall results imply that firms with highly effective compensation committees encourage prospective restructuring activities by shielding executive compensation from the effect of restructuring charges, and filter restructuring charge reversals from CEO compensation to avoid opportunistic behavior of rent extraction. However, restructuring charge reversals are rewarded by committees characterized by low effectiveness through the placement of a higher compensation weight, which is consistent with the view of managerial rent extraction.
    Relation: 會計評論, 67, pp.1-40
    Data Type: article
    DOI 連結: https://doi.org/10.6552/JOAR.201807_(67).0001
    DOI: 10.6552/JOAR.201807_(67).0001
    Appears in Collections:[會計評論] 期刊論文

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