自從冷戰結束、中共政權進入後鄧時期之後，中國亦開始積極投入各項公共外交布局。在各種公共外交工具之中，中共最經常使用的工具即為最高領導人出訪。在中共官方的聲明裡，中國政府宣告了至少三項中國欲藉其公共外交策略來達成的主要目標：降低他國對中國威脅的感受、增加中國與其他國家的經濟關係，以及促進中國與其他國家的雙邊共同利益。本研究分析中共最高領導人出訪策略從冷戰結束後實施以來至今，是否達成了上述三項官方所宣示的公共外交目標。實證資料顯示，中共最高領導人出訪行為不論是在「降低他國對中國威脅的感受」上或是在「增加中國與其他國家的經濟關係」上，所達到的效果普遍都不顯著，反而是與「使出訪國的國家利益更趨近中國、更疏遠美國」的這個事實有穩定的關聯性。本文的發現對於中共最高領導人出訪外交政策的效果以及中美關係都提供了更具實證性的理解。 Since 1993, when the Cold War came to its end and the Communist Party of China (CPC) entered the post-Deng era, China has begun to actively use public diplomacy strategy. Among the various CPC's public diplomacy tools, supreme leaders' state-visiting diplomacy is the one that is most commonly used. In official announcements, the Chinese government has declared at least three main goals that China wants to achieve by using public diplomacy: reducing other states' perceptions of China as a threat, promoting economic relations with other states, and harmonizing both sides' common interests. This article evaluates whether or not Chinese supreme leaders' state-visiting diplomacy has achieved its announced goals through public diplomacy. After analyzing the empirical evidences, this article finds that, although Chinese supreme leaders' state-visiting diplomacy fails to achieve most of its alleged public diplomacy goals, but it has succeeded in changing other countries' interests by moving them closer to China and further away from the United States. The findings of this article shed light on both the research of Chinese supreme leaders' state-visiting diplomacy and the study of the Sino-US contestations.