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    请使用永久网址来引用或连结此文件: https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/150820


    题名: 霸權妥協：解析各國為何遵循數位服務稅多邊建制
    A Hegemon’s Compromise: Explaining States’ Compliance with the Multilateral Digital Service Tax Regime
    作者: 蘇翊豪
    Su, Yi-hao
    贡献者: 問題與研究
    关键词: 霸權穩定論;數位經濟;關稅報復;常設機構;遊說
    Hegemonic Stability Theory;Digital Economy;Tariff Retaliation;Permanent Establishment;Lobbying
    日期: 2024-03
    上传时间: 2024-04-11 14:43:36 (UTC+8)
    摘要: 由於提供數位經濟服務的跨國公司不須在市場國建立恆久據點，導致利潤來源地政府無法適用傳統的常設機構原則進行課稅。面對此項國際稅收分配的挑戰，經濟暨合作發展組織（Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, OECD）在2013年公告「防止稅基侵蝕與利潤移轉計畫」 （BEPS），試圖建立一致的課稅替代方案。然而，部分國家後續卻自行開徵數位服務稅，美國川普政府對這些國家威脅使用301條款並發起關稅報復，直到2021年美國拜登政府支持雙柱方針共識，英、法等國終於放棄片面課徵的數位稅。本文透過單一個案和過程追蹤法，剖析各國遵循BEPS的考量。首先根據霸權穩定論的公共財邏輯，本文指出美國願意制止本國數位企業利用稅法漏洞，有助於各國遵循BEPS。其次，依照企業影響力邏輯，本文發現當美國科技巨擘表達承擔更多稅額給利潤來源地政府的偏好，而非忍受單邊數位稅造成的營運不確定性，可促使美國政府支持BEPS。本研究發現延伸霸權穩定論在國際稅務領域的分析效果，並透過檢視企業與政府的互動，解釋霸權為何初期卸責而後妥協承擔責任。
    Host countries cannot tax digital multinational corporations (MNCs) based on the traditional permanent establishment principle because digital services are intangible. To address this challenge, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) initiated the “Base Erosion and Profit Shifting” (BEPS) multilateral regime in 2013. Nonetheless, several host countries hunting for revenue unilaterally adopted digital service taxes, and the US Trump administration responded with Section 301 tariff retaliation from 2019 to 2020. These countries, including France and the United Kingdom, did not reach an agreement on digital service tax with the US until the US Biden administration agreed to support the BEPS Two-Pillars Model in 2021. This paper identifies the factors influencing global compliance with the BEPS multilateral regime using a within-case study and the process-tracing method. First, based on the public goods argument, I claim that states are more likely to comply with the BEPS regime after the US shows support by restraining American digital MNCs from utilizing international tax loopholes. Second, the political leverage argument suggests that the US is more inclined to support BEPS after American digital MNCs express a preference for paying higher host country taxes instead of facing the uncertainty of unilateral digital taxes. The findings extend the analytical utility of hegemonic stability theory to scholarship on international taxation. Moreover, by focusing on firm-state interactions, this paper adds to the understanding of why a hegemon would initially withhold support from an international tax framework but ultimately acquiesce.
    關聯: 問題與研究, 63(1), 103-146
    数据类型: article
    DOI 連結: https://doi.org/10.30390/ISC.202403_63(1).0003
    DOI: 10.30390/ISC.202403_63(1).0003
    显示于类别:[問題與研究 TSSCI] 期刊論文

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