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    題名: 不對稱資訊下勞工報酬契約的訂定
    作者: 林豪傑
    貢獻者: 劉維琪
    林豪傑
    日期: 1989
    1988
    上傳時間: 2016-05-03 14:11:39 (UTC+8)
    摘要: 論文摘要
    面對工資不斷上漲的趨勢,企業當尋求有效的辦法,以盡量節省公司的總報酬成本;將福利性所得由附加( fringe)地位轉變為「基礎」(fabric)角色,正代表著節省報酬成本的一個絕佳機會。
    不過,由於公司內各個員工對福利性所得的偏好程度並不一致,因此,公司的報酬契約,除了強調福利性所得的重要性外,若能再考慮到員工的偏好差異,藉提供數額不等的福利性所得給偏好程度各異的員工,並據以扣除數額不等的薪資所得,則將使勞資雙方進一步得利。
    然而,在彈性的報酬契約中,對福利性所得偏好較高者,可能隱藏自己的真實偏好,以期減少薪資所得扣除額,致公司所能節省的總報酬成本受到限制。 因此,公司便需謹慎的決定薪資所得扣除額,以消除員工欺騙的誘因。
    基於此,本文利用代理理論,探討企業如何決定報酬契約中,福利性所得與薪資所得的關係及數額,以避免員工發生逆選擇的欺騙現象,並據以節省最大的報酬成本。 根據第四章的模式推導,本文的重要結論如下:
    一、在不對稱資訊、不連續分配下,為防止較偏好福利性所得者隱藏真實偏好,公司提供的報酬契約必須使員工覺得,隱藏與否對效用並無影響;因此,此時較偏好福利性所得者,將得到一消費者剩餘為正的報酬組合。至於較不偏好者,當其隱藏真實偏好時之消費者剩餘將為負,因此其將無隱藏的誘因,而其從選擇福利性所得得到的消費者剩餘將為零。
    二、在不對稱資訊、不連續分配下,最適報酬契約將決定於,公司內員工對福利性所得偏好程度的分配型態:
    A. 當員工偏好呈均等分配時此時公司應提供之最適契約稱為遞減型的分隔契約(separating contract)即,針對不同偏好之員工提供不同契約,且提供較多褔利性所得給較低偏好者。
    B.當員工偏好呈指數分配時此時公司應提供之最適契約為聯合契約(pooling
    Contract)即,提供相同的契約給所有員工。
    C.當員工偏好呈鐘型分配時此時公司應提供之最適契約視員工偏好在眾數前或眾數後而定。當員工偏好在眾數前,則最適契約為遞減型的分隔契約,即,提供較多福利性所得給偏好較低者,以節省較多之報酬成本。當員工偏好在眾數前,最適契約可為聯合契約,亦可為遞減型或遞增型的分隔契約,端視員工偏好程度的變化狀況而定。不對稱資訊下勞工報酬契約的訂定
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    描述: 碩士
    國立政治大學
    企業管理學系
    資料來源: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#B2002005552
    資料類型: thesis
    顯示於類別:[企業管理學系] 學位論文

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