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    政大機構典藏 > 學術期刊 > 中國行政 > 期刊論文 >  Item 140.119/90348
    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/90348

    Title: 組織層級的最適理論:交易成本的觀點
    Other Titles: The Model of Organizational Structure:A Transaction Cost Perspective
    Authors: 傅岳邦
    Fu, Yueh-Pang
    Keywords: 組織理論;階層;交易成本經濟學;機會主義預期成本;治理成本
    Organizational Theory;Hierarchy;Transaction Cost Economics;Expected Costs of Opportunism;Governance Costs
    Date: 2006-07
    Issue Date: 2016-05-03 16:24:38 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: 本文試圖藉由「交易成本經濟學」,建構一套組織層級的最適理論,探討組織結構從「階層」到「無政府階層」的轉變,並分析其根據「機會主義預期成本」與「治理成本」而變動的「無政府階層-階層」連續體:機會主義的預期成本愈低,或是治理成本愈高,組織中的行動者愈可能選擇較為無政府階層的關係;機會主義的預期成本愈高,或是治理成本愈低,組織中的行動者愈可能選擇較為階層的關係。
    This paper attempts to through TCE theory, construct an exploratory explanation as to the transformation of organizational structure from anarchy to hierarchy. This paper identifies the change of “anarchy-hierarchy” continuum by pointing out two kinds of TCE:expected costs of opportunism and governance costs. Organizational actors may choose more anarchic relations when expected costs of opportunism decreases or governance costs increases, and vice versa, more hierarchic relations when expected costs of opportunism increases or governance costs decreases.
    Relation: 中國行政, 77,77-100
    Chinese journal of administration
    Data Type: article
    Appears in Collections:[中國行政] 期刊論文

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