政大機構典藏-National Chengchi University Institutional Repository(NCCUR):Item 140.119/130580

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政大典藏 > College of Liberal Arts > Department of Philosophy > Theses > Item 140.119/130580

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/130580

Title:	規約、自我與兩種隱私：隱私的哲學探究 Conventions, Personhood and Two Senses of Privacy: A Philosophical Study on Privacy
Authors:	林怡仲 Lin, Yi-Chung
Contributors:	鄭光明 Cheng, Kuang-Ming 林怡仲 Lin, Yi-Chung
Keywords:	隱私文化規約說描述義隱私規範義隱私隱私訊息控制─人際關係說價目表說隱私自我生成說 privacy conventionalism descriptive sense of privacy normative sense of privacy control-relationship definition of privacy price list theory personhood view of privacy
Date:	2020
Issue Date:	2020-07-01 13:48:01 (UTC+8)
Abstract:	隱私是我們日常生活中出現頻率頗高，卻也是最難精確捕捉的概念之一。有哲學家主張隱私至關重要、不容侵犯，如：Ferdinard David Schoeman主張隱私即定義自我的核心事物 (Schoeman, 1984)；然亦有哲學家認為隱私僅是文化產物，如：Richard A. Wasserstrom認為隱私與「必須私下從事的事務」相關，並且之所以「必須私下從事」並非理性的產物，是我們所處文化下的隱私規約所決定 (Wasserstrom, 1978)。另外，即便同屬支持隱私具重要價值的哲學家，各持理據亦不同。James Rachels認為隱私即我們對自身訊息的控制，唯有保障隱私不受他人侵犯，我們方得以建立親疏有別的人際關係 (Rachels, 1975)。而Jeffrey Reiman認為我們的社會有一套與隱私相關的規約，該規約告訴我們哪些事項屬於自身事務。透過該隱私規約的運作方能使得我們逐漸掌握自我的範圍，形成自我 (Reiman, 1984)。本文將以評判Wasserstrom及Schoeman的歧見為切口，繼以兩者中勝出的理論 (筆者主張Wasserstrom的理論勝出)，檢視Rachels、Deigh及Reiman三者作為隱私傳統上的哲學探討的經典理論，並試圖釐清隱私此一錯綜複雜的概念。 Frequently referred to in our daily life, privacy as a significant value is actually one of the most far-fetched and elusive concepts in contemporary philosophical disputes. Some philosophers argue that privacy is so substantial that it is inviolable in any circumstanses. For example, Ferdinard David Schoeman argues that privacy is the core of a person which define one’s self (Schoeman, 1984). Some others argue that privacy is irrational and merely a product of our culture. For example, Richard A. Wasserstrom argues that privacy is related to things which need to be performed in private and the reason why people should do those things in private is a product of irrationality which is determined by their own culture (Wasserstrom, 1978). On top of that, despite their consensus that privacy is cherishable, philosophers may offer different grounds on which privacy’s value is founded. James Rachels believes that privacy is control over information about ourselves—only by keeping people’s privacy inviolated can we establish multiple personal relationships (Rachels, 1975). However, Jeffrey Reiman suggests that our culture has a set of conventions related to privacy which determines what kind of things belong to the personal domain. Following the privacy convention, we can grasp the concept of the self (Reiman, 1984). This paper focuses primarily on the debates between Wasserstrom and Schoeman, and I will side with Wasserstrom and indicate several problems in Schoeman’s arguments. Further, on the basis of Wasserstrom’s privacy theory, I will look into the privacy theories laid out by Rachels, Deigh, and Reiman, all of which hold a prominent place in the philosophical debates over privacy, as an attempt to better capture the complex concept of privacy.
Reference:	鄭光明，林怡仲 (2018)，隱私、規約、獨處與自由：瓦瑟史東與修曼論隱私。台灣哲學學會2018年學術研討會。林怡仲 (2019)，Deigh與Thomson的描述義隱私。台灣哲學學會2019年學術研討會。 Benn, Stanly I. (1971). Privacy, Freedom, and Respect for Persons. Reprinted in Ferdinand David Schoeman (ed.), Philosophical Dimensions of Privacy: An Anthology (pp. 223-244). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Bloustein, Edward. (1964). Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity. New York University Law Review, 39: 962-1007. Reprinted in Ferdinand David Schoeman (ed.), Philosophical Dimensions of Privacy: An Anthology (pp. 156-202). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Deigh, John. (2008). Privacy. In Laurence Thomas (ed.), Contemporary Debates in Social Philosophy (pp. 131-145). Oxford, UK: Blackwell. Fried, Charles. (1968). Privacy. Yale Law Journal, 77: 475-493. Gerstein, R. (1970). Privacy and Self-Incrimination. Ethics, 80, 2: 87-101. Kalven, Harry Jr. (1966). Privacy in Tort Law—Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong? Law and Contemporary Problems, 31: 326-341. Parent, W. (1983). Privacy, Morality, and the Law. Philosophy & Public Affairs, 12, 4: 269-288. Prosser, William. (1960). Privacy. California Law Review, 48: 383-423. Rachels, James. (1975). Why Privacy Is Important. Philosophy and Public Affairs, 4, 4: 323-333. Reprinted in Ferdinand David Schoeman (ed.), Philosophical Dimensions of Privacy: An Anthology (pp. 290-299). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Reiman, Jeffrey. (1976). Privacy, Intimacy, and Personhood. Reprinted in Ferdinand David Schoeman (ed.), Philosophical Dimensions of Privacy: An Anthology (pp. 300-316). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Schoeman, Ferdinard David. (1984). Privacy and Intimate Information. In Ferdinard David Schoeman (ed.). Philosophical Dimensions of Privacy: An Anthology (pp. 403-418). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Thomson, Judith Jarvis. (1975). The Right to Privacy. Philosophy & Public Affairs, 4, 4: 295-314. Reprinted in Ferdinand David Schoeman (ed.), Philosophical Dimensions of Privacy: An Anthology (pp. 272-289). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Warren, Samuel and Louis Brandeis. (1890). The Right to Privacy. Harvard Law Review, 4: 193-220. Reprinted in Ferdinand David Schoeman (ed.), Philosophical Dimensions of Privacy: An Anthology (pp. 75-103). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Wasserstrom, Richard A. (1978). Privacy: Some Arguments and Assumptions. Reprinted in Ferdinard David Schoeman (ed.), Philosophical Dimensions of Privacy: An Anthology (pp. 317-332). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Description:	碩士國立政治大學哲學系 107154002
Source URI:	http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0107154002
Data Type:	thesis
DOI:	10.6814/NCCU202000499
Appears in Collections:	[Department of Philosophy] Theses

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