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    請使用永久網址來引用或連結此文件: https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/100098


    題名: How (Not) to Relate Cognitive Externalism and Rule-Following
    其他題名: 如何（不要）從規則依循導出認知外在論
    作者: 鄭凱元
    Cheng, Kai-Yuan
    關鍵詞: 規則依循;外在論;麥道爾;靜默論
    Rule-Following;Externalism;McDowell;Quietism
    日期: 2007-07
    上傳時間: 2016-08-11 15:46:04 (UTC+8)
    摘要: 米勒 (Miller, 2004) 最近提出論證，支持以下兩點宣稱：（一）麥道爾 (McDowell, 1992a) 在論述如何恰當解讀帕特南 (Putnam, 1975) 的孿生地球論證 (Twin-Earth argument) 時，藉由他對克里奇的維根斯坦關於規則依循的懷疑論之解決方案，推導出某種形式之認知外在論 (cognitive externalism)；（二）然而，此一推導並不成功。在本文中，我的主要論點有二。首先，雖然米勒的第二宣稱是對的，但是麥道爾並沒有從對規則依循的懷疑弔詭之解決方案裡，推導出支持認知外在論的立場。其次，麥道爾確實在討論帕特南的脈絡裡，支持某種形式的認知外在論，但其論證方式僅止於指出，帕特南忽略了另一種可能導衍孿生地球論證的結論之方式，以及試圖說明為何帕特南沒能看到此可能性。 本文的主要目的除了在指出，由於米勒未能充分地體認到麥道爾在處理哲學問題時，所廣泛而持續地採取維根斯坦式靜默論(quietism) 之方法論，以至於不恰當地歸給麥道爾一個他並無採取之推論外，更希望藉由揭露米勒所犯的重要錯誤，釐清關於規則依循與認知外在論間之關係應如何界定之問題。
    Miller (2004) has recently argued for the following two claims: (1) McDowell (1992a), in the context of discussing Putnam’s (1975) Twin-Earth argument, derives a particular form of cognitive externalism from his favored solution to Kripke’s Wittgenstein’s “skeptical paradox” about rule-following, and (2) McDowell’s derivation fails. In this paper, I argue for the following two points. First, though Miller’s. Second, McDowell does argue for some form of cognitive externalism when discussing Putnam, but his argument consists in merely pointing out a possibility of drawing the conclusion of the Twin-Earth argument that Putnam fails to see, and in diagnosing why Putnam fails to see it. My analysis of why Miller makes the attributive error is that he has not sufficiently appreciated the quietist methodology which McDowell widely and persistently adopts in dealing with philosophical problems. This paper concludes with a suggestion of how we should not relate rule-following and cognitive externalism.
    關聯: 政治大學哲學學報, 18, 75-100
    The national Chengchi university philosophical
    資料類型: article
    顯示於類別:[政治大學哲學學報 THCI Core] 期刊論文

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